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**File Notes**

This file contains the affirmative answers to the Japan Alliance Disadvantage. The affirmative can choose from a variety of arguments to contest this disadvantage. First, the affirmative can argue that the US-Japan alliance is already on the rocks in the status quo due to presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rhetoric, who has questioned the value of the alliance and suggested that Japan acquire nuclear weapons to defend themselves. Second, the affirmative can argue that engaging with China will actually help relations with Japan by helping to build order in the region. Third, the affirmative can point out that even if the plan doesn’t necessarily help boost relations with Japan, relations are not zero-sum; the US can build relations with both countries at the same time. Next, the affirmative can argue that Japan will never build nuclear weapons, due to their own experiences during WWII and for a variety of other reasons. The affirmative can also maintain that the alliance is resilient and would not collapse due to one instance of engagement with China. Last, the affirmative can argue that regional arms races are unlikely, and that even if they did happen, the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not guarantee a nuclear conflict.

## Affirmative Answers

**US-Japan Relations Low**

**US-Japan relations are low and will degrade further – Trump rhetoric**

**Larter 5-6** {David, syndicated military-affairs columnist from Sightline Media Group, former columnist for Gannett Government Media Corporation, B.A. in English (University of Richmond), “Japan Defends U.S. Alliance Amid Worries Stoked by Trump, Sanders,” 5/6/16, http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/06/trump-sanders-rise-stokes-fears-in-japan/84019404/#THUR}

The insurgent candidacies of Donald **Trump** and Bernie Sanders have **sent shock waves** **through Japan, with** **mounting concern** that **their** most powerful **ally could pull back** from the region **while China flexes its growing military**. **Current and former** Japanese **officials said** the contentious **presidential primaries have been interpreted as** the **America**n people **seeking to pull back** from global leadership. **They pushed** back **against** Republican presumptive nominee Donald **Trump's suggestion** that **Japan does not contribute** enough to the security relationship. "**There has been** some change, **some structure change** **in the** thinking of **U.S.** people," **said** Satoshi **Morimoto**, Japan's former defense minister, through a translator. "I think **with** Mr. **Trump's supporters** there is a commonality between them that **they don't think the U.S. should bear the burden** alone, they no longer want to be the world's policeman." Morimoto rejected the notion that the U.S. security arrangement with Japan was unfair, saying that his country contributes nearly $40,000 per U.S. service member stationed there, nearly $1.7 billion per year. But he added that the skepticism among both Sanders and Trump's supporters should be taken seriously and that allies may need to contribute more. "The U.S. cannot do everything on its own ... and so allies should step up their forces," Morimoto said. "We wish the U.S. to take leadership, but we do need to cooperate. We wish to uphold values based on international laws ... and in order to protect that we need to contribute." In late 2015, **Trump questioned** the **value and fairness of the U.S.-Japan alliance**, a decades-old pact where the U.S. pledges to defend Japan in return for allowing them to base troops and warships there, becoming a U.S. security and logistics hub to respond to regional threats from piracy to North Korean militarism. "If somebody attacks Japan, we have to immediately go and start World War III, okay? If we get attacked, Japan doesn't have to help us," Trump said. "Somehow, that doesn't sound so fair." The allies are also worried that a Sanders presidency would be more inwardly focused on America's domestic problems, rather than maintaining U.S. leadership in regions from the Asia-Pacific to Europe. **Japan's current ambassador** to the U.S. **echoed the call for the U.S. to avoid isolationism**. "One candidate has taken a more isolationist stance," Kenichiro Sasae said. "I don't want to see that kind of United States. I want to see the United States strong and in a strong global position." **Another senior** Japanese **minister**, who heads major agricultural and security programs in Japan's government, **said both countries need to be clear about the alliance** and what it provides. "**One candidate** has been talking about change in alliance relationship and this **is a concern** **in Japan**," said Shigeru Ishiba. "We understand that the citizens of the U.S. choose the president and who they chose, that's none of our business. But no matter who becomes president I think an understanding of the nature of the alliance ... will lead to proper policies being implemented."

**US-Japan Relations Low**

**Trump’s rhetoric creates uncertainty and raises a laundry list of other threats to the alliance**

**Tanaka 7-13** {Hitoshi, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange, chairperson of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, former Japanese deputy minister for foreign affairs, “Trump and the Future of the US–Japan Alliance,” East Asia Forum, originally posted in East Asia Insights Vol. 11 No. 2, 2016, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/13/trump-and-the-future-of-the-us-japan-alliance/#THUR>} \*\*Modified for ableist language

**Even if** **Trump** ultimately **fails to win the** US **presidency**, the **rhetoric of his campaign** has **already put US–Japan relations at risk**. The **question of** the **US role in the world will be** a **critical** issue **for the incoming admin**istration. **Trump’s rhetoric fails to recognise** the **interconnected nature of** shared global **challenges and** **pushes public opinion** **toward** ~~blind~~ [under-evaluated] **isolationism**. A 5 **May** opinion **poll** by Pew Research Center **indicates** that **57 per cent** of Americans **would rather** the **U**nited **S**tates ‘**deal with its own problems**, while letting other countries get along as best they can.’ A much **greater number** of respondents (41 per cent) **said** that the **U**nited **S**tates ‘**does too much’ to solve global problems rather than ‘too little’** (27 per cent). **A tilt toward isolationism** **will** **undermine alliance relations**, US economic and political interests, and overall regional stability. **Trump’s rhetoric** **risks undermining confidence** **in the** US **security guarantee to Japan**. The **fact that the presumptive candidate** of one of the two major US parties has **openly suggested** **abandoning the alliance** **is forcing Japanese policymakers to start more actively contemplating** **previously unthinkable scenarios in case** the **U**nited **S**tates **were to actually walk away. This risks** **setting in motion** **an evolution** in thinking on both sides that is ultimately **harmful to US interests**. **What**, then, **must** the **U**nited **S**tates and Japan **do** in order to continue strengthening alliance cooperation? For one, **they should** be **bolster**ing **coop**eration **with** mutual **partners** in the region **such as** **So**uth **Ko**rea, **Australia, India and** the **ASEAN** nations. **Japan should** also continue to **explore options to reduce** the **US burden**, including further expanding the contributions of the SDF, helping to make US military troops stationed in Japan as compact as possible, and instituting joint drills, training and base-sharing arrangements. **At the same time**, the **question of** reducing **Okinawa’s burden** — **including** how to move forward on the issue of the relocation of US Marine Corps Air Station **Futenma** — **needs to be addressed.** The **danger of isolationist foreign policy must be firmly resisted**. The US–Japan alliance has played a critical role in securing shared peace and prosperity in Asia Pacific. **Throwing away** more than 70 years of **an alliance** that continues to benefit both nations and the region **would be** a **tragic** mistake.

**Plan Helps the Alliance**

**Plan helps the alliance—increases perception of U.S. involvement in the region—constructive engagement is key**

**Tanaka 2015** (Hitoshi, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs
Hitoshi, “The next step for the US-Japan alliance,” Aug 4, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japan-alliance/>)

**This evolution in US-Japan alliance relations has taken place as the regional balance of power shifts. Emerging economies such as China,** India, and ASEAN countries **are rising**; Asia’s middle class is growing; and US defence spending shifting toward a more sustainable, ‘lean-but-mean’ posture. Thus as the Abe administration struggles over the next couple of months to pass legislation to expand Japan’s security role, **structural shifts in East Asia are making it clear that the next step for Japan and the US must be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted partnership.** Japan must strengthen regional trust. The 70th anniversary of World War II offers an opportunity to affirm Japan’s peaceful postwar identity and to mend ties with South Korea and China. In his anticipated August statement, Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of the key elements of the Murayama Statement. At the same time, Abe should set out Japan’s defence policy in a forward-looking way — clearly stating that it is aimed solely at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional security environment — to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea that the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s new security legislation to allow limited forms of collective self-defence represent a return to a more aggressive regional posture. **A change in the US mindset is needed so it may truly act as a resident power in East Asia. Current projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class** by 2030 **and will account for more than half of global GDP** by 2050. **As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the US become more intimately and directly involved in the order-building process. This requires the US to move away from its tendency to act as an external balancer and toward a more engaged day-to-day involvement and leadership role in the region across political, security and economic dimensions**. One channel for the US to project such political leadership would be to spearhead the establishment of a four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. Such a mechanism would be well positioned to foster reassurance diplomacy regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, and to promote agreements on military-to-military hotlines and crisis management procedures to reduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate damage in the event of a crisis. The US and Japan should strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, including contingency planning, is urgent given the uncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trilateral cooperation directed toward North Korea should take into account the need to engage China and Russia, make preparations to steer the situation toward a soft-landing unification, and utilise Track 2 diplomacy to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployment of US troops throughout East Asia needs to be re-examined regularly — through intensive consultation with alliance partners — to ensure it is politically sustainable and able to meet contemporary challenges. While the US forward deployment is a critical regional public good, it must be re-considered whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration in one area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa in the face of strident local opposition, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfil US-Japan alliance goals. Advances in new military technologies and the changing nature of regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more evenly distributed and rotated across the region — a trend that is already underway with increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. At the same time, as the SDF continues to expand its roles and functions to engage in limited collective self-defence, there will be greater potential for joint US-Japan basing arrangements, which should be utilised as an opportunity to deepen US-Japan security cooperation. Finally, **Japan and the US would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas**, including on multilateral financial institutions, mega-regional trade agreements, and energy and the environment.

**Relations Aren’t Zero-Sum**

**Relations aren’t zero-sum – Japan welcomes cooperation.**

**Mifune 11 (**Emi Mifune, Professor at Komazawa University, visiting professor at China Foreign Affairs University, “Japan’s Perspectives towards a Rising China”, in Herbert S. Yee, ed. China's Rise: Threat or Opportunity? London and New York: Routledge, 2011, http://www.la.utexas.edu/dsena/courses/globexchina/readings/yee-japan.pdf)

On his first trip to Asian countries as the US president in November 2009, President Obama said the US would seek to strengthen its tie with a rising China even as it maintains close ties with allies like Japan. There are questions about how the US perceives China's emergence as a global power, how its seeking to build stronger ties with China wields influence over the Japan-US relations and the Japan-US-China triangle relations, and how Japan should engage the expanding US-China relations. **Some Japanese worry that the deepening US-China relations in a new era affects the Japan-US relations**, causing Japan's position to retreat. **However, others believe that Japan welcomes the idea that the US and China have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability and prosperity. It is important for Japan to welcome a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs by interacting with the United States.** According to lEA (lntemational Energy Agency), China exhausted 21 percent of the world's carbon dioxide in 2007, the US exhausted 20 percent, the EU exhausted 14 percent, Russia exhausted 6 percent, India exhausted 5 percent, and Japan exhausted 4 percent. **Both China and the US must find way to mitigate climate change and should combine efforts.** Without dramatically significant actions by the US and China, the global climate crisis will leave human beings with no future. China's role in the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea is crucial to regional security in Asia. China's influence over North Korea is not absolute, but there is no one that can affect North Korea as much as China can. Without China's cooperation with the US on the North Korea issue, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be expected. China has recently increased its economic, military, and diplomatic influence in countries in South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China's investments in these countries are large and will continue to increase. It is seeking to develop its influence over those countries to ensure its energy import and to build its sea-lane. It has obstacles in these places because there is historical antagonism among these countries even though the governments have now developed better relations. The countries and sea around them are so important for Japan's sea-lane that **Japan needs to build cooperative relationships** with them without causing a confrontation with China. The US has decided to encourage more Americans to study in China by launching a new initiative to send 100,000 students to China over the forthcoming four years. China has sent the United States a lot of students in the past. This new project of sending American students to China is going to cultivate US experts on China. It will also develop personal channels between China and the US. Japan also needs to develop personal exchanges. Recently, there have been a lot of Chinese scholars and celebrities who have conveyed propaganda to Japan about the preferred ideas and politics of China. However, there have been few Chinese specialists in Japanese affairs. The current relation between US and China poses challenges for Japan. **The Japan-US relation is not a zero-sum game towards the US- China relation. While the Japan-US relation is one of being allies, the US-China relation is a partnership** to negotiate and resolve many issues concerning global and regional stabilities and prosperity. **These two bilateral relationships are completely different. Seeking to build common ties to China and the US is necessary for Japan,** and now is the appropriate time to get into the act. However, the Hatoyama Administration forms abstract ideas of the Japan-US and the Japan- China relations, which might harm those relations in the near future. **Japan does not need to fear a rising China**; however, the Japanese government needs a grand foreign strategy with mid-term and long- term views to cope with a rising China.

**Japan Won’t Nuclearize**

**Japan is pacifist – won’t develop nukes**

**Lind, 2016** (Jennifer, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University, “Japan’s Security Evolution” Cato POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 788 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-788.pdf> JJH)

In East Asia’s worsening threat environment, **greater Japanese military activism is not surprising, nor is it a break from Japan’s postwar policy.** Rather than a major departure, the new security legislation is just the most recent recalibration of a familiar strategy. **Japan does less when it can; more when it must**.39 **Cries of “Japan is abandoning pacifism” are not only misleading because they come 70 years too late; they also distort the magnitude of recent changes. Any discussion of increased Japanese military activism must acknowledge that Japan remains the most dovish of the world’s great powers**. **Japan spends 1 percent of its GDP on defense, which is less than half of the global average of 2.3 percent**.40 **Its people are unlikely to support higher defense spending; they are preoccupied with internal problems such as stimulating the economy and addressing debilitating demographic trends**. And — as shown by the ox-walking Taro Yamamoto, his many opposition colleagues, and the tens of thousands protesting outside the Diet — the **Japanese people remain deeply apprehensive about even the most minimal levels of military activism**. As Adam Liff argues, “Japan’s security policy remains far more self-restrained than any other major economic power.”41 **Japan’s movement into “collective self-defense” is indeed historic — but not as a dramatic abandonment of a previous strategy.** It is the most recent step in a long evolution for a peaceful country that today faces a growing threat. And as such, it represents more continuity than change in Japan’s national security policy.

**Japan Won’t Nuclearize**

**Japan won’t build nukes – multiple reasons**

**Berger 15 –** DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR POLICY AND SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW (Andrea, 9/20/15, “Pacifism bill: Why Japan won't build a nuclear weapon quickly”, Located at <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/>, Accessed 6/24/16, CNN, MW)

Japan's new military policy making region wary 01:44 Some assess that the scale and sophistication of Japan's nuclear infrastructure would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months, should the unlikely political decision be taken to do so. **Strategic rival China has sought to draw attention to this fact, issuing loud warnings over Japan's stocks of nuclear material**, for example. But it should be noted that **under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- which Japan ratified in 1976 -- states are entitled to peaceful nuclear technology for energy purposes if they forswear nuclear weapons.** **To ensure that the country's nuclear sites remain exclusively for peaceful use**, **they are subjected to intensive scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna**. The Agency consistently verifies the accuracy and completeness of Japan's declarations regarding its nuclear facilities, material, and activities and conducts monitoring and inspections at relevant facilities. Its role in Japan will continue to be particularly important in order to dispel any fears that the country may harbor nuclear weapons intentions. **China and the International Atomic Energy Agency are not the only ones following Japan's nuclear activity closely. Two other audiences are noteworthy**. The **first is Japan's public, who have become increasingly wary of the risks and dangers associated with nuclear technology** -- whether for civilian or military applications -- following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The **second is** the country's closest ally, **the United States**, who is similarly attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of **Japan's alliance with the United States that the former has even less of an incentive to build a nuclear weapon**. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa are a visible reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it. As long as Japan believes in the strength of the U.S.'s so-called "extended deterrence" guarantee it is unlikely to see any merit in having its own nuclear weapons capability. For this reason, both countries work tirelessly to ensure the credibility and durability of their defence partnership -- an immeasurably important aim. Despite what many may think, the Abe administration sees the new security bill as part of this broader effort to contribute to a two-way military relationship -- not as a legal green light for offensive action. The bill creates the framework for Japan to give as much to the relationship as it receives, by enabling it to come to the aid of the United States if necessary. More than anything else, **history is likely to undermine any temptation Japan might have to build a bomb. Japan was the first and only country to ever be attacked with nuclear weapons**. Over 100,000 Japanese citizens were killed in the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seventy years on, Japan's nuclear history will not be forgotten any time soon. Indeed, it is because of that history that Japan has become one of the most active signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tokyo has invested significant resources into preventing the illegal spread of nuclear weapons-relevant materials and technology, promoting the conditions needed for nuclear disarmament, and reminding the world of the grotesque effects of the use of an atomic bomb. The non-proliferation norm is one that Japan will have little incentive to abandon in the short, medium, or likely even in the long-term. Contrary to the suggestions of some watching legislative developments in Japan, the new security bill is not going to change that.

**Japan Won’t Nuclearize**

**Japan is in military spending deficit – they can’t make nuclear weapons**

**Bremmer 15 —** Ian Bremmer, foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME, 2015, (“Why the World doesn’t have to fear Japan,” TIME, 9/24, Available online at <http://time.com/4047863/the-world-doesnt-have-to-fear-japan/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Trouble in the East China Sea between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, has been an uncomfortable undercurrent in global affairs. Now, 70 years after the end of World War II, ostensibly pacifist Japan has passed legislation that expands the role and reach of its military. The angry reaction from the Chinese and South Korean governments that followed owe as much to domestic politics as to memories of WW II–era Japanese militarism. Some fear that **Japan**’s move signals that East Asia will become the world’s next danger zone. But breathe easier–East Asia **is one region we don’t have to worry about.** First, it’s much easier to pass a new law than to build a new military. That’s especially true in **Japan**, which **doesn’t have much more money to spend on defense**. **The country’s debt is already approaching 250% of GDP, and the International Monetary Fund warned this summer that it will rise to as much as three times the size of Japan’s economy within 15 years** unless the government reins in spending. The country’s rapidly aging population demands progressively higher spending on pensions and health care. That’s why Japan’s Ministry of Defense is asking for a bump in military spending of just 2.2% for next year, a rise that owes more to increased costs imposed by a weaker yen than a desire to beat China, which is recording double-digit increases in military spending. **Nor is there public support in Japan for a more hawkish foreign policy. The new law has eroded Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s popularity and provoked intense protests inside and outside Japan’s parliament. According to a recent Pew survey, 68% of Japanese want to limit Japan’s military activity**, while only 23% want the country to be more active. If Japan becomes militarily aggressive, costs will become unsustainable and opposition to Abe will become entrenched. So if it’s expensive and unpopular, why did the Prime Minister push for this change? **Abe wants to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the military alliance with the U.S. by showing a willingness to become a more active partner**. The U.S.-Japan alliance, not a stronger Japanese military on its own, is crucial for countering China’s expansion. In addition, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are more hawkish than the average Japanese. Appeasing them helps Abe build and maintain support within the LDP for his more important drive for economic reform. And the economy is one more reason Japan is not about to stoke conflict. China is Japan’s largest trade partner. We may see more Japanese patrol boats in the East China Sea, but we’re no more likely to see open conflict than we were before this law passed.

**Alliance Resilient**

**Japan alliance resilient**

**Pilling 15 —** David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times. 2015 ("An unsinkable Pacific alliance," Financial Times, April 22nd, Availabale Online at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e32282d8-e8cf-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cPkFBAkt>, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

The **closeness between America and Japan,** forged in the ashes of war, **goes beyond the ideological**¶ If the **Americans and Japanese** went in for that kind of thing they might **describe themselves as being as close as lips and teeth**. In actual fact, that it is how China and North Korea have traditionally categorised their relationship. **Washington and Tokyo prefer to talk soberly about their “shared values” as fellow democracies and market economies. Yet, despite the lack of colourful language, theirs has been one of the closest and most enduring of postwar relationships. They stand shoulder to shoulder on most issues from terrorism to intellectual property.¶ That closeness, forged in the ashes of the second world war, goes beyond the ideological. In tangible ways, the two lean on each other heavily. The US regards Japan as its representative in Asia. It depends on Japan to help fund its debt**: Tokyo not Beijing is the biggest holder of US Treasuries, if only just. **Japan** has **supported Washington’s military interventions, with cash and, increasingly, with logistical support. Tokyo relies on the US nuclear umbrella** and on the protection afforded by 35,000 US troops stationed on its territory. In a candid description of the relationship, **Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister in the mid-1980s, referred to Japan as Washington’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific.¶** Next week Shinzo **Abe**, perhaps Japan’s strongest leader since Mr Nakasone**, will celebrate 70 years of that relationship with a rare speech to a joint session of Congress**. He will stress Japan’s concerted effort to revive its economy. He will urge Congress to give Barack Obama, the US president, the fast-track authority he needs to conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership. He will express some contrition for the war, though perhaps not enough for the taste of some in congress. He wil**l paint a future in which Japan, released from postwar constitutional handcuffs, can play a more active role in helping the US to keep the world a safe and lawful place**. He is unlikely to mention China. But everyone will know what he means.¶ **Mr Abe will** mostly **be warmly received**. Washington hopes Abenomics will work and is prepared to tolerate a little “Abenesia” — the downplaying of Japan’s war record — if that is the price of a strong leader. Indeed, many in Washington regard Mr Abe as the best Japanese prime minister in a generation.

**No Arms Race Impact**

**No incentive for an East Asian arms race and it doesn’t lead to war**

**Sundstrom 15 —** Ian Sundstrom, surface warfare officer and holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College in London, 2015, (“An East Asian Arms Race: Does it Even Matter,” The Diplomat, 1/16, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? **Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two** fundamental **requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises** military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of **war, money and guns**. **The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of** a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, **and the belief that war is the only**, or even just the best, **option available** to achieve the desired outcome. **An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect**. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the “Missile Gap” on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. **The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary’s intentions. In the context of an East Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China’s expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns.** China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing’s point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China’s historical record is not obviously aggressive. China does have a recent history of aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas, though. **Taken at face value, this would indicate that expanded Chinese military capabilities will be used offensively. However, talk is cheap whereas war is not, and rhetoric is just as often used to mask intentions as display them. Aggressive public statements are an easy way to placate nationalist sentiment at home and apply diplomatic pressure abroad.** I do not have any doubt that China desires both de facto and de jure control over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the various islands and reefs of the South China Sea, but **it is more likely that China will continue its current “salami-slicing” diplomatic tactics than it will use its expanding military to engage in campaigns to seize the islands**. China currently has the capability to seize these territories (Taiwan possibly excepted), even if it couldn’t defend them against recapture, and so continued restraint speaks volumes to Chinese intent. While we fret about the PLA Navy’s newest frigate and latest stealth fighter, China will slowly use diplomatic maneuvering to achieve its ends well below the threshold of open war. Of course, intentions are slippery and can change drastically without warning. That is why military capability is so often discussed. You can count and analyze tanks with some degree of certainty that tomorrow they won’t suddenly become submarines. Capability, however, is not a substitute for intent and it does not do to study one without the other. **Whether an arms race is occurring in Asia or not, it should be remembered that war is not caused by weapons, but by people. China’s defense spending continues to increase, and its neighbors’ budgets may follow suit, but this does not change anything fundamental about the region’s international relations.** Keeping the capability/intent framework in mind allows you to see past the bluster about rising defense budgets and expanding capabilities and focus on what really matters: who wants what, and are they willing to fight for it.

**No Proliferation Impact**

**Prolif is slow, won’t happen, and has no impact – reject their evidence**

**Keck 13** (Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, 12/4/13, “Why Nuclear Weapons Don't Spread (Quickly)”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-nuclear-weapons-dont-spread-quickly/)

Cartwright is hardly alone in holding these views. Indeed, the general consensus when it comes to nuclear weapons has long been “when there’s a will there’s a way.” And yet, **the spread of nuclear weapons has always been** **surprisingly slow**. Moreover, **despite the** **diffusion of** nuclear **tech**nology, **nuclear weapons have** actually **been** **spreading** **much more slowly than they did during the first** **few decades of the nuclear era.** Consider that, **in the three decades following** the atomic bombings of **Hiroshima and Nagasaki**, no less than **seven countries** **developed** at least **a nascent nuclear weapon capability**. **In the** nearly **four decades since**, **only three countries** — Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea — **have developed** a nuclear weapons **capability**, **and one** of these states — South Africa — **voluntarily dismantled its arsenal.** So what explains this great nuclear slowdown? Two converging trends seem to be at work. First, **there has been an** **undeniable decline** **in the number of states interested in acquiring** nuclear **weapons**. Harald **Muller** **and** Andreas **Schmidt** have **documented this** well. **In their** **comprehensive study** **of states with** nuclear **weapons activities between** 19**45** **and** 20**05**, **they find that** “**states with nuclear weapons activities were** **always a minority**, **and today they are the** **smallest minority** since 1945.” Specifically, in 2005 **they identified 10 states as having nuclear weapons activities** (including those with nuclear weapons), **which constituted** **less than six percent** **of** **UN members**. Today the only non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that might be interested in an atomic weapon is Iran. The fact that **states have** **by and large been uninterested in nuclear weapons** is somewhat perplexing from a historic perspective. After all, what other revolutionary military technology hasn’t elicited strong interest from most states competing in the international system? At the same time, when one examines the properties of nuclear weapons more closely, the lack of interest is easier to understand. **Nuclear weapons** have basically **served one purpose** for states possessing them; namely, **they** have **deterred others** from challenging that state’s survival and other fundamental interests. But the **nuclear era has** also **been characterized by a sharp decline in warfare** **and** today **fewer** **states** **face** fundamental external **threats** to their existence. Given the high costs of building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, it makes little sense to acquire nuclear weapons without such an existential threat. While lack of interest explains why some states have renounced nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to build them, the **difficulty** **in building them has prevented others states that seek** nuclear **weapons from acquiring them**. **Despite** the view that “**where there is a will there’s a way,” and** a strong sense that **globalization** has exacerbated this, the **historical record tells** **a** very **different story.** As Jacques Hymans has pointed out, before 1970 seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapon programs and all seven succeeded in an average of seven years. Since 1970, **ten states have launched dedicated nuclear weapons programs and only three** have **succeeded** (the jury’s still out on Iran). **These** three have **take**n an **average of 17 years to succeed** and **Iran** under the Islamic Republic **has been working towards a** nuclear **weapon** capability **for** some **three decades.** Just as **pundits** have **routinely** **underestimate**d **the difficulty of building** nuclear **weapons**, so too do **they** **grossly overstate the** **number of states** who are **technically capable of building them**. Both journalists and scholars regularly cite 40 as the number of non-nuclear weapon states who are technically capable of building them. This figure is often attributed to the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, who said in 2004: “Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means if they have the required fissile material — high enriched uranium or plutonium — we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.” As Scott Sagan has pointed out, most of those citing ElBaradei omit the latter part of his statement about having the required fissile material. But this statement is crucial as only a handful of NNWS are capable of producing or otherwise procuring fissile material, which is necessary for a nuclear bomb. Moreover, thanks in no small part to President Obama’s focus on nuclear security, the **global availability of fissile material has been declining** **as the U.S. and** its **allies** help **remove fissile material from** some **states while downsizing** the **stockpiles** in many others. Furthermore, compared with the Cold War era and even the 1990s, nuclear weapon holding and **nuclear capable states are** **much less willing to sell** NNWS **crucial dual use tech**nology that can be used to indigenously produce fissile material. Thus, **contrary to common perception**, **there is** **no impeding nuclear domino about to fall.**

**No Proliferation Impact**

**Prolif doesn’t cause war**

**Waltz** 3/22/**2007** (Kenneth, Professor – UC Berkeley, “A Nuclear Iran”, Journal of International Affairs, Lexis)

First, nuclear **proliferation is not a problem** because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that'sobviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, **it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons**. Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. Forinstance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, **with nuclear** **weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation**. **Every country**--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution **behaves with** such **caution**. It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses.Well, I have one: **If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked** militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. **That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years**. Pretty impressive.