# \*\*WDCA Japan Alliance DA\*\*

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### File Notes

This file contains the Japan Alliance Disadvantage. This disadvantage states that increasing engagement with China, who Japan views as their regional adversary, will cause them to doubt the United States commitment to their security. Currently, the United States has a strong relationship with Japan, and Japan relies on them for security and protection. After WWII, Japan demilitarized, and established a security force that was purely for peace-keeping. However, Japan has become increasingly concerned over the past few years about Chinese threats to their security, and there is growing public support for the establishment of a stronger Japanese military, including developing nuclear weapons. However, many experts view this as unlikely unless Japan had a reason to doubt the US security commitment. If Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, the disadvantage argues that this would set off an East Asian arms race in the region.

### Glossary

Adversary: One's opponent in a contest, conflict, or dispute.

Alliance: A relationship among people, groups, or states that have joined together for mutual benefit or to achieve some common purpose

Arms race: A competition between nations for superiority in the development and accumulation of weapons, especially between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. (Google Dictionary)

Article 9: A clause in the national Constitution of Japan outlawing war as a means to settle international disputes involving the state. The Constitution came into effect on May 3, 1947, following World War II.

Conventional weapons: Weapons that are in relatively wide use that are not weapons of mass destruction.

Decoupling: To separate, disengage, or dissociate (something) from something else. (Google Dictionary)

Fukushima: The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was an energy accident at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, initiated primarily by the tsunami on 11 March 2011.

Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF): The unified military forces of Japan that were established in 1954, and are controlled by the Ministry of Defense.

Missile defense: A system, weapon, or technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception, and destruction of attacking missiles.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): An international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

Nuclear latency: The time it takes for a non-nuclear weapon state to develop a nuclear weapon capability. (Google Dictionary).

Nuclear triad: A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three components: traditionally strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Plutonium: A fissionable isotope and can be used to make a nuclear fission bomb. The bomb which was dropped at Nagasaki was a plutonium bomb. (Hyperphysics.com)

Preemptive strike: A first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy's capacity to respond. A preemptive strike is based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent attack. (Dictionary.com)

Proliferation (nuclear): The spread of nuclear weapons.

Rearmament: The process of building up a new stock of military weapons. (Collins Dictionary)

Remilitarization: The act of militarizing again. (The Free Dictionary)

Second strike: A country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker.

Security dilemma: A situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it.

Senkaku Islands: A group of uninhabited islands controlled by Japan in the East China Sea. Japan’s control over the territory is disputed by the People's Republic of China.

Uranium: Uranium is a very heavy metal which can be used as an abundant source of concentrated energy. It can also be used to make nuclear weapons. (World Nuclear Association)

Yen: The official currency of Japan.

Zero-sum: A situation in which whatever is gained by one side is lost by the other. (Google Dictionary)

\*All definitions are sourced from Wikipedia unless otherwise noted.

## 1NC Shell

### 1NC – Japan Alliance DA (1/3)

#### The U.S-Japan alliance is strong, but fragile

Glosserman et al 15 — Panel of Experts: Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, James Miller is Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy for National Security Council policy-making and crisis management, Catherine Kelleher is a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, Kori Schake is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, 2015, ("Reassurance: What Should Allies Expect?”, Carnegie Endowment, March 23rd, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/files/07-Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

On the operational level we’re seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South Koreans. We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like Ambassador Ho-young this morning, the news today that there’s a deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out, so we’re seeing a stepping up of the presence. It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that that’s what the allies are looking for. We get the fact that there’s a demand for more. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need to be expecting, is a demand for the United States for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, the alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides, a receptiveness to the needs. Finally, I think, we’re seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic connection between the three countries.

### 1NC – Japan Alliance DA (2/3)

#### Strengthened US-China engagement creates a perception of weakened commitment to Japan, causing them to nuclearize, which creates an Asian arms race.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH) U.S. Security Commitment

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors. US China Relations The course of the relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.

### 1NC – Japan Alliance DA (3/3)

#### Proliferation in East Asia risks nuclear war

Tan 15 — Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at <https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

## Uniqueness

### Alliance High

#### US-Japan alliance is strong now and strengthening it is key to overcome limitations

Manggala 16 (Pandu Utama, part of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, published on the East Asia Forum, a policy forum directed by Emeritus Professor Peter Drysdale of the Australian National University, “Could Domestic Politics Shake the US–Japan Alliance” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/22/could-domestic-politics-shake-the-us-japan-alliance/) aj

Not only is the US–Japan alliance looking solid, but it appears that both countries are looking to further strengthen it. This sentiment gained momentum after the official visit of Abe to the United States in April 2015. Both leaders have also reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance by announcing the revised Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised document acknowledges the regional shifts in the balance of power, Japan’s altered defence posture, and the emerging transnational threats to Japan and the United States. The outlook for the US–Japan alliance has also improved with the passage of Japan’s security-related bills in September 2015, which allows the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to play a greater role in maintaining international peace and stability under the banner of a ‘proactive contributions to peace’. The alliance is now explicitly global in scope and aims to be more balanced and effective. But, as the alliance expands, the limitations faced by both Washington and Tokyo must be managed carefully. With the relative decline in US power, the future of global leadership is uncertain. As such, there is a risk that the United States could pursue the same ‘isolationist policy’ that US presidential hopeful Donald Trump has been advocating so strongly. Alternatively, there is a risk that the United States might try to drag Japan into unnecessary conflicts. And, while Japan’s new security laws expand the role of the SDF, its ability to exercise collective self-defence is still limited under strict conditions. With these limitations in mind, both Washington and Tokyo must elevate the alliance to the next step by developing a more multifaceted partnership. The United States and Japan are already taking this next step through strengthening trilateral cooperation with like-minded partners such as Australia and India. For instance, Japan and India upgraded their relationship to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan in 2014. The relationship has gone from strength to strength ever since, and has included a successful US–India–Japan Malabar naval exercise in 2015.

### Alliance High

#### Japan is assured of US commitment now

Smith 15(Dr. Shane Smith is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His current research focuses on strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons in Asia-Pacific affairs, extended deterrence, and North Korea’s nuclear program. He is also a Special Advisor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Implications for Extended US Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia”, November 2015. http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf)

Japan is also wrestling with uncertainty about the future of US security commitments in a changing regional and global environment. Some analysts argue that Japan is at a critical juncture in its security policy, driven both by North Korea’s nuclear program and the rise of China.43 In the minds of some regional experts, the two threats are not mutually exclusive. North Korea is sometimes considered the “cat’s paw” in a Chinese strategy to push the United States out of the region, antagonize and distract Japan, and pave the way for China’s regional expansion.44 Regardless of the actual link between China and North Korea, the rising costs of US regional deterrence against multiple nuclear threats heighten Japan’s long-term anxiety over US security commitments.45 North Korea’s growing capabilities and threats generate three immediate kinds of concerns in Japan. First, North Korea could launch non-nuclear provocations against Japan while using nuclear threats to deter retaliation. Second, Japan would be a primary nuclear target during a conflict that it cannot control on the peninsula. Indeed, many Japanese take Pyongyang at its word when it states that “Japan is always in the [nuclear] cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first.”46 Third, once North Korea can target the US homeland with nuclear weapons, it can intimidate Washington in a way that leaves Japan vulnerable to coercion. For instance, one former Japanese defense official reportedly opined about the implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea, “we cannot completely rule out the possibility of Japan’s being cut off from US nuclear strategy.”47 Faced with these challenges, Japan has engaged in intense debate over new policies to address a changed and changing security environment. Calls in Japan for a more robust US nuclear presence or for independent capabilities are quieter than in South Korea. Public opinion and institutional opposition to nuclear weapons continue to shape Japanese discourse on such issues. However, a growing number of US and Japanese analysts argue that Japan’s indefinite renunciation of nuclear weapons cannot be taken for granted; it would likely consider changing course if the security environment deteriorated or if it lost faith in the US extended deterrent.48 As Richard Samuels and James Schoff suggest, since the 1950s, Japan has more or less made clear that it reserves the right, and maintains the capacity, to develop its own nuclear arsenal if the situation warrants it.49Meanwhile, Japan is already exploring other measures to augment the US deterrent, arguably in areas where it sees US assurances lacking. For instance, there is now debate in Japan over developing a conventional strike capability that could, as Prime Minister Abe reportedly told the National Diet, “hit enemy bases in accordance with the changing international situation.”50 A primary justification for such capabilities is the need to conduct preemptive counterforce operations against a nuclear-armed North Korea.51 Unsurprisingly, these discussions raise regional concerns about a fundamental shift in Japan’s military posture partly because the debate is taking place in the context of Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution to enable “collective self-defense” and the 2013 National Security Strategy that argues for the need “to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities.”52 Not only do these developments have the potential to aggravate Japan’s relations with both South Korea and China, but it is also not clear in the literature how the changes and new capabilities would work within the structure of the US-Japan alliance. A lack of coordination between the two could lead to dangerous and unhelpful escalation during conflict on the peninsula. In an effort to enhance consultation on future challenges and the role of US extended deterrence, the US and Japan established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. There have also been repeated statements from US political leaders recommitting the full range of US capabilities to the defense of Japan. The United States has also committed additional capabilities to signal its willingness and ability to uphold its security commitments, such as the deployment of additional missile defense assets to the region, including plans to increase ground-based interceptors for national missile defense; deployment of additional Aegis-equipped warships to the West Pacific; and the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam. These may not be sufficient for assuring Japan in the future, however, as it faces an increasingly nuclear-capable and unpredictable North Korea.53

### Alliance High – AT: Trump Rhetoric

#### Trump’s rhetoric won’t lead to nuclearization – White House rebuttal and Japanese confirmation

Shim 3-30 {Elizabeth, World News Reporter for The Star Tribune, Associated Press, Korean Cultural Service New York, and South China Morning Post, founder of the Global Asian Culture Center, “White House Dismisses Trump Remarks on Japan, South Korea,” United Press International, 2016, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/03/30/White-House-dismisses-Trump-remarks-on-Japan-South-Korea/4451459388796/#THUR>} \*\*Modified for gendered language

 The White House dismissed remarks on Japan and South Korea from Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump as "ridiculous." Trump, while airing his views on U.S. foreign policy, had suggested in an interview with The New York Times last week that he was not opposed to Tokyo and Seoul building its own nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against regional rivals. Trump had made the comment in the context of a larger proposal – both Japan and South Korea aren't paying enough for the defense of their countries, although experts have said the allegations aren't true. The two countries host tens of thousands of U.S. troops on military bases. White House ~~spokesman~~ [spokesperson] Josh Earnest told reporters Wednesday Trump's suggestion Japan and South Korea ought to nuclearize would be destabilizing. Trump's insistence U.S. ally South Korea acquire nuclear weapons is inconsistent with decades-long policy, the White House said. The Republican presidential candidate's view on nukes also contradicts other policies long supported by the international community, Earnest said. It would be difficult to imagine justifying North Korea's nuclear weapons development, and promoting an arms race would be ridiculous, the spokesman added, according to South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh. Asian officials and media were also questioning Trump's worldview and his general qualifications for the presidency. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments are of the opinion the military alliance with the United States is crucial for regional security. South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo stated in an editorial Trump's call for a removal of U.S. troops was "shocking," and were he to become president he would have an impact on the long-term alliance between Seoul and Washington. In Japan, Tokyo chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga said the country has no intention to develop nuclear weapons, The New York Times reported.

## Links

### Links – General

#### US-China engagement causes fear of abandonment and breaks Japanese self-restraint on regional activism

Zhu, 5/10/2010 (Feng, professor and director of the International Security Program at the School of International Studies @ Peking University, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” Foreign Policy In Focus Accessed 6/23/2016 <http://fpif.org/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia/> JJH)

Japan faces both domestic and demographic constraints on its regional activism. Even if Japan becomes a “normal” power more engaged in international security affairs, its nationalism makes regional cooperation more difficult. Japan’s tradition of “mercantile realism”—or, more popularly, “reluctant realism”—remains very difficult to change and also constrains Japan’s emergence as an independent strategic power. In this context, Japan has focused its emerging international activism on support for the U.S.-Japan alliance rather than pursuit of an independent international role. This quite limited contribution to regional stability will eventually cause growing dissatisfaction among Japan’s strategic-military specialists, given the Barack Obama administration’s “nuclear twin commitments,” as they are inclined to believe that a better relationship between Washington and Beijing might make the United States less likely to risk an outright conflict with China to defend Japan. However, Japan’s international stance is not fixed and unchangeable. China’s growing international clout is beginning to transform Japan’s long-held self-restraint in defense thinking. China’s military spending surpassed Japan in 2006, and the gap between Tokyo and Japan will continue to grow as long as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains bent on rapid modernization. China’s military spending will, sooner or later, produce less tolerant behavior from Japan. At the same time, the constructive U.S.-China relationship calls into question the U.S. commitment to protect Japan if Tokyo comes into conflict with Beijing. There is a remarkable tendency in Tokyo to see U.S. efforts to engage China as detrimental to Japan. Many Japanese aligned with the Liberal Democratic Party mistakenly interpret efforts to engage China as hostility, or at least, the malign neglect of their own country.

### Links – General

#### Increases US-China engagement furthers Japanese nationalism which causes rearmament

Chu 08 (Shulong, Professor of Public Policy and Management @Tsinghua University and CNAPS China Fellow 2006-2007, “A MECHANISM TO STABILIZE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN ASIA“ THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES January, Accessed 6/22/2016 <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/2736/uploads> JJH)

Japan’s potential to become a greater military power has been noticed by certain Chinese, American, and Japanese observers. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Matthews wrote that the December 18, 2001, North Korean spy ship event demonstrated “that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force,” which suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense.… rising nationalism has taken hold in one of America’s closest allies. This development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan. … Japan is clearly moving in a different direction.2 Matthews argues that Japanese resentment over the United States’s shift of attention to China, coupled with Japan-China strategic tensions, has strengthened the hand of Japanese nationalists who think their country should once more possess military power to rival that of its neighbors. The lack of recognition of Japan in international institutions strikes many Japanese as profoundly unjust, and leads some to wonder whether military rearmament might be one way to help their country get the respect it deserves. In the words of Kitaoka Shinichi, a University of Tokyo law professor whom Matthews cites, “Remilitarization is indeed going on.”3 When Shinzo Abe was about to take office as Japan’s Prime Minister in September 2006, the New York Times and other news media published many articles and reports on the rise of Japanese nationalism, represented by Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. According to the Washington Post, Prime Minister Abe would encourage Japanese citizens “to take pride in their country…and promote the ideal of a proud and independent Japan.”4 Abe had a big vision for the future of Japan. “Rather than getting praised for wrestling a good round of sumo under the rules that foreign countries make, we should join in the making of the rules,” he said in televised debate in September 2006, “…I believe I can create a new Japan with a new vision.”5 The Post further reported that he would implement “a sweeping education bill, strengthening the notion of patriotism in public classrooms in a way not seen since the fall of Imperial Japan,” and would “rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow the country to again have an official and flexible military.” It claimed that “[t]he rise of Abe, an unabashed nationalist set to be Japan’s youngest post postwar prime minister and its first to be born after the conflict, underscores a profound shift in thinking that has been shaped by those threats.”6

### Links – General

#### Increased US-China engagement accelerates Japanese fears of decoupling which damage the alliance and cause remilitarization

Glosserman 13 — Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, 2013 (“The China challenge and the US-Japan alliance”, CSIS, 11/21, Available Online at <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/Pac1383.pdf>, Accessed 6-23-16, JJH)

The biggest issue for the US-Japan alliance is China. Washington and Tokyo must address the direct challenges that Beijing poses to regional security as well as manage the impact of China’s rise on their bilateral relationship. The latter is the more difficult of the two assignments: while there is considerable common ground in the two countries’ assessment of China, there is a growing gap between Americans and Japanese on how to respond to Chinese behavior. On paper, the two countries are in lockstep when it comes to China. The language of the last Security Consultative Committee meeting (the SCC, usually called the “2+2”) is explicit: The US and Japan “continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.” It sounds like boilerplate, but it hits the right notes, identifying concerns and telling Beijing what they expect it to do. But beneath this concord, there is discord. When it comes to China, Japan is channeling the spirit of Margaret Thatcher, who once warned President George HW Bush to “not go wobbly” when dealing with the Soviets. Japanese experts and officials voice two concerns. The first is a fear of “decoupling” the US and Japan, a worry since President Bill Clinton overflew Tokyo twice on his way to and from Beijing. Japanese worry that they have been eclipsed by China as the US’s preferred partner in Asia. There is teeth gnashing in Tokyo every time the US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue convenes, and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is still waiting for his shirt-sleeves Sunnylands summit with President Obama. Fears of decoupling have receded – but haven’t vanished – and Tokyo now frets over “mutual vulnerability” (sometimes called “strategic stability”), a world in which China’s nuclear arsenal makes Washington hesitant to respond to Chinese aggression. This leads to a “stability-instability paradox”: a situation in which the prospect of mutual pain creates stability at the strategic level (MAD provided this during the Cold War) but invites small-scale provocations or aggression locally. The geographic focus of this particular fear is the Senkaku Islands, uninhabited islets in the East China Sea that are held by Japan and claimed by China (and called the Daioyu in Chinese), that have become the locus of tensions in the Japan-China relationship. Even though the US has insisted for years that the islands are covered under the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese are not mollified. The standard US response is that the “US takes no stand on the claims to disputed territory, but the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the treaty as ‘territory administered by Japan.’ ” Japanese experts and officials urge the US to be more forward leaning, actually backing Japan’s claim to the islands as well as chastising China for threatening instability in the region. They prefer language from the Trilateral Security Dialogue (which includes the US, Japan and Australia), released a day after the SCC statement, which decries “coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea,” wording more explicit than that in the 2+2 declaration. What accounts for the gap in perspectives? One difference is obvious: Japan feels threatened now by Chinese actions. As a Japanese scholar explained, “this is the first occasion in which the Japanese people really sense the possibility that Japanese territory under control of their government may be menaced by an external enemy.” The US is also worried by Chinese behavior, but the threat is more distant, both in terms of geography and time, and more abstract (typically framed in regard to a shifting balance of power). This reflects a second difference: how each country ranks security threats. China tops Japan’s list, while the US identifies North Korea as its immediate regional concern. The US may be dragged into conflict in both cases, but Pyongyang is considered a more belligerent and unpredictable force than Beijing. Third, there is the context in which each country frames relations with China. China is among both countries’ top trading partners and the destination of considerable investment from both. But Washington sees relations with Beijing more broadly, engaging it as a partner across a range of endeavors, <<card continues>>

### Links – General

<<card continues>> while Japan’s perspective is narrower – it sees China primarily as a threat. US references to a strategic partnership, or sometimes even cooperation, with China raise temperatures in Tokyo. Other factors tug on the alliance. The bitter, bloody history of Japan-China relations during the 20th century distinguishes regional analysis in Tokyo and Washington, creating expectations and obstacles for Japan that the US doesn’t face. (Ironically, in the 1980s, this history pushed Tokyo closer to Beijing than the US liked.) Beijing is quick to widen perceived gaps in thinking between Washington and Tokyo, playing up the image of an irresponsible US or an irresolute Japan. Some Japanese hawk a China threat because it supports their political agenda, whether increasing military spending or loosening constitutional restrictions on the Self-Defense Forces. Highlighting a China threat also reinforces the message that Tokyo is a serious ally, ready to pull its weight on regional security concerns. Unfortunately, while many in the US back these moves, Japanese messaging has been ham fisted, arguing that Tokyo must change the interpretation of the right of collective self-defense because in some cases Japan might not be able to defend its own territory, an argument that inadvertently plays up the image of an irresponsible ally. Some insist that problems in the US-Japan relationship spring from Japanese insecurities. That is true – up to a point. But those insecurities, real or imagined, are a problem for the alliance and need to be deflated. As a start, while pursuing cooperation with China, and urging Tokyo to do the same, Americans must push back against the notion that there is an equilateral triangle among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Our alliance fundamentally distinguishes the US-Japan relationship from that of the US and China.

#### Relations are zero-sum – engagement trades off

Govella, 7 (Kristi Elaine, MA in Political Science from Berkeley, “Accommodating the Rise of China: Toward a Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2017” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 16 pp. 15-18. Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57987/ichaptersection_singledocument/19b9c958-8d7a-4fd9-a6a2-f0b25006fef6/en/chap3.pdf> JJH)

Attitudes toward leadership in East Asia are permeated by a zero-sum mentality; according to this line of thought, either Japan or China can be the regional leader, and the U.S. will align itself with only one of the two countries to best pursue its interests. In reality, an exclusive alliance between the U.S. and either of these countries no longer makes sense in modern East Asia; instead, the task must be to build good relations between the U.S. and both countries. Consequently, the U.S. must strike a balance between supporting Japan through the U.S.-Japan alliance and facilitating China’s peaceful rise. The China portion of this equation is impossible to ignore, and indeed, giving China the incentives to progress down a path of peaceful integration and benign competition is a key part of a successful strategy in Asia. However, it is also vital that the U.S. avoid giving the impression (real or perceived) that Japan is being ignored or undermined by its long-time ally. In giving increased emphasis to relations with China, there is a natural danger that Japan might feel displaced. For example, in a 2007 report from the Japan Defense Research Center, Takayama Masaji cites Chinese “wish for a dissolution” of U.S.-Japan relations as a potential threat and cites the insult of President Bill Clinton’s failure to visit Japan after a 10-day visit to China in 1999. Takayama also mentions changes in American referents for China; he notes Clinton’s use of the term “strategic partner” and Bush’s movement from labeling the PRC a “strategic competitor” to recognizing it as a “stakeholder.” It is clear that Japan is highly sensitive to changes in its relative status, and consequently, the U.S. must tread carefully as it tries to accommodate the growing power of China.

### Links – TPP

#### The plan hurts US-Japan relations – Japan is severing economic ties with China and will benefit from Chinese exclusion from the TPP

Hornung 15Jeffrey Hornung Ph.D., Associate Professor at the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies(APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii,2015, “Japan’s Pushback of China”, <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Hornung_0.pdf>, cut by Evan Sander

Concurrent with its military and diplomatic efforts, Japan has begun to take economic aim at China. Although bilateral trade remains robust, Japan began curtailing economic ties after the 2010 collision. Not only has the percentage of Japan’s total exports to China fallen from 19.4 percent in 2010 to 18.3 percent in 2014,49 its FDI elsewhere now supersedes its China-bound FDI.50 China has also fallen as the most popular production site for Japanese companies.51 Japan has even begun to challenge China’s dominance in rare-earths. China holds a near monopoly, producing over 95 percent of the world’s supply.52 From 2000 until 2009, Japan’s reliance on China never fell below 85 percent.53 Following the 2010 collision, Beijing suspended its Japanese exports until late November. Immediately, Japan started to reduce its reliance, resulting in the percentage of Japan’s China-rare-earths falling to 66.7 percent in 2011, and further to 56.1 percent in 2012.54 It did this by replacing Chinese imports with increases from existing suppliers such as France, Vietnam, and Estonia. Tokyo and private Japanese companies also signed long-term agreements to develop and supply with companies in Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Australia, and India with rare-earths, and are actively seeking new partnerships with companies in Myanmar, Mongolia, Canada, Brazil, and Serbia. Japan also launched projects to develop technologies for recycling rare-earth elements from used high-tech components and develop materials to use as substitutes. Japan’s challenge to China is also prevalent in its TPP thinking. Economic rationale aside, China dominates Japan’s motivation to join.55 According to Abe’s National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi, Japanese policymakers see the TPP as a chance to set rules that will bind trade to help Japan at a time when China’s economy appears unable to join.56 It is a means to shape China’s rise in a way beneficial to Japan by encouraging China to abide by the regional order, an order under which Japan prospers.57 Noda’s special advisor, Akihisa Nagashima, believed the TPP would “create a strategic environment where China would see Japan as a formidable neighbor that cannot be pushed around.” Through creating trade rules, “Japan and [the United States] will foster order” by which China will have to abide.58

### Links – Space

**Japan considers China space program a threat, does not want cooperation in space, means plan would anger Japan**

**Kosaka 16** February 11, 2016. Eyeing China, US and Japan aim to keep the space station aloft. <http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160211-China-Outbound/Tech-Science/Eyeing-China-US-and-Japan-aim-to-keep-the-space-station-aloft>

When **the U.S. and Japan agreed recently to extend the use of the International Space Station until 2024**, four years longer than initially planned, it was partly out of concern **that mothballing the ISS as scheduled would leave China as** the only country with a manned space station. The station, construction of which began in 1998, is operated jointly by the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada and 11 European countries. Japan has spent roughly 890 billion yen ($7.43 billion) on the ISS so far. For that price, it has been able to conduct tests in the Kibo experiment module. However, some in Japan have complained that the science performed in the space lab has not produced results sufficient to justify the massive cost. Japan's Kibo space lab is one of the modules used by the International Space Station. Nevertheless, Japan went along with the U.S. on the Dec. 22 decision to extend the life of the space station until 2024. Russia -- whose rockets ferry astronauts, equipment and supplies to the ISS -- and Canada, with its expertise on the facility's robotic arms, are both expected to agree to keep it open. Although not part of the ISS program, China played a role in keeping it aloft. China launched its space program by making use of technology from the Soviet Union and later Russia. It put up its first satellite in 1970 and sent its first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou 5, into orbit in 2003. Those feats were followed by the landing of a lunar probe in 2007 and the launch of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, a Chinese version of the GPS system, in 2010. If all goes according to plan, China will put up the main section of its Tiangong space station as early as 2018. It will send the other sections into orbit in pieces and assemble them, aiming to open the station by 2020. Construction of the Tiangong is to be completed around 2022. China says it may then allow astronauts from other countries to stay at the station or dock laboratory modules there. **Germany is moving toward working with China in space development, and European Space Agency astronauts have started learning Chinese, according to a Japanese expert in the field. If the ISS shuts down in 2020, China will become the only country to have a working manned space station. That would encourage other countries interested in the final frontier to turn to Beijing for help. A China-led space alliance would be a heavenly analogue to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank -- and would likely get just as cool a reception from Washington. It would both boost China's international influence and raise the possibility that military technologies from Europe or elsewhere may find their way into Chinese hands. Better technology, in turn, would enhance China's spacefaring capabilities, creating a positive feedback loop, attracting more countries to China's space program.** NATIONAL SECURITY ANGLE Major powers rely on communications and surveillance satellites to ensure their national security by, for example, keeping an eye on the missile launches and troop movements of potential adversaries. This makes space assets a prime target in any military conflict between great powers. The U.S. and Japan are thus eager to limit China's access to space technology with military applications.

### Links – Space

**Japan is in direct competition with China over space – the plan would anger Japan**

**Moltz 15** January 17, 2015 It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/17/why-china-will-win-the-next-space-race.html>

**Since China’s first human spaceflight in 2003 and its threatening anti-satellite test in 2007, Asia has seen a surge in space activity, with budgets increasing rapidly across the region. While few officials admit to the term,** [**a “space race” is emerging in Asia**](http://www.amazon.com/Asias-Space-Race-International-Contemporary/dp/023115688X). **The surge of Asian countries joining the ranks of major space powers mirrors the rise of Asian economies and their militaries** more generally since the end of the Cold War. But following the political drivers of these trends leads most often to regional rivalries, not a desire to compete with the United States or Russia. Being first in Asia to do anything in space brings prestige, lends credibility to governments in power, and helps stimulate Asia’s young population to study science and technology, which has other benefits for their national economies. The **responses to China’s rise have included the sudden development of military space programs by** two countries that previously shunned such activities—**Japan** and India—and dynamic new activities in countries ranging from Australia to Singapore to Vietnam. On the Korean Peninsula, both North and South have orbited satellites in the past three years and both have pledged to develop much larger rockets. Many of these countries realize that they can’t “win” Asia’s space race, but they also know that they cannot afford to lose. China’s rapid expansion in space activity has also raised serious concerns within U.S. military circles and in NASA. But these developments pose an existential threat to China’s neighbors, some of whom see Beijing’s space program as yet another threatening dimension to their deep-seated historical, economic, and geo-political rivalries for status and influence within the Asian pecking order. Even more, space achievements affect the self-perceptions of their national populations, challenging their governments to do more. How this competition will play out and whether it can be managed, or channeled into more positive directions, will have a major impact on the future of international relations in space. The U.S. government has thus far responded with a two-track strategy, seeking a bilateral space security dialogue with Beijing, while quietly expanding space partnerships with U.S. friends and allies in the region, adding a space dimension to the U.S. “pivot” to Asia. China Although shocking to some, China’s space efforts have actually been long in coming. Beijing has gradually built up a range of scientific, commercial, and military space capabilities since the 1980s that have now put it in a position to compete favorably with any country in Asia—even technologically advanced Japan—while presenting an asymmetric threat to the United States. Over the past decade China has launched a spacecraft that mapped the Moon (Chang’e 1), conducted a lunar rover mission (Chang’e 2), and orbited and visited a small space station (Tiangong 1), with plans for a much larger station within a decade. It is building a new launch site on Hainan Island with plans for a heavy-left booster. In the military realm, the People’s Liberation Army has demonstrated the capability of putting critical U.S. space assets at risk in a crisis, forcing Washington to think twice about the surety of its space-enhanced military capabilities. The sheer size of China’s young scientific and engineering cadre, its steadily expanding satellite network (including a newly operational commercial and military GPS system called Beidou), its increasing space budget, and its investment in military counter-space technologies—with recent tests of possible offensive systems in 2010, 2013, and 2014—presage a broad and formidable set of capabilities. Experts are divided over whether China has set itself on a course for space dominance or not. Its policies are likely to be influenced—for better or for worse—by its economic status and its evolving relationship with the United States. But Asian countries are not taking the threat lying down. Unlike in Europe, where all of the major powers (except Russia) are members of the European Space Agency and share a cooperative approach to space (including highly integrated cost sharing), Asia’s space arrangements are highly nationalistic, sometimes secretive, and mostly competitive. There are no space security talks currently ongoing among the major powers, no history of arms control talks linking space and nuclear deterrence (unlike in the U.S.-Soviet case), and no civil space cooperation in its key political dyads: China-Japan, India-China, and North-South Korea. At the regional level, China and Japan have sponsored rival space organizations in an effort to “organize” smaller countries in this broader competition and draw them to their side. China has formed an ESA-like body called the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which now includes Bangladesh, Thailand, and Mongolia among its dues-paying members. APSCO benefits include access to Chinese space training, ground stations, and satellite development projects. Others in the region have opted to participate in the less formal, Japanese-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, maintaining greater flexibility. Japan At the domestic level, Japan, long Asia’s technological leader, has also reacted with a range of new activities. In 2008, the Japanese Diet pushed through revolutionary legislation that ended Japan’s previous ban on military activities in space. Despite the high costs of recovery after the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, Tokyo has doubled down on its space efforts with a new launcher and renewed efforts in high-prestige space science and human spaceflight, including an active program of research on its Kibo module on the International Space Station (ISS). Japan’s H-II Transfer Vehicle spacecraft now provides the only non-U.S. and non-Russian service module able to ferry supplies to the ISS. In December 2014, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency launched the ambitiousHayabusa 2 mission, which aims to put four landers on an asteroid by 2018 and then return soil samples to Earth. Japanese officials see an intimate connection between their space accomplishments and the ability of its economy to export advanced technologies. They fear that China’s space accomplishments might put Japan’s technological reputation into doubt. Therefore, they believe they cannot fall behind their rapidly advancing neighbor.

## Internal Links

### US Key

#### US commitment is a key driver in Japan’s decision to nuclearize

Saunders and Feary, 2015 (Emily Cura, PhD Candidate in International Security and Arms Control and Bryan L., Senior Science & Policy Advisor for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or Not? Japan’s and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models” Chapter 3 From: Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges Editors: Samuel Apikyan, David Diamond Springer Link JJH)

Japan’s potential nuclear latency has been one of great debate and speculation since the end of the Second World War. There have been many theories as to why Japan would or would not pursue a weapons program, but the two variables identified in this paper, regional security and confidence in the United States’ extended deterrent, have strongly influenced this issue. Having been the sole victim of a nuclear attack, Japanese politicians have always taken great care with regard to their rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons. This rhetoric should be carefully monitored by the United States. Many of Japan’s nuclear options can be measured in this highly nuanced political rhetoric. For example, in 1957 under Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi, the Cabinet Legal Affair Bureau “confirmed that nuclear weapons were not unconstitutional.”40 Domestic pressure and outrage at this claim soon forced Prime Minister Kishi to resign; however, the taboo of talking about Japanese nuclear weapons had been broken.41 In the early 1960s Prime Minister Sato went so far as to explicitly tell President Johnson that he was not opposed to exploring a nuclear option for Japan, remarking that, “Japanese public opinion will not permit this at present, but I believe the public, especially the younger generation, can be ‘educated.’”42 Ironically, Prime Minister Sato ended up winning a Nobel Prize for what he deemed the Three NonNuclear Principles—no manufacturing, possessing, or presence of nuclear weapons in Japan.43 While this change in rhetoric was important, it did not end nuclear exploration in Japan. Several Japanese administrations since Prime Minister Sato have commissioned reports on the feasibility, both scientifically and economically, of developing nuclear weapons. In the context of these administrations the idea of latent capability surfaced. In a memorandum written by the director of the Japanese Defense Policy Bureau, Kubo Takyua, he makes this option out to be an insurance plan to keep the United States commitment strong. The memorandum reads, If Japan prepares a latent nuclear capability which would enable Japan to develop significant nuclear armament at any time, the United States would be motivated to sustain the Japan-US security system by providing nuclear guarantee to Japan, because otherwise, the US would be afraid of the stability in the international relations triggered by nuclear proliferation.44 The commitment of the United States is clearly an issue for Japan. They want to be assured that the commitments are strong, and if not, this memo suggests that they are willing to consider an independent deterrent if need be.

### Perception Key

#### Perception of allies drifting apart kills assurances and causes Japan to rearm themselves

Santoro and Warden 15 (David, senior fellow @ Pacific Forum CSIS and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf>)

Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been starker in Northeast Asia. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, the critical factor is perception. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11

### AT: No Prolif

#### Japan has the means to produce a nuclear weapon

Smith et al 14, Jeffrey Smith R. Jeffrey Smith is a reporter at the Washington Post and was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting in 2006, went to duke, Douglas birch, reporter on national security and foreign affairs, Jake Adelstein is a Jewish American journalist crime writer and blogger who has spent most of his career in Japan, 2014(“Japan’s Nuclear Fever”, Foreign Policy, March 12, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/12/japans-nuclear-fever/>, Acccesed 7/15/2016, EC)

The United States has long been concerned about potential development of a Japanese bomb, since Japan has the scientific skills, infrastructure, and — most important — the raw explosive material in the form of plutonium, hundreds of pounds of weapons-grade uranium, and the technology to produce more. Washington’s worry is that such an arsenal would set off a regional arms race, complicating Japan’s relations with its neighbors, some of whom would clamor for a similar capability. U.S. policymakers have pursued a two-pronged path to blocking that development: Over the past four years, they have quietly brought a stream of Japanese diplomats and military officers into highly restricted U.S. nuclear weapons centers — including the Strategic Command headquarters in Nebraska, a Minuteman missile base in Montana, and a Trident submarine base outside Seattle — to remind them of the robustness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The United States also has gently urged Japan to cap or reduce the size of its plutonium stockpile. Its officials have encouraged Japan to reopen its closed reactors, in part so any newly-created plutonium can be burned at the same rate it is being produced. They’ve also pressed Japan to give up, through repatriation to the United States, some of its existing plutonium stocks before production gets under way. But the United States has not urged Japan to cancel its Rokkasho project, several current and former senior U.S. and Japanese officials said. Authorities say one reason Washington has not offered that advice is that killing it — and all the future nuclear power plants linked to it — would increase Japan’s dependence on traditional energy supplies and drive up their price on the world market, adversely impacting the U.S. economy.

### AT: No Prolif – Deficit

#### Military spending increasing – record high budgets looming

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The cabinet of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved a record 5.05 trillion yen ($41.4 billion) defense budget for fiscal year 2016/2017 and slightly below the 5.09 trillion yen requested by Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), The Japan Times reports. This marks the fourth consecutive rise in defense spending since Shinzo Abe assumed office in December 2012. The rise in the defense budget is primarily driven by a weakened yen, higher personnel costs and an increase in expenses for the planned relocation of the U.S. Marine Corp’s Futenma air base in Okinawa Prefecture, which increased from 24.4 billion yen for the current fiscal year to 59.5 billion yen under what is known as “SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa)-related expenses.” Defense spending for the next fiscal year starting in April 2016 will be heavily focused on solidifying Japan’s position in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – an island chain administered by Tokyo in the East China Sea—by investing in additional amphibious warfare capabilities. As I reported before (See: “Japan’s Defense Ministry Wants Record Military Budget for 2016”), the Ministry of Defense’s 10-year National Program Guidelines – subdivided into two five-year Mid-Term Defense Programs – has allocated 23.97 trillion yen ($199.5 billion) within five years (2014-2018) toward the creation of more amphibious warfare capabilities and a lighter “Dynamic Joint Defense Force.” By 2023, the Ministry of Defense plans to convert seven out of the current 15 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) brigades and divisions into mobile divisions and brigades that can be more easily transferred to the East China Sea in the event of a crisis. A Japanese division usually consists of around 8,000 troops, whereas a brigade fields around 4,000. The fiscal year 2016/2017 shopping list encompasses 11 units of AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles made by BAE System — Japan is in the process of setting up an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade by 2017 — 17 Mitsubishi SH-60K anti-submarine warfare helicopters, four Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft (a hybrid between a conventional helicopter and turboprop plane), three Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk drones, six F-35A Lightning II fighter planes, one Kawasaki C-2 military transport aircraft, and 36 new lighter maneuver combat vehicles (MCVs). Other purchases include tanker aircraft, Aegis destroyers, and mobile missile batteries. Acquisition costs for the Ministry of Defense keep rising. I wrote in September: Japan is also planning to set up a Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) in early 2016 to better coordinate new acquisitions among the three service branches and to encourage the domestic defense industry to partner up with international defense contractors to co-develop new military hardware. In addition, Tokyo is also working to introduce more long-term defense contracts and bulk orders in order to save costs and provide more stable and predictable procurement plans for defense firms. For example, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) will receive 20 P-1 patrol planes – Japan’s first indigenously developed and built maritime patrol aircraft – by 2022 based on one placed bulk order that will save the MOD 41.7 billion yen ($348 million) (…). Japan’s Ministry of Defense will also purchase land and expand a GSDF base to station a patrol unit on Miyakojima in Okinawa Prefecture, and build another base to house a GSDF patrol unit equipped with mobile surveillance radars on Amami Oshima island in Kagoshima Prefecture. The MOD will also construct a military radar station on Yonaguni island, the westernmost inhabited island of Japan.

### A2: No Prolif – Nuclear Fears

#### Japan will proliferate – security concerns outweigh anti-nuclear sentiments

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During his tenure as prime minister, Abe has worked to increase Japan’s military capabilities and commitments abroad — but with a half-hearted antinuclear posture. Abe has made numerous attempts to revise Article 9 of Japan’s “peace constitution,” which outlaws war as a means of settling international disputes. Abe’s formal policy of “proactive peace” is not so much a problem. To play a greater role in maintaining international peace and combating terrorism, Japan will need to increase its capabilities and update its security policies. However, Japan’s militarization means greater insecurity, and thus more opportunities to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. China and North Korea have warned Japan about its current security posture, and Japan’s increased presence abroad has brought the attention of terrorist groups, such as ISIS. Recently, the Abe cabinet argued that possessing nuclear weapons would not violate the country’s constitution — a statement that provoked a strong reaction from the public and opposition forces. A strict reading of the Japanese constitution, however, would suggest otherwise. The document states, “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” and in order to accomplish this, “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” More importantly, this sentiment violates the Three Non-Nuclear Principles Japan adopted in the late 1960s, which forbid it from developing, possessing or introducing nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil. Japan’s aversion to nuclear weapons has always been a matter of principle rather than a legal mandate. Under Abe, however, security concerns have far outweighed antinuclear sentiments — and the Japanese people seem less averse to the idea of having a nuclear arsenal. Abe also is a strong believer in the benefits of nuclear power, a politically difficult position given the ongoing clean-up efforts following the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Abe has had a poor relationship with non-proliferation activists; he sees them as obstacles to his security agenda. At present, Japan has one of the largest global stockpiles of plutonium and has enough material to make thousands of nuclear weapons.

## Impacts

### Ext. Causes Arms Race

#### Japanese rearmament leads to arms race and war

Mizokami 15 — Kyle Mizokami, writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, 2015 (“China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons”, The National Interest, October 31st, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal. To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here. Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan, the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack. Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would make their positioning more predictable. Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network. Strategic bombers Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission. A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons. Geography also makes strategic bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously vulnerable. Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air, but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. <<card continues>>

### Ext. Causes Arms Race

<<card continues>> The cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive. Ballistic Missile Submarines This is the most attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself. Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine, missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline, Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile. In a sea-basing scheme Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads. There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128 warheads would be available. Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.

#### Rearming Japan ignites a regional arms race

Chelala, 8/15/2015 (Cesar Chelala, MD, PhD, is an international public health consultant for several UN agencies, 8/15/15, “Abe is wrong to rush toward militarization,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/15/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-wrong-rush-toward-militarization/#.Vc\_HIrJViko, 8/15/15, PCS)

The 23-minute ceremony aboard the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on Sept. 2, 1945, was the most significant event in Japan’s recent history, and the most painful. The ceremony established the surrender of the Empire of Japan and marked the end of World War II. After the horrific experience of the war, and to create the legal basis for the country’s future peaceful development, a new Constitution was enacted — the peace Constitution. Its defining characteristic is the renunciation of the right to wage war, contained in Article 9, and a provision for de jure popular sovereignty in conjunction with the monarchy. Article 9 states that the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” To achieve this, the article provides that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” The extent of Article 9 has been debated since its enactment, particularly after the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, a de facto military force, in 1954. It is possible that originally the SDF was intended as something similar to what Mahatma Gandhi called the Shanti Sena, or soldiers of peace, or as a collective security police (peacekeeping) force, operating under the United Nations. However, in July 2014, the Abe Cabinet introduced a reinterpretation of this role, giving more power to the SDF and allowing it to defend Japan’s allies. This action, which potentially ends Japan’s long-standing pacifist policies, was supported by the U.S. but was heavily criticized by China and North Korea. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for a reinterpretation of those policies, asking that they allow for collective self-defense and for Japan to pursue a more active deterrence policy. Because of what many perceive as a decline in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan may want to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S. and play a more assertive role in regional security. To that effect, Japan has reached some military agreements with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam that are engaged in territorial disputes with China. At the same time, Abe wants to revitalize the economy and meet increasing social security demands. It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. In 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and this year hosted a trade show on military defense systems. Not everybody agrees with Abe’s push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from the Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe that the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something that absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan also carries the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences. Given the volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9.

### Ext. Asian Arms Race Bad

#### Asian prolif sparks an arms race and accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 14 — Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, B.A. in Journalism from Penn State in 1965, M.A.in 1967 and his Ph.D. in 1969 both in Political Science, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison,has consulted for a number of U.S. government agencies and defense contractors, 2014("Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects", Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March, Available Online at [http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA6-1Eng%20(4)\_Cimbala.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA6-1Eng%20%284%29_Cimbala.pdf), Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 24-5, aqp)

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

### Ext. Asian Arms Race Bad

#### East Asian arms race could cause nuclear war

Richardson 13 (Michael, journalist who writes for multiple major newspapers with a focus on Japan, “deterring an asia nuke race,” a.d. 6.15..15, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/08/commentary/world-commentary/deterring-an-asia-nuke-race/#.VX9ftkaPWy0,je)

Without mutual restraint in Asia, other regional countries with civilian nuclear reactor experience and the necessary resources and skills could also decide to protect themselves by developing their own nuclear arms. Such potential “threshold” countries include South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, a driving force for a nuclear threat reduction group of security specialists and former senior officials from 18 countries, cautions that when “a large and growing number of nuclear-armed adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used rises dramatically.” Another prominent member of the group, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, says that there is only a short time left to pull back from the edge of a nuclear precipice. “Asia is an important backdrop for this discussion, as a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens regional stability and could spark a new wave of proliferation,” he warns. Their comments follow a recent call by U.S. President Barack Obama for America and Russia to open new arms control talks to further cut their deployed long-range nuclear arms by as much as one-third. The last bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by Moscow and Washington in 2010, requires each nation by 2018 to cap its stockpile of fielded nuclear warheads at 1,550. So under Obama’s proposal, a new ceiling could become approximately 1,000 deployed strategic warheads apiece. Under the current START pact, the two former Cold War adversaries also agreed to limit fielded nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers and missiles based on land and at sea, to 700, with an additional 100 allowed in reserve. But the START deal does not cover all nuclear warheads or delivery systems, only those classed as long range. Nor does it encompass all nuclear armed states, although at least 90 per cent of atomic arms belong to the U.S. and Russia. The SIPRI report estimates that at the start of 2013, eight of the nine nuclear armed nations had approximately 4,400 operational atomic weapons, with nearly 2,000 “in a state of high operational alert.” North Korea was assessed to have perhaps six or eight nuclear bombs, none of them operational. This evidently means they cannot yet be made small enough to be carried by North Korean missiles or bombers. SIPRI said that if all the nuclear warheads held by the nine nations with atomic weapons were counted, the total would amount to approximately 17,270 nuclear weapons, with a variety of short-, medium- as well as long-range delivery systems. The total warhead count includes spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads set to be dismantled, as well as operational warheads. Obama also called for the reduction of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons in Europe. These have never been officially counted or limited by any international treaty. One reason Russia gives for being reluctant to negotiate further bilateral nuclear cuts with the U.S. is that some other nuclear-armed countries are strengthening their warhead and missile capabilities. This is an evident reference to China among others, even though Moscow and Beijing have formed a “strategic partnership” to oppose U.S. and Western domination. China’s position is that the U.S. and Russia have the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, meaning those capable of traveling intercontinental distances and causing massive destruction. So Washington and Moscow should continue to make “drastic” cuts in their stockpiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Cheng Jingye, China’s top envoy to a U.N. nuclear nonproliferation conference, said last year that once this was done, “other nuclear-weapon states, when conditions are ripe, should also join the multinational negotiations on nuclear disarmament.” But when might that be? One of the concerns of U.S. critics of Obama’s latest proposals is that China could use any extended new round of START negotiations that involve only America and Russia to enlarge and modernize its own nuclear arsenal in secret. Some U.S. analysts say that this is already happening. The critics argue that if the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals keep dropping, China might be able to achieve numerical parity, or near-parity, quite quickly with the today’s two dominant nuclear powers. Nonnuclear Asian states, such as South Korea and Japan, look to their ally, the U.S., to protect them from nuclear attack under Washington’s extended deterrence policy. If U.S. nuclear strength and resolve appears to be weakening, they might become so alarmed at the heightened nuclear threats they face, whether from North Korea or China, that they would make their own dash for atomic arms.

### Alliance Impact

#### Japan armament causes NPT withdraw and crushes the US-Japan Alliance

Roberts 13—Brad Roberts, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy under the first Obama administration, former consulting professor and William Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a doctorate in International Relations from Erasmus University, Rotterdam, a William J. Perry Fellow in International Security, 2013.(“Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, August 9th, Available Online at <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 28-9, aqp)

A final model is sometimes proposed by Japanese politicians and pundits: a nuclear-armed Japan. This is not a model of extended U.S. deterrence. The case is sometimes made that perhaps Japan could arm itself and join Britain and France as a nuclear-armed ally of the United States. It is difficult to imagine how this step might be taken in the current security environment. Britain and France became nuclear weapon states before the NPT; for Japan to do so now would require NPT withdrawal, with significant political and economic consequences. Moreover, Japan’s decision to seek an independent nuclear deterrent would presumably reflect profound lack of confidence in U.S. credibility; it is difficult to see how or why the U.S.-Japan alliance would survive a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons. And of course Britain and France were able to acquire nuclear weapons without generating significantly adverse reactions among their immediate neighbors in Europe, whereas Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would likely generate significantly adverse reactions in Asia.

#### Strong U.S-Japan Alliance key to solve a broad range of global-scale issues

Roos 2016 — John V. Roos 2016, United States Ambassador to Japan, 2016 (“The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2010”, Reischauer Center, Available at <http://www.reischauercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-US-and-Japan-in-Global-Context-2010-FINAL-Ia.pdf>, Accessed June 29th, RKim)

Of course, no discussion of the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship would be complete without referencing our indispensable security alliance. During his visit to Tokyo last November, President Obama stated that “the Alliance between the United States and Japan is a foundation for security and prosperity not just for our two countries but for the Asia Pacific region.” Recent events, including the attack on the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, should remind us all of the critical importance of the U.S.-Japan Foreword iii alliance. North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs remain the most immediate concern, and the risks of proliferation and the possibility of regime collapse pose huge security challenges. But there are other challenges that have the potential to affect regional security and stability, including piracy on vital sea lanes, maritime territorial disputes, and the provocative actions of extremist groups. Unanticipated developments and unforeseen crises will undoubtedly surface, and we and our partners in the region should maintain the readiness to address them. We have already begun laying the groundwork to prepare for these contingencies. Japan and the United States are cooperating bilaterally, regionally and globally. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are assisting with rescue operations in flood-stricken Pakistan, earthquake relief in Haiti, and anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. The Government of Japan recently announced new sanctions on Iran that go beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1929, an important and very welcome addition to the international community’s united effort to combat proliferation and prevent Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. Our two countries are working together to find solutions to urgent global issues ranging from climate change to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

### NPT Impact (1/2)

#### Japan acquiring nuclear weapons crushes the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH)

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.

### NPT Impact (2/2)

#### Strong NPT prevents hotspot escalation and war

Cooper 2015 (Christian H. is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Pride of the Diplomats: Why the NPT Works” Global Policy Journal 5-19-15, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/05/2015/pride-diplomats-why-npt-works>)

The review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this month is a once every five years chance to reaffirm and strengthen one of the strongest international norms: that against the proliferation and use of nuclear technology for military means. Representatives of 190 countries are gathered to examine the treaty itself and discuss new ways to increase global buy-in against nuclear dangers. This time, they might do so in a critical new way. Israel will be at the table for the first time in 20 years as an observer only (having not signed the NPT), and according to a senior Obama administration official, has agreed to begin working with Arabs on an agenda for a conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. This is a dramatic change from 2010, when Israel refused to even consider the idea. Incremental diplomatic wins like this one lie at the core of the truly transnational strategic interest on the path to complete nuclear weapons disarmament. This is precisely why ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology must remain a key component of all nations’ foreign policy doctrines. Perhaps one reason the NPT, and its review every five years, is often overlooked by the general public is because at face value, everyone agrees more nukes are a bad thing. However, the NPT, and the corresponding diplomatic collaboration surrounding nuclear weapons, go much deeper than simply halting the proliferation of such dangerous technology. It is through this nearly universal treaty the next generation of world leaders will likely see nuclear disarmament, avoid an open war with Iran over its nuclear program, and stop a Middle East nuclear arms race in its tracks. However, it wasn't always clear the NPT would be the resounding success it is. In 1961 when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told U.S. President John F. Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program at Dimona was for peaceful purposes only, Kennedy’s National Security Council was simultaneously warning that by the 1970s there could be 40 nuclear weapon armed states (including Israel). If an America in the future faced rampant nuclear threats and could not believe a face-to-face conversation with a reliable ally, what could anyone trust? There had to be a better way, and the NPT was the answer: Never trust, always verify. In Israel's defense, the only NPT signatories who have violated the treaty since adoption— Iran, Iraq and Syria—have sworn to destroy the Jewish state. Remaining a non-signatory to the NPT and maintaining an opaque nuclear first strike nuclear capability was strategically the right choice for Israel (regional de-stabilization be damned), and one that could be revisited given their 2015 decision to consider an agenda for a nuclear weapons free Middle East. Israel's gambit to wait for the NPT to become as ironclad as it has paid dividends that we can all reap both in June with a comprehensive agreement between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (including Germany, a group colloquially referred to as the P5+1) and Iran and well into the future. The defining trait of the NPT is reframing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride circa 1960 to an act contrary to international law by 1970. Thankfully, today we operate in a world that accepts nuclear power as a scientific pursuit but abhors its use for violence. This is also why Iran's right to domestically enrich as a signatory to the NPT will be a cornerstone of the P5+1 agreement that will be announced soon and likely ratified by the first of July. This comprehensive agreement will also implicitly underscore one of the pillars of the NPT: The gradual demilitarization of nuclear technology. And lest critics make the argument that the NPT can only be used to coerce pariah states like Iran, consider the actions of the major powers. Since the NPT entered into force, the United States has drastically reduced the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile by 80 percent and completely removed multiple entry warheads from its nuclear strike capacity. In some respects just as importantly, Washington is currently targeting the open ocean; there is no longer a single ICBM aimed at the Russian Federation and nuclear-armed, long-range strategic bombers have been removed from daily nuclear alert. Russia has made similar progress, with both commitments and demonstrated progress in reducing deployed warheads as well as deployed and undeployed delivery vehicles. Moscow has also taken the lead in other areas where the United States has lagged behind, singing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. To be sure, complications—including Russia’s tendency to view their remaining weapons as a counterweight to all NATO stockpiles rather than simply that of the United States—still exist, but the fact remains that the norm created by NPT has reduced the potential for nuclear disaster across the globe. And where has all that potential destruction gone? Fully 10% of electric power in the United States over the last two decades came from down-blended, highly enriched uranium earmarked for Russian megaton nuclear bombs. Over 20,000 warheads (and their associated risk of accidental launches) were removed from service all thanks the spirit of the NPT. The spirit of bilateral cooperation remains strong; despite the tensions in Ukraine, both the United States and the Russian Federation are fully implementing the terms of the New START treaty, wherein each shares data on the movement of strategic forces and both engage in reciprocal inspections of military facilities. The NPT is not just about non-proliferation; it is a shift in mindset that nuclear technology will be shared with those who want it for peaceful purposes in return for de-arming those who have militarized it. It has been a resounding victory for the idea of internationalism and the fundamental idea that a community of nations can come together and, through mutually-reinforcing and verifying behavior, make strategic choices that defy the self-serving nature of states in an anarchic system. Moreover, it has been the bedrock of a norm that spawned a range of bi- and multilateral measures to protect the world against the terrible risk of nuclear conflict. Collective continued nuclear demilitarization is a win for the diplomats of the world. Progress on the biggest issues comes in small breaks, such as the Israeli decision to if not pull a seat up to the table, at least pay close attention on the sidelines. Through extraordinary burdens of verification and disclosure, the NPT will continue to make the world a safer place.

### AT: Won’t Escalate

#### We control magnitude and probability – Northeast Asia lacks security institutions and has historical animosity – makes nuclear war exceedingly likely

Moltz, November 2006. (James Clay, Deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and associate Professor on the National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. “FUTURE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS IN NORTHEAST ASIA,” The Nonproliferation Review 13.3, Informaworld)

Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile regions of the world when it comes to nuclear weapons. Compared to other areas, it has a higher percentage of states with not only the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, but also the potential motivation.1 With the exception of Mongolia, all the countries in the region—Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—already have civilian nuclear power infrastructures. They also have experience with nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia has two established nuclear weapon states—Russia and China—and North Korea is a presumed nuclear power. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered “threshold” states—all have had nuclear weapons development programs and could resume them in the future. Adding potential volatility to the mix, Northeast Asia suffers from underlying political and security fault lines: the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula; enduring Korean and Chinese enmity over Japanese atrocities committed before and during World War II; Russo-Japanese disputes over the Kuril Islands; and the tensions created by China's growing effort to rein Taiwan into its governance. For these and other reasons, regional security institutions in Northeast Asia are weak and tend to be based around bilateral commitments (Sino-North Korean, U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-South Korean, and U.S.-Taiwanese). The nuclear character of Northeast Asia is further defined by the fact that the United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in August 1945 and eventually stationed 3,200 nuclear weapons in South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the formerly U.S.-held islands of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.2 Major and minor wars involving regional powers were fought in the years from 1945 to 1991: the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Given this violent history, it is remarkable that further nuclear proliferation did not occur. The role of U.S. security guarantees with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan clearly played a major role in this sometimes less-than-willing restraint. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of political support for U.S. forces in both South Korea and Japan. North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 also has caused both states to reevaluate their decisions to halt nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, the views of some top officials in the George W. Bush administration regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons may be eroding national restraint and increasing the willingness of countries to go the final step, using their nuclear capabilities to make up for any conventional defense gaps. This essay examines potential nuclear proliferation trends among the states of Northeast Asia to 2016 from the context of early post-Cold War predictions, current capabilities, and possible future “trigger” events. It offers the unfortunate conclusion that several realistic scenarios could stimulate horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation.3 Indeed, if left unattended, existing political and security tensions could cause Northeast Asia to become the world's most nuclearized area by 2016, with six nuclear weapon states. Such a scenario would greatly exacerbate U.S. security challenges and probably spark nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world.

### AT: Won’t Escalate

#### Japan’s rearmament escalates all current tensions and makes war more likely

Zhou 15 – Tony Zhou studied at Cornell in International Relations (Tony, 10/10/15, Located at <https://diplomacist.com/2015/10/10/the-dangerous-ramifications-of-japans-revised-security-laws/>, “The Dangerous Ramifications of Japan’s Revised Security Laws”, Diplomacist, Accessed 6/24/16, MW)

After weeks of contentious debate, vigorous civilian protest, and stiff political opposition, a set of controversial security laws passed the Upper House of the Japanese Diet on September 19th, already having passed the Lower House in July, handing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a twofold victory. First, it effectively overturned Article Nine of the Japanese constitution, which forbade the existence of a standing military and plans to wage offensive war — Japan is now allowed to rearm and engage in military operations on behalf of its allies’ defenses. Second, it increased Japan’s commitment to the US-Japan defense alliance, resulting in additional defense spending allocations and a more active deployment of Self Defense Force (SDF) troops in outposts and neighboring allies. Japan’s rearmament finds its roots in a long and murky political history. In 1926, Emperor Hirohito’s ascendancy to the throne led to an increase in ultra-nationalistic tendencies, which eventually transformed into aggressive imperialism and a desire for regional dominance, as was demonstrated in the 1937 provocations with China that led to the Sino-Japanese war and further invasions of the Dutch-East Indies and British Hong Kong in 1941. Post World War II defeat, however, Japan’s military capabilities were removed and codified as an illegal means of solving disputes through Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. Although the Self Defense Forces, a peacetime paramilitary force, were established in 1954, rearmament has been seen as a sort of taboo within both Japanese lawmaking and society due to the fear of a reversion back to the imperialist tendencies displayed earlier. However, recent security problems have brought the issue of rearmament back to the national spotlight. Beginning in 2012, Chinese naval encroachment into the Japanese-claimed Senkaku Islands has been on a steady uprise, and a lack of force projection by the Japanese could indicate weakness and encourage further encroachments. On the other side of the globe, two Japanese nationals were beheaded by the terrorist group ISIS in January 2015 — Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was not able to offer much retaliation other than a verbal condemnation of the group and increased humanitarian aid to the region. Thus, the question arises: does Japanese rearmament properly solve Japan’s security problem or does it ultimately cause more harm than good? To begin judging the effects of Japan’s rearmament, one can gauge the reactions of Japan’s neighbors. Without a doubt, the rearmament has caught the eyes of every major regional power in East Asia. In October 2013, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se announced, “There are many countries including us that are worried about Japan’s rearmament. A situation where [we] overlook Japan’s rearmament will not come.” Having succumbed to Japanese aggression and brutal colonialism in the early 20th century, the historical memory of South Korea shows a heavy societal and political disfavor toward any Japanese military capabilities. The closest effect of Japan’s rearmament may therefore be a significant decrease in relations between the two previously allied countries. While South Korea’s reaction may be purely diplomatic, rearmament may start a deeper provocation in two other countries: China and North Korea. Earlier this year, China’s foreign ministry released a powerfully worded statement condemning a Japanese defense white paper asking for appropriate increases in defense spending to combat the “China military threat.” The statement reads, “This kind of action completely lays bare the two-faced nature of Japan’s foreign policy and has a detrimental impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region” and that China would implement a “necessary reaction depending on the situation.” China has reiterated this threat multiple times, most recently by accompanying President Xi Jinping’s speech slamming Japanese aggression on September 3rd with a massive military parade through Beijing. Perceiving South Korea and the United States as key advocates for Japan’s endangering of North Korean national security, North Korea entered the fray with threats of escalation as well. In 2013, North Korean state media stated that ”The prevailing situation calls upon all Koreans to decisively smash the Japanese reactionaries’ attempt to exercise the right which has become undisguised under the backstage wire-pulling of the U.S. and the South Korean regime’s criminal collusion and nexus to help them.” Although both China’s and North Korea’s threats may only seem to be threatening rhetoric, their credibility and immediacy are both advanced by a real and publicized development in Japanese military capabilities. Backlash from either the economic and military superpower of China or the rogue military state of North Korea may lead to a fatal escalation of regional tensions that already lie on the brink — ultimately doing more harm than good to Japan’s security. For Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling LDP party, the development of a military beyond the Self Defense Forces may seem to be a proper defense against regional tensions as of late. However, after examining other countries’ reactions to the newly passed security laws, a definite conclusion can be drawn that Japan’s rearmament only exacerbates those tensions and further endangers Japanese security.

### AT: Prolif Defense

#### Proliferation in secondary states like Japan is uniquely destabilizing.

Lanoszka 12 – Alexander, Ph.D. in IR, Postdoctoral Fellow Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College, “Protection States Trust?: Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics” https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-Protection-States-Trust-022012.pdf

4.3 Nuclear Behavior as Insurance and Bargaining As doubts over the superpower’s commitment increase, the secondary state will be more apt to explore military policies that insure against the effects of patron abandonment. They are more likely to adopt ambiguous nuclear postures or even begin pursuing their own nuclear weapons program. Having a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a robust insurance policy for the secondary state. Goldstein (2000) notes that the secondary state is not required to develop such an extensive and technologically advanced arsenal as those possessed by the US and the Soviet Union. Rather, it needs to have a sufficient number of weapons that are capable of second-strike delivery to deter the adversary from launching a direct attack. Indeed, the philosophy guiding the secondary state’s approach to deterrence is different from that of their patrons. Superpowers rely on the threat of ‘controlled escalation’ in which they proceed 21 through limited but gradually more intense exchanges to communicate their resolve in inflicting damage. Engaging in controlled escalation requires advanced command and control systems as well as the ability to absorb nuclear damage. These requirements are especially demanding for smaller states that are less able to meet them.16 Consequently, such states opt for a ‘poison pill’ strategy in which their deterrence policy rests on the threat of ‘uncontrolled escalation’. The high likelihood of both parties losing control of a nuclear exchange characterizes this form of confrontation. For such an exchange to occur there needs to be an element of risk that neither side could attenuate (Powell 1987, 719). A state’s technological capacity for managing its nuclear weapons poses such a risk if it is involuntarily underdeveloped and thus prone to accidents and other organizational failures. These concerns gain significance when it comes to secondary states. Their national command structures are likely to be small and more concentrated than is the case for superpowers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, they face a much higher probability of being thrown into disarray during the conflict’s initial stages. Nuclear retaliation, therefore, becomes less inhibited and results in the infliction of massive damage on the adversary (Goldstein 2000, 47-51). Backwards inducing from this possibility leads the adversary to refrain from direct military attack on the secondary state.17 Such are the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, but secondary states have to pass through various stages of nuclear development first. Indeed, there is a paradox underlining nuclear weapons acquisition. As much as having a nuclear arsenal might engender international stability, the process by which states finally acquire nuclear weapons generates instability (Sagan and Waltz 1995). Adopting an ambiguous nuclear posture or pursuing a nuclear weapons program provokes alarm amongst neighboring states, regardless of whether they are allies. Those states might be unsettled by the uncertainty of the potential proliferator’s intentions and the fear of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in the future. Moreover, though the secondary state acts to hedge against superpower abandonment in their effort to obtain greater foreign policy autonomy, they also risk punishment from the superpower for threatening to undermine its alliance structures.