# \*\*WDCA Communication Case Negative\*\*

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**File Notes:** This file contains the answers to the Communication Affirmative.

The negative has four responses to the self-fulfilling prophecy advantage. First, they can argue that realism is the correct theory of international relations, and that we should act to secure ourselves against threats. Second, they can argue that there is no root cause of conflict, and in particular no root cause of conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Third, the negative can contend that there is no such thing as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, they can argue that the way we represent China does not contribute to our security policy or increase the likelihood of war.

The negative has four responses to the affirmative’s solvency contention as well. The first argument is that the affirmative is unable to change the negative mindset about China that they critique with their plan. The second argument is that Congress will use various methods to sabotage the talks between the US and China, rendering them ineffective. The third argument is that realism is inevitable in international security. The fourth argument is that communicative engagement cannot overcome the real differences in US-China strategic interests, and thus will not resolve tensions.

### 1NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Answers

#### 1. Securitization and realism are good – they address militarist policies like the Iraq war and check violence

Rosato & Schuessler 11 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame AND Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College (Sebastian and John, “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States”, Perspectives on Politics December 2011 Vol. 9 No. 4)

With these requirements in mind, we describe and defend a prescriptive realist theory of foreign policy to guide American decision makers as they navigate the current environment. Brieﬂy, the theory says that if they want to ensure their security, great powers such as the United States should balance against other great powers and also against hostile minor powers that inhabit strategically important regions of the world. We then show that had the great powers followed our theory’s prescriptions, some of the most important wars of the past century might have been averted. Speciﬁcally, the world wars might not have occurred, and the United States might not have gone to war in either Vietnam or Iraq. In other words, realism as we conceive it offers the prospect of security without war. Our argument is likely to be controversial because few observers think that a realist foreign policy can minimize the chances of war. Indeed, the main reason that “no one loves a political realist” arises from the intimate association that realism is thought to have with war. 13 The criticism takes several forms: some argue that realism is a license for aggression; others that it perpetuates competitive behavior; still others that it advances few ideas on how to overcome interstate conﬂict, thus foreclosing possibilities for progressive change. 14 As a result, most analysts consider realism an inappropriate guide to current US foreign policy. Liberals have been quite outspoken in leveling these kinds of charges, claiming that realism neglects transformative developments such as globalization, democratization, and the proliferation of international institutions, all of which offer the possibility of an enduring peace. 15 Robert Keohane observes that realism “is better at telling us why we are in such trouble than how to get out of it.” 16 Realism, that is, may explain why international politics is conﬂictual, but provides little guidance for overcoming that conﬂict peacefully. For Keohane, such complacency is morally unacceptable, leading him to conclude that “no serious thinker could . . . be satisﬁed with Realism as the correct theory of world politics.” He advises scholars to focus on international institutions instead: “Unlike Realism, theories that attempt to explain rules, norms, and institutions help us to understand how to create patterns of cooperation that could be essential to our survival.” 17 Bruce Russett adopts a similar tack in his defense of democratic peace theory. Realism, he notes, “has no place for an expectation that democracies will not ﬁght each other.” 18 This is important because understanding the sources of the democratic peace can have the effect of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. By adopting a skeptical attitude toward the democratic peace, then, realists are at least indirectly diminishing the prospects for a world without war. 19 The constructivist charge is that realist discourse perpetuates the very competition for power that realists purport to explain. Anarchy, after all, is what states make of it; so if realists describe international politics as competitive, then states are more likely to act in precisely that way. 20 This is, in fact, Alexander Wendt’s critique in his seminal statement of constructivism. The problem with realism, he argues, is that it refuses to acknowledge that international politics can be anything but Hobbesian and in doing so impedes progress. In Wendt’s own words, “Realism’s commitment to self-interest participates in creating and reifying self-help worlds in international politics. To that extent Realism is taking an at least implicit stand not only on what international life is, but on what it should be; it becomes a normative as well as a positive theory.” 21 Critics have zeroed in on modern realism, the branch of the tradition that informs our theory. 22 Classical realism has recently undergone a revival among realism’s critics. Classical realists are described as being less ﬁxated on narrow power considerations than their successors and more attuned to transformative developments in world politics. They therefore have more to contribute to the cause of peace. Richard Ned Lebow has been a forceful advocate of this position, lamenting that the structural turn in realism has led to a vicious circle: “The language of classical realism, with all its subtlety, commitment to caution and respect for conventions, has been replaced by the cruder language of modern realism and its emphasis on power and expediency. These maxims, which have become conventional wisdom, guide policymakers, and their behavior in turn appears to conﬁrm the assumptions of the modern realist discourse.” Lebow concedes that many realists opposed the Iraq War and cannot be held responsible for the failures of US foreign policy, but in the same breath warns that modern realist discourse “has the potential to turn American hegemony into another tragedy.” 23 Michael Williams has joined the debate in a similar fashion, reconstructing a “wilful” realist tradition from the writings of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Morgenthau. For him, “wilful Realism is deeply concerned that a recognition of the centrality of power in politics does not result in the reduction of politics to pure power, and particularly to the capacity to wield violence. It seeks, on the contrary, a politics of limits that recognizes the destructive and productive dimensions of <<card continues>>

### 1NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Answers

<<card continues>> politics, and that maximizes its positive possibilities while minimizing its destructive potential.” 24 Williams is explicit that his “wilful” variant stands in stark contrast to most understandings of realism today, implying that modern realists do reduce politics to power maximization and eschew any limits on the exercise of that power, with destructive consequences. We dispute the conventional characterization of realism. Our position is that it is possible to develop a prescriptive realist theory—one derived from the core assumptions of modern realism—that meets a state’s security needs while minimizing the likelihood of war. 2 Our case proceeds as follows. We begin by describing our prescriptive realist theory of foreign policy. Next we describe an alternative liberal approach that promises perpetual peace rather than the mere stability implied by our theory. We then suggest that had the great powers behaved as our theory advises, some of the most important wars of the past century might have been avoided. At the same time, we show that liberalism was at least partially to blame for the outbreak of these wars. We conclude by using our theory to outline a foreign policy for the United States, one that we argue should make the US secure, while simultaneously minimizing the likelihood that it will become embroiled in future wars. A Prescriptive Realist Theory Here we develop a prescriptive realist theory that tells great powers such as the United States how they should behave if they want to ensure their security.26 The prescriptions can be briefly summarized. If they are dealing with peer competitors, great powers should balance— they should build up their capabilities and make it clear to actual and potential great power rivals that they will oppose their attempts at expansion. At the same time, they should take a relaxed view toward developments involving minor powers and, at most, should balance against hostile minor powers that inhabit strategically important areas of the world. We begin with three core assumptions. First, the international system is anarchic—there is no government above states to enforce agreements among them or to protect them from one another.27 Second, states cannot know the present and, especially, the future intentions of others.28 Third, interstate war is an unpredictable enterprise with potentially devastating consequences. As Robert Jervis observes, “statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of unpredictable and uncontrollable events.”29 Of course, the more powerful a state, the more likely it is to prevail in battle. But superior strength does not guarantee victory; weaker states can and sometimes do defeat stronger opponents.30 The fundamental prescription that follows from these premises is that states should be attentive to the balance of power. Because there is no government to protect them and they cannot know the intentions of others, great powers must ultimately provide for their own security. This, in turn, means that they must worry about how much power they have relative to their competitors, where power refers to military and economic assets.31 Before we turn to the task of laying out more specific prescriptions, a few words are in order about the status of our theory. For one thing, its assumptions and its emphasis on power competition clearly place it within the modern realist tradition.32 At the same time, however, the task we have set ourselves is quite different from the one that preoccupies most realist scholars. They are engaged in a primarily explanatory enterprise. According to John Mearsheimer, “realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future.”33 This is not to say that realists are uninterested in prescription. Indeed, the opposite is closer to the truth. As Marc Trachtenberg points out, “At the heart of the realist tradition is an interpretation of why things go wrong, and thus involves claims about how international politics should work and what sort of policies should be pursued.”34 But explanation is the primary goal and prescriptions follow. We take a different tack and set out with the express purpose of creating a prescriptive theory.

### 1NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Answers

#### 2. There is no root cause of war. The aff’s claims of “self-fulfilling prophecies” are too general and don’t account for the nuances of conflict

Levy & Thompson 13 (Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419)

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether different kinds of organized warfare—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether different kinds of interstate wars can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time. As his detailed and informative graphs make clear, different forms of human violence began to decline at different times and proceeded at different rates.12 Many of the trends are not monotonic and sometimes point in different directions. The gradual decline in the frequency of great power war was interrupted in the first half of the twentieth century but then continued from 1950s to the present, while the frequency of civil wars began to increase significantly after 1960 before beginning an uneven decline by 1990 that included an uptick in the early 2000s. It is clear that great power wars and civil wars follow different trajectories,13 undercutting any claim that a single process could drive these different patterns (unless those processes are defined so generally as to lose their analytic utility).

### 1NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Answers

#### 3. Modern security measures and discourses make war highly unlikely and allow for peaceful reassurance between countries.

Jervis 1 (Robert, Prof. of International Politics at Columbia Univ., American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 1-14)

Predictions about the maintenance of the Community are obviously disputable (indeed, limitations on people’s ability to predict could undermine it), but nothing in the short period since the end of the Cold War points to an unraveling. The disputes within it do not seem to be increasing in number or severity and even analysts who stress the continuation of the struggle for world primacy and great power rivalries do not expect fighting [Huntington 1993; Kupchan forthcoming; Waltz 1993, 2000; however, Calleo (2001), Layne (2000), and Mearsheimer (1990, 2001) are ambiguous on this point]. If the United States is still concerned with maintaining its advantages over its allies, the reason is not that it believes that it may have to fight them but that it worries that rivalry could make managing world problems more difficult (Layne 2000; New York Times, March 8, 1992, 14; May 24, 1992, 1, 14). The Europeans’ effort to establish an independent security force is aimed at permitting them to intervene when the United States chooses not to (or perhaps by threatening such action, to trigger American intervention), not at fighting the United States. Even if Europe were to unite and the world to become bipolar again, it is very unlikely that suspicions, fears for the future, and conflicts of interest would be severe enough to break the Community. A greater threat would be the failure of Europe to unite coupled with an American withdrawal of forces, which could lead to “security competition” within Europe (Art 1996a; Mearsheimer 2001, 385–96). The fears would focus on Germany, but their magnitude is hard to gauge and it is difficult to estimate what external shocks or kinds of German behavior would activate them. The fact that Thatcher and Mitterrand opposed German unification is surely not forgotten in Germany and is an indication that concerns remain. But this danger is likely to constitute a self-denying prophecy in two ways. First, many Germans are aware of the need not only to reassure others by tying themselves to Europe, but also to make it unlikely that future generations of Germans would want to break these bonds even if they could. Second, Americans who worry about the residual danger will favor keeping some troops in Europe as the ultimate intra-European security guarantee. Expectations of peace close off important routes to war. The main reason for Japanese aggression in the 1930s was the desire for a self-sufficient sphere that would permit Japan to fight the war with the Western powers that was seen as inevitable, not because of particular conflicts, but because it was believed that great powers always fight each other. In contrast, if states believe that a security community will last, they will not be hypersensitive to threats from within it and will not feel the need to undertake precautionary measures that could undermine the security of other members. Thus the United States is not disturbed that British and French nuclear missiles could destroy American cities, and while those two countries object to American plans for missile defense, they do not feel the need to increase their forces in response. As long as peace is believed to be very likely, the chance of inadvertent spirals of tension and threat is low. Nevertheless, the point with which I began this section is unavoidable. World politics can change rapidly and saying that nothing foreseeable will dissolve the Community its not the same as saying that it will not dissolve (Betts 1992). To the extent that it rests on democracy and prosperity (see below), anything that would undermine these would also undermine the Community. Drastic climate change could also shake the foundations of much that we have come to take for granted. But it is hard to see how dynamics at the international level (i.e., the normal trajectory of fears, disputes, and rivalries) could produce war among the leading states. In other words, the Community does not have within it the seeds of its own destruction. Our faith in the continuation of this peace is in- creased to the extent that we think we understand its causes and have reason to believe that they will continue. This is our next topic.

### 1NC Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Answers

#### 4. Representations don’t cause war – their argument is empirically false

Reiter 95 (Dan, Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR)

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of thethird, most skeptical view of preemptive war, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent(by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out**.** Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

### Ext. #1 – Realist Security Good

#### Their portrayal of realism as violent is wrong – realists hate war

Edelstein 10 (David, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Why realists don’t go for bombs and bullets,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/21/why-realists-dont-go-for-bombs-and-bullets/)

Thanks to Steve Walt for inviting me to contribute to his blog while he is away on vacation. I have been a regular reader of Steve’s blog since it launched, and for my first post, I wanted to pick up on a motif that I have seen running through Steve’s posts: Will realists ever again support the use of military force by the United States? Followers of this blog will by now have little doubt about how Walt felt about the Iraq War or how he views the prospects for U.S. success in Afghanistan. In fact, throughout the history of his blog, I can only recall one case in which Walt advocated the use of U.S. military force (and I think the realist credentials in that case are rather dubious). There is a common perception in the field of political science that realists are war-mongering Neanderthals anxious to use military force at the drop of a hat. Attend any meeting (if you must) of the American Political Science Association or the International Studies Association, and one will find realists derided as the "bombs and bullets ~~guys~~ [people]" as if we were all direct descendants of Curtis LeMay. What is notable about this — and what has been notable about Steve’s blog — is just how infrequently realists have supported the use of American military force. Take the U.S. interventions of the post-Cold War period: Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of those interventions, Afghanistan was the only one that received anything close to strong support from most realists. Others, most notably the Iraq War, received vehement opposition from the vast majority of realists. Even in the case of Afghanistan, realists expressed trepidation about the prospects for ultimate success despite early victories. Go back to the Cold War, and realists like Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau were famously opposed to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Lest one think this is an academic phenomenon, realist policymakers like Brent Scowcroft were equally critical of the Bush administration’s actions in Iraq, and George F. Kennan was skeptical of the U.S. interventions in both Korea and Vietnam. Today, should anyone dare to suggest the use of military force in new contexts such as Iran, they are summarily dismissed by prominent realists. Not a single (self-proclaimed or attributed) realist I know of has advocated the use of military force against Iran in response to its apparent development of nuclear weapons, and most are adamantly opposed to it. From one perspective, this opposition is surprising. It is realists, after all, who so value material power, in particular military capabilities. It is not difficult to understand why so many would assume that realists are anxious to use military force because realists are anxious to focus on military capabilities as a primary explanatory variable for international politics. But it is precisely because realists have spent so much time studying military force that they are also so reluctant to use military force. Though realists themselves are divided on the question, many have concluded that the use of military force is often counterproductive, inviting balancing coalitions that simply make life more difficult. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, using military force to reorder societies is very difficult and unlikely to succeed except in uncommon circumstances.

### Ext. #1 – Realist Security Good

#### Contrary to popular conceptions, realism opposes war in most instances and is the most effective for bringing about positive outcomes

Preble 11 (Christopher A., Vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “In Defense of Realism”, The National Interest, 12/28)

Regular Skeptics readers will recognize Schuessler from his posts here, so we know where he is coming from. Both Schuessler and Rosato deserve enormous credit for knocking down some of the most common criticisms of modern realism and substituting instead a more positive (and I think accurate) vision of realism's core precepts. They also offer clear policy prescriptions flowing from that vision. The entire article is worth a read, but I enclose below the abstract followed by a few observations. What kind of policy can the United States pursue that ensures its security while minimizing the likelihood of war? We describe and defend a realist theory of foreign policy to guide American decision makers. Briefly, the theory says that if they want to ensure their security, great powers such as the United States should balance against other great powers. They should also take a relaxed view toward developments involving minor powers and, at most, should balance against hostile minor powers that inhabit strategically important regions of the world. We then show that had the great powers followed our theory's prescriptions, some of the most important wars of the past century might have been averted. Specifically, the world wars might not have occurred, and the United States might not have gone to war in either Vietnam or Iraq. In other words, realism as we conceive it offers the prospect of security without war. At the same time, we also argue that if the United States adopts an alternative liberal foreign policy, this is likely to result in more, rather than fewer, wars. We conclude by offering some theoretically-based proposals about how US decision makers should deal with China and Iran. These are some pretty bold claims, but the article supports them quite well. Schuessler and Rosato note the conventional wisdom [is] that realism is more prone to war than competing theories, despite the fact that nearly all of the leading realist scholars opposed the Iraq war. They note a number of realists who have been similarly vociferous in warning against war with Iran They move beyond descriptive realism (the world as it is) and offer a prescriptive vision based on three core assumptions—international anarchy, the inability to discern the intentions of others and the unpredictability of war—that help to shape policy as it should be. "The fundamental prescription that flows from these premises is that states should be attentive to the balance of power." They should avoid minor wars and seek ways to deter or prevent large ones. They point out that balancing against great powers "does not imply that they should build up their capabilities without limit, [which] would be a prescription for bankruptcy." They stress the importance of nuclear weapons and of allies (no nation wishes to fight on multiple fronts). It isn't enough to show how realism, properly conceived, is likely to lead to fewer wars. Their article also takes on the task of showing how the other dominant theory, liberalism, often pushes in the opposite direction. Their arguments are sure to raise hackles, but I think that liberals will be hard pressed to refute them. In order to do so, they should explore the historical cases in the article—World Wars I and II, Vietnam and Iraq—and offer a competing explanation for how realism, not liberalism, was the driving force behind them. The remaining critique that liberals might offer is that our only goal shouldn't be to minimize war and maintain stability, especially at the expense of justice. But even wars undertaken with the best of intentions have led to horrific ends, so a presumption against war seems a wise course. At a minimum, it is incumbent upon the critics of Schuessler and Rosato's approach to explain why a more permissive attitude toward the use of force would have served humankind well and would do so in the future.

### Ext. #1 – Realist Security Good

#### There is no such thing as threat inflation- foreign policies based on perceived threats are legitimate

Ravenal 9 (Earl, Professor Emeritus at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1, 21-75)

Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia‐class submarines … aircraft carriers … F‐22 fighters … [and] Osprey tilt‐rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no strategic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold‐plated white elephants.” The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies … looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military‐industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military‐industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies … routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic‐politics” theory, which once made several reputations (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense‐intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub‐industry within the field of international relations, 5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,” 6 which can be considered the right‐wing analog of the “bureaucratic‐politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision‐making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public‐choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop separate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public‐choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public‐ignorance and elite‐expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post‐government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self‐dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract‐dispensing and more under‐the‐radar‐screen agencies of government, the “public‐choice” imputation of self‐dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self‐promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic‐politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent‐seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub‐rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic‐politics theorists, whose model of the <<card continues>>

### Ext. #1 – Realist Security Good

<<card continue>> derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role‐playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic‐politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points—empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national‐security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub‐rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state‐level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self‐seeking impulses of the individual. Role‐derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer‐reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and transmitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision‐makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non‐rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision‐making. In that structure, obvious, and even not‐so‐obvious, “rent‐seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent‐seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self‐placement in these reaches of government testifies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### Ext. #2 – No Root Cause

#### Attempts to resolve singular causes of warfare locks in aggression – developing predictive paradigms is key and are useful even if not always accurate

Moore 4 (Director Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, (John N., *Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace*, pg. 41-42)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, andperceptions of "honor," ormany other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivatingaggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factorsfor war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policiesthat will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems**,** an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinkingaboutthe war puzzle is provided inthe Kenneth Waltzclassic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkersabout the causes of war have tended to assignresponsibility at one of thethree levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, orthe nature of the internationalsystem. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. **Yet** another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressivebehavior**.** Democracy internalizesthese costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement <<card continues>>

### Ext. #2 – No Root Cause

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### Ext. #2 – No Root Cause

#### There’s no root cause of war – only deterrence works

Moore 4 (Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. 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### Ext. #2 – No Root Cause

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### Ext. #3 – No Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Current international conditions make war unthinkable – self-fulfilling prophecy claims are false

Jervis 2 (Robert, Prof. of International Politics at Columbia Univ., American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, March, pp. 1-14)

My explanation for the development and maintenance of the Community combines and reformulates several factors discussed previously. Even with the qualifica- tions just discussed, a necessary condition is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly. When conquest is easy, aggression is encouraged and the security dilemma operates with particular vicious- ness as even defensive states need to prepare to attack (Van Evera 1999). But when states have modern armies and, even more, nuclear weapons, it is hard for anyone to believe that war could make sense. Of course statesmen must consider the gains that war might bring as well as its costs. Were the former to be very high, they might outweigh the latter. But, if anything, the expected benefits of war within the Community have declined, in part because the developed countries, including those that lost World War II, are generally satisfied with the status quo.16 Even in the case that shows the greatest strain—U.S.–Japanese relations—no one has explained how a war could pro- vide anyone much gross, let alone net, benefit: it is hard to locate a problem for which war among the Commu- nity members would provide a solution. The other side of this coin is that, as liberals have stressed, peace within the Community brings many gains, especially economic. While some argue that the disruption caused by relatively free trade is excessive and urge greater national regulation, no one thinks that conquering others would bring more riches than trad- ing with them. Despite concern for relative economic gain (Grieco 1990; Mastanduno 1991) and economic disputes, people believe that their economic fates are linked more positively than negatively to the rest of the Community. Of course costs and benefits are subjective, depend- ing as they do on what the actors value, and changes in values are the third leg of my explanation. Most political analysis takes the actors’ values for granted because they tend to be widely shared and to change slowly. Their importance and variability become clear only when we confront a case such as Nazi Germany, which, contrary to standard realist conceptions of na- tional interest and security, put everything at risk in order to seek the domination of the Aryan race. The changes over the last 50–75 years in what the leaders and publics in the developed states value are striking. To start with, war is no longer seen as good in itself (Mueller 1989); no great power leader today would agree with Theodore Roosevelt that “no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war” (quoted by Harbaugh 1961, 99). In earlier eras it was commonly believed that war brought out the best in individuals and nations and that the virtues of dis- cipline, risk-taking, and self-sacrifice that war required were central to civilization. Relatedly, honor and glory used to be central values. In a world so constituted, the material benefits of peace would be much less important; high levels of trade, the difficulty of mak- ing conquest pay, and even nuclear weapons might not produce peace. Democracy and identity also operate through what actors value, and may be responsible in part for the decline in militarism just noted. Compromise, consideration for the interests of others, respect for law, and a shunning of violence outside this context all are values that underpin democracy and are reciprocally cultivated by it. The Community also is relatively homogeneous in that its members are all democracies and have values that are compatibly similar. It is important that the values be compatible as well as similar: a system filled with states that all believed that war and domi- nation was good would not be peaceful.17 One impulse to war is the desire to change the other country, and this disappears if values are shared. The United States could conquer Canada, for example, but what would be the point when so much of what it wants to see there is already in place? Central to the rise of the Community is the decline in territorial disputes. Territory has been the most com- mon cause and object of conflicts in the past, and we have become so accustomed to their absence within the Community that it is easy to lose sight of how drastic and consequential this change is (Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Huth 1996, 2000; Kacowicz 1998; Vasquez 1993; Zacher 2001). Germans no longer care that Alsace and Lorraine are French; the French are not disturbed by the high level of German presence in these provinces. The French, furthermore, permitted the Saar to return to Germany and are not bothered by this loss, and in- deed do not feel it as a loss at all. Although during the Cold War the West Germans refused to renounce their claims to the “lost territories” to the east, they did so upon unification and few voices were raised in protest. Today the United Kingdom is ready to cede Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic if a referendum in the six counties were to vote to do so.

### Ext. #4 – Discourse Not Key

#### Discourse doesn’t shape reality

Tuathail 96 (Gearóid, Professor of Government and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, The patterned mess of history and the writing of critical geopolitics: a reply to Dalby, Political Geography 15:6/7, p 661-5 http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/miscellaneous/DalbyResponse.htm)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign policy decision makers are quite different, so different that they constitutes a distinctive problem-solving theory-averse policy making sub-culture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are**.** This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many which sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby's fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement -- "Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought" -- evades the important question of agency I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby's reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby's fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses not the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public policy reasoning on national security. Dalby's book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with in the book. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post-structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby's interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev's reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self-interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographer's to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies "post-structuralism" nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

### 1NC Solvency Answers

#### 1. The aff can’t wish away realist conceptions of security in diplomacy – it’s not the policy that’s the problem, but the mindset surrounding it

Guzzini 98 (Stefano, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, pp. 231)

Hedley Bull (1977) writes that although we do, of course, know that there is no such a thing as a balance of power, it is a concept we cannot do without. He is right in a double sense. First, the balance of power is a concept that diplomats use to make their trade. Second, for the first reason and only this, the observer cannot do without it. Power might not be fungible, but diplomats work on measures to give power a translatable meaning. Traditional compensation politics must rely on some measure across different power sectors. Before diplomats can count, they must decide what counts. Hence, the balance of power or any equilibrium idea of this kind is based upon a social construction, sometimes an agreemen,. of the diplomatic community. They share a common measure of power although they would be hard-pressed to define it exactly. Hence, as with the security discourse, measurement of power is a political act. The diplomats who represent states endowed with one particular power resource will do their best to enhance the Uitler's value. The Soviet government's stress on military, and not economic, factors was a case in point. The rush for mass-destructive weapons is as much a concern of security as a question of power in the sense of acquiring a resource which is commonly considered to be at the top rank. The prestige, in turn, is traded for particular compensations or attentions. Sometimes, such agreements on measures and treatments, if generally shared, might diplomatically recreate something similar to the supposedly mechanical balance of power (Kivi 1996). On the second level of observation, the existence of balance of power as a social construct means that we cannot simply forget about it because we found out that no mechanical balance exists. The concept does not refer to anything in the objective structures of the international system. It is a fallacy to think that since it is reproduced in the diplomatic culture, it must correspond to an objectified reality, a fallacy which has daunted much realist writings, both scientific and classical. But it is a device used by diplomats, and as such it exists, and is consequential for international politics. In his inaugural lecture in Zurich, the Swiss scholar Daniel Frei (1969) urged his fellow political scientists to help practical policy with a neutral and measurable concept of power. He was perfectly aware both of the practical needs of such a concept and of its difficult scientific underpinning. This lucid text shows the political value of concepts which travel between the academic and the political community. Power is a device used by academics and as such has effects on the production of knowledge and the reproduction of the traditional diplomatic culture.

### 1NC Solvency Answers

#### 2. Engagement will be circumvented – domestic opposition to engagement with China guarantees the aff will fail

Crocker 9 (Chester, professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 9/13/9, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=1)

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon. The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes. Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement. So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior. Diplomatic engagement is proven to work — in the right circumstances. American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and, intermittently, Syria. There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional conflict management in order to stop cross-border attacks and create better conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the Cubans in an effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia (from South Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique, engagement meant building a constructive relationship with the United States, restraining South African interference in Mozambique’s internal conflicts and weaning the country from its Soviet alignment. More recently, the Bush administration’s strategy for engagement with Libya ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the elimination of that country’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court. Engagement, of course, comes with risks. One is that domestic opponents will intentionally distort the purposes of engagement. Another risk is that each side may try to impose preconditions for agreeing to meet and talk — and ultimately negotiate. But we will not get far with the Iranians, for example, if we (and they) insist on starting by establishing the other side’s intentions. Another risk is that, no matter what we say, the rogue regime may claim that engagement confers legitimacy. A more consequential danger is that a successful engagement strategy may leave the target regime in place and even strengthened, an issue that troubled some critics of the Bush administration’s 2003 breakthrough that led to the normalizing of relations between the United States and Libya. But by far the greatest risk of engagement is that it may succeed. If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own. If talk is fruitful, a negotiation will begin about taking reciprocal steps down a jointly defined road. Engagement diplomacy forces us to make choices. Perhaps this is what frightens its critics the most. As the Obama team works to fend off accusations that it is rushing into Russian, Iranian, Syrian or even North Korean arms, it will need to get the logic and definition of engagement right. In each case, we will need a clear-eyed assessment of what we are willing to offer in return for the changed behavior we seek. Engagement diplomacy may be easier to understand if the Obama administration speaks clearly at home about what it really requires.

### 1NC Solvency Answers

#### 3. Altering the discourse surrounding diplomacy won’t change uncertainty. This is a more substantial cause of conflict, and the aff’s failure to resolve it makes returning to containment policies inevitable

Copeland 2K (Dale C., Assoc. Prof. in Dept. of Govt. and Foreign Affairs at Univ. of Virginia, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 187-212)

The question of uncertainty is critical to understanding the differences between structural realism and constructivism, and where Wendt’s analysis misses the mark. Consider first uncertainty regarding the other’s present intentions. Wendt is aware that this kind of uncertainty challenges his point that the current distribution of interests drives the way anarchy plays itself out. He counters that, at least in the modern environment, the “problem of other minds” is not much of a problem. States today can indeed learn a great deal about what the other is doing and thinking. That knowledge may not be “100 percent certain,” Wendt argues, “but no knowledge is that” (p. 281, emphasis in original). To assume a worst-case scenario and to treat the other as hostile may be more dangerous than adopting a conciliatory policy, because it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual mistrust (pp. 281, 107–109, 360). This counterargument has serious flaws. In essence, it is an effort to assume away the problem—that there really is no problem of other minds—and it is weak on three grounds. First, Wendt’s view that states typically know a lot about the other’s motives is an unsupported empirical statement based only on a reading of the contemporary situation. Even if it were true for the majority of states today—and it certainly does not capture the reality between the states that count, such as the United States and China—his point cannot be retrofitted into the previous five centuries that constitute the focus of Wendt’s analysis. In sum, if uncertainty about present intentions was rampant during these five hundred years, it (along with shifts in relative power) may explain a great deal about changes in conflict and cooperation over time. Second, Wendt’s view is inconsistent with his recognition that states often do have difficulty learning about the other. The very problem Ego and Alter have in first communicating is that “behavior does not speak for itself.” It must be interpreted, and “many interpretations are possible” (p. 330). This point is reinforced by Wendt’s epistemological point of departure: that the ideas held by actors are “unobservable” (chap. 2). Because leaders cannot observe directly what the other is thinking, they are resigned to making inferences from its behavior. Yet in security affairs, as Wendt acknowledges, mistakes in inferences—assuming the other is peaceful when in fact it has malevolent intentions—could prove “fatal” (p. 360). Wendt accepts that the problem facing rational states “is making sure that they perceive other actors, and other actors’ perception of them, correctly” (p. 334, emphasis in original). Yet the book provides no mechanism through which Ego and Alter can increase their confidence in the correctness of their estimates of the other’s type. Simply describing how Ego and Alter shape each other’s sense of self and other is not enough.22 Rational choice models, using assumptions consistent with structural realism, do much better here. In games of incomplete information, where states are unsure about the other’s type, actions by security-seeking actors that would be too costly for greedy actors to adopt can help states reduce their uncertainty about present intentions, thus moderating the security dilemma.23 Wendt cannot simply argue that over time states can learn a great deal about other states. It is what is not “shared,” at least in the area of intentions that remains the core stumbling block to cooperation. Third, Wendt’s position that the problem of other minds is not much of a problem ignores a fundamental issue in all social relations, but especially in those between states, namely, the problem of deception. In making estimates of the other’s present type, states have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic gestures—the other may be trying to deceive them. Wendt’s analysis is rooted in the theory of symbolic interactionism, but he does not discuss one critical aspect of that tradition: the idea of “impression management.” Actors in their relations exploit the problem of other minds for their own ends. On the public stage, they present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage.24 In laying out his dramaturgical view of Ego and Alter co-constituting each other’s interests and identities, Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are making genuine efforts to express their true views and to “cast” the other in roles that they believe in. But deceptive actors will stage-manage the situation to create impressions that serve their narrow ends, and other actors, especially in world politics, will understand this.25 Thus a prudent security-seeking Ego will have difficulty distinguishing between two scenarios: whether it and Alter do indeed share a view of each other as peaceful, or whether Alter is just pre- tending to be peaceful in order to make Ego think that they share a certain conception of the world, when in fact they do not.26 Wendt’s analysis offers no basis for saying when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they should be discounted as deceptions.27 When we consider the implications of a Hitlerite state deceiving others to achieve a position of military superiority, we understand why great powers in history have tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust.

### 1NC Solvency Answers

#### 4. Their conception of open-ended dialogue is utopian – there is no clear end to discussion and consensus isn’t achievable between the U.S. and China

Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger 98 (Mark and Philip, Professor of Town Planning at Newcastle University and Professor of Land Economy at the University of Cambridge, “Deconstructing communicative rationality: a critique of Habermasian collaborative planning,” Environment and Planning, 30(11), p. 1978-1979)

To accept Habermas's work there has to be a corresponding 'world view' of values. At a crude level, communicative rationality is about undistorted communication, open- ness, a lack of oppression. It is, therefore, ironic, if not contradictory, that it should itself contain clear prejudices towards a certain view or set of values. The counterclaim would be that at least this view or set of values are open and can be challenged. But here we return to the circularity of the position; how can you challenge a set of values within a system that has been created by those values without destroying the system or process itself? Further, how can a system or process that claims to bring about consensus (by making participants 'open up' and show their values in the knowledge that 'everyone is equal') justify a biased process? This is not to say that these values are not acceptable or held by everyone anyway. Two aspects are of particular concern. Participatory democracy, upon which communicative planning depends, is by no means problem free or a value held by everyone. Even proponents of participatory democracy feel that it has its limits given the emphasis on or preference for local rather than national concerns (Pateman, 1970). What happens when the two meet? The assumption that involvement in democratic processes breeds more involvement is also open to question. As Held (1987, page 281) has concluded "...it is at least questionable whether participation per se leads to consistent and desirable political out- comes; an array of possible tensions can exist between individual liberty, distributional questions (social justice) and democratic decisions." Communicative rationality also criticises markets as allocators of resources and as the basis for instrumental rationality. But one of the acknowledged strengths of New Right theory and, in particular, public choice theory is the anthropological analysis of individuals as rational self-interested actors whose characteristics shape political behaviour in voter, politician, or bureaucrat. Communicative rationality rejects the individual basis of society and plumps instead for an approach which is either community based or consensus based. Even if a position somewhere between the two exists (where the biological imperative of the selfish gene meets the social animal) then this undermines the nonpolitical nature of communicative rationality. Habermas's only answer to this charge is that he is not concerned with building an anthropology of action as a whole (Outhwaite, 1994, page 10). ∂ A (if not the) basic assumption of communicative rationality is that consensus can be reached. Although Habermas accepts that this might not always be the case there are two aspects of concern here. The first aspect is what to do and how to mediate when such consensus is not reached. The use of 'courts' accepts a dominatory and represen- tative approach to politics absent from communicative rationality and involves using the same mechanisms rejected by Habermas and his followers. More fundamentally, attempts to mediate disagreement involve not only an acceptance of ontological difference but also a desire to unify it. Reaching agreement through open discourse is then dependent upon a threat of imposition—hardly 'uncoerced'. Equally of concern and related to the above point is the question of whether we should aim to create consensus∂ (1)∂ at all. Communicative rationalists accept the idea of postmodernism as epoch , as∂ demonstrated by the associated importance attached to difference and the poststruc- turalist concern with the relativity of language. But at the point where you think that the acceptance of postmodern difference a la Foucault et al will surely undermine (or at least question) the modernisms of Habermas and his search for consensus, the communicative rationalists 'pull back'. Their position could be summarised as 'we are living in a world of increasing difference, with the death of overarching assumptions and theories which makes it even more important to create a shared basis for living together'. <<card continues>>

### 1NC Solvency Answers

<<card continues>>Even where such consensus does not naturally exist. Although we do not wish to follow the postmodern universalisation of difference and the lack of action relativity entails, we feel that the unifying assumptions and aims of communicative rationality are at odds with a desire for self-expression and difference. As Foucault might say, opposition is good and power can be positive as well as negative. There is a∂ danger (if not inevitability) that seeking consensus will silence rather than give [agency]~~voice~~.∂ Also, there is the question raised by Rorty regarding instrumental rationality—the bogeyman of communicative rationality. Is it all bad? Of course not. Just as we must take the undoubted benefits of modernism with some of its alleged drawbacks, so Rorty (1985) argues should we take instrumental rationality as an inevitable by-product of liberalism. Besides, rationality and modernity have not been as influential as all that. The growth in universal education, unions, the mass media, standards of living, and consumer durables have greatly affected peoples lives in the past century, freeing people from the slavery of work and mass opinions, and at least giving them an avenue for self-expression. Although we must not forget that not everyone has benefited from this in equal measures and huge disparities exist, can we really say that instrumental rationality has (1) been crucial to people's 'voice', and (2) made a significant detrimental difference to their ability to express that voice when other avenues are open to them? We think not.

### Ext. #1 – No Reform

#### Trying to think differently about national security fails – national security is rooted in objective facts and expertise is desirable and inevitable

Cole 12 (David, professor of law at Georgetown, “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy”, Georgetown University Law Center, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617 1625)

Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by “thinking differently” about national security. The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based. Third, deference to expertise is not always an error; sometimes it is a rational response to complexity. Expertise is generally developed by devoting substantial time and attention to a particular set of problems. We cannot possibly be experts in everything that concerns us. So I defer to my son on the remote control, to my wife on directions (and so much else), to the plumber on my leaky faucet, to the electrician when the wiring starts to fail, to my doctor on my back problems, and to my mutual fund manager on investments. I could develop more expertise in some of these areas, but that would mean less time teaching, raising a family, writing, swimming, and listening to music. The same is true, in greater or lesser degrees, for all of us. And it is true at the level of the national community, not only for national security, but for all sorts of matters. We defer to the Environmental Protection Agency on environmental matters, to the Federal Reserve Board on monetary policy, to the Department of Agriculture on how best to support farming, and to the Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration on how best to make air travel safe. Specialization is not something unique to national security. It is a rational response to an increasingly complex world in which we cannot possibly spend the time necessary to gain mastery over all that affects our daily lives. If our increasing deference to experts on national security issues is in part the result of objective circumstances, in part a rational response to complexity, and not necessarily less “elitist” than earlier times, then it is not enough to “think differently” about the issue. We may indeed need to question the extent to which we rely on experts, but surely there is a role for expertise when it comes to assessing threats to critical infrastructure, devising ways to counter those threats, and deploying technology to secure us from technology’s threats. As challenging as it may be to adjust our epistemological framework, it seems likely that even if we were able to sheer away all the unjustified deference to “expertise,” we would still need to rely in substantial measure on experts. The issue, in other words, is not whether to rely on experts, but how to do so in a way that nonetheless retains some measure of self-government. The need for specialists need not preclude democratic decision-making. Consider, for example, the model of adjudication. Trials involving products liability, antitrust, patents, and a wide range of other issues typically rely heavily on experts.14 But critically, the decision is not left to the experts. The decision rests with the jury or judge, neither of whom purports to be an expert. Experts testify, but do so in a way that allows for adversarial testing and requires them to explain their conclusions to laypersons, who render judgment informed, but not determined, by the expert testimony.

### Ext. #2 – Circumvention

#### Congress can roll back diplomatic efforts – they want a more hardline approach

Tiezzi 14 (Shannon, Master’s in East Asia Regional Studies from Harvard University, 11/21/14, “Could Capitol Hill Derail US-China Relations?”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/could-capitol-hill-derail-us-china-relations/)

On Thursday, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its annual report to Congress. The Commission was created in 2000 to monitor and report to Congress about the “national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship” between the U.S. and China. Each year, the Commission submits a report to Congress that includes recommendations for congressional action. This year, the report included a number of recommendations that, if implemented, could overshadow the Obama administration’s efforts to keep U.S.-China relations on an even keel. Historically, Congress has been fairly uninvolved in U.S.-China relations. Although many members of Congress adopt vocal positions regarding issues from human rights violations to the value of China’s currency, congressional opinion generally has little sway on executive actions. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provided for a continued U.S.-Taiwan relationship even after Washington normalized diplomatic ties with Beijing, is the notable exception to this general rule. Even during the high point of congressional and public outrage over the Tiananmen Square incident, Congress’ bid to deny China Most Favored Nation trading status was diverted by the Clinton administration, which eventually dropped the idea altogether. Given this history, we should remember that the USCESRC report will not automatically translate into congressional action, much less have a lasting influence on the administration’s China policy. However, its recommendations do indicate areas of growing concern within Congress, and an increased desire for Congress to take whatever action it can to address perceived imbalances in the U.S.-China relationship. Notably, the report discussed long-standing concerns over increased Chinese investment in the U.S. Chinese companies can face an uphill battle doing business in the U.S., due to both security concerns and worries that China’s economic policies give its firms an unfair competitive advantage. The report warned that allowing investment by state-controlled companies “risks creating a hybrid economy where privately owned U.S.-based businesses must complete with Chinese state-financed companies” that are motivated not by profit by but fiat from Beijing. To address the issue, the report recommends that Congress direct the Department of Commerce to assume that Chinese “state-owned, state-controlled, or state-invested firms” operating in the U.S. are under the “direction of the [Chinese] state” unless proven otherwise. As the example of Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications firm, shows, it is nearly impossible for Chinese firms to prove to Congress’ satisfaction that they do not have inordinately close ties to the Chinese government. If acted upon, this recommendation could have a major dampening effect on Chinese investment in the U.S. at a time with Washington and Beijing are growing more serious about negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty. The report also ups the ante on the on-going U.S.-China dispute regarding cyber espionage. The report recommends that Congress order the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate whether existing mechanisms could be used to sanction Chinese companies “that benefit from trade secrets or other information obtained through cyber intrusions or other illegal means.” In May, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers on charges of economic espionage, citing the men’s alleged involvement in a Chinese cyber espionage unit. At the time, some analysts suggested that, as the PLA officers will never stand trial, it would be more effective to directly penalize Chinese companies who had benefited from the theft of U.S. companies’ intellectual property. The USCESRC report suggests that Congress give serious consideration to this option by seeking to find ways the U.S. government can sanction firms alleged to have profited from cyber espionage. The report said that, given the enormous benefits China reaps from economic espionage, such activities are “unlikely to be altered by small-scale U.S. actions,” implying that Washington must increase the severity of its response to encourage a change in Chinese behavior. Given the reaction from China to the ultimately toothless indictment of five PLA officers, the implementation of sanctions on Chinese companies (or another, more substantial actions aimed at curbing cyber-espionage) would undoubtedly bring about a severe response from China. The report also calls into question the value of the Obama administration’s platforms for engaging with China. The report recommended that Congress ask the Government Accountability Office to update its report on the “effectiveness” of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Doubts about the effectiveness of the S&ED are particularly troubling, as this forum (which brings together the top U.S. and Chinese officials for foreign and economic affairs) is the premier annual platform for high-level dialogue between the U.S. and China. The report also recommended that Congress ask the Pentagon to explain “its purpose and rationale” for “military-to-military engagement planning with the People’s Liberation Army,” suggesting that Congress should be skeptical about the recent warming in military-to-military ties. For much of the past 35 years, U.S.-China relations have been under almost the exclusive control of the executive branch, for better or for worse. As issues in the U.S.-China relationship become more high profile, however, Congress will start wanting more of a say in how the bilateral relationship is handled. As the Commission’s report shows, that could force Washington to take a tougher stance toward China.

### Ext. #2 – Circumvention

#### Congress controls the success and credibility of any negotiation – Iran proves

Maloney 15 (Suzanne, deputy director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, 1/20/15, “Domestic Politics and Diplomacy Toward Tehran: Congress and the Real Threat to an Iranian Nuclear Deal”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/01/20-iran-nuclear-negotiations-sanctions-obama-veto)

Representatives of Iran, the United States and five other world powers convened last week for talks on Iran's nuclear program, in what was at least the 18th negotiating session in as many months since the June 2013 election of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. By now, there is a certain familiarity to the proceedings: diplomats, journalists and activists converge upon a European capital. Negotiators linger behind closed doors, emerging only to pose for silent, sunny photo opportunities and murmur hopeful ambiguities. Meetings beget future meetings, with all the players compliantly reprising their roles. Rumors of piecemeal progress are Tweeted and rehashed. The American secretary of state and Iran’s foreign minister even take picturesque walks in the park. The flurry of excitement and activity around the process itself belies the unmistakable reality — the Iran nuclear negotiations have been stalemated for months. The regular powwows and eruption of bilateral bonhomie have failed to achieve their first and foremost goal — a comprehensive agreement that would conclusively end the impasse over Iran nuclear program. Unfortunately, the state of play on the Iran nuclear issue is likely to get worse before it gets better. President Barack Obama defended the negotiations tonight in his annual State of the Union address, in an effort to convince the Republican-controlled Congress that legislation to restrict diplomacy or impose new sanctions on Iran would be a mistake. He threatened to veto new sanctions, warning Congress that imposing more penalties would torpedo diplomacy and that "it doesn't make sense." Iran sanctions are always political catnip for the Hill, popular with most constituents and effectively cost-free, at least with respect to any Congressional objectives. And the administration's Iran diplomacy has faced stiff opposition from many Republicans from the start, making the negotiations a perfectly predictable target for the ambitious new Republican majority in the Senate as well as the House. Obama is mostly correct in his admonition about the dangers of new sanctions. Many in Congress are presumably unaware that the successful application of sanctions toward Tehran over the past decade came about through an unprecedented and inherently ephemeral set of circumstances — an Iranian leadership, personified by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose rhetoric managed to outrage the world; the indignities of Iran's domestic repression, laid bare for all to witness in the regime's repression of the 2009 post-election protests; and the surge of unconventional supplies of oil and gas that lowered prices and made it possible to knock as much as 1.5 barrels of oil per day of Iranian exports from the market with relatively little impact on the global price of oil or the price that consumers pay at the pump. With the (meaningful) exception of the energy markets, the conditions that facilitated far-reaching global adherence to Iran's economic isolation have dissipated. As a result, it is entirely conceivable that the rest of the world will prefer to revert to the status quo ante — a world where only Washington truly embraces economic penalties against Tehran and where the powerfully extra-territorial impact of U.S. sanctions generates frictions with allies and partners instead of a unified multilateral coalition against Iranian transgressions. So the President is right to lay a marker now on sanctions, and warn Congress against actions that would undercut efforts toward a deal. He might have mentioned that the blame game is already well under way; for months, Iran's diplomacy has been focused on ensuring that Washington is seen as the spoiler if and when the prospects for a deal truly go south. Congressional action and rhetoric will make or break that perception around the world.

### Ext. #3 – Inevitability

#### The power politics of realism enter into any possible system – even a critical approach leads back into realism

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, pp. 130)

The other members of the group varied in their emphases, but there are clear parallels to this formulation in their conceptions which suggest its employment as a framework to assist understanding. The extent to which power infuses all social relations, the extent to which all social structures are marred by relations of domination and subordination, forms a pervasive theme throughout their work. It was this awareness of the intrusion of power into all social relations that generated their emphasis on 'the inevitable imperfections of any organization that is entangled with the world. l 1 " As Morgenthau once put it, the ideal 'can never be fully translated into political reality but only at best approximated ... there shall always be an element of political domination preventing the full realization of equality and freedom'. "9 The principal focus of this critique of the corrupting influence of power was, of course, international relations. Here, economic and legal mechanisms of domination are ultimately reduced to overt violence as the principal mechanism of determining political outcomes. The diffusion of power between states effectively transforms any such centrally organized mechanisms into simply another forum for the power politics of the very parties that it is supposed to restrain. As Kennan put it: ‘The realities of power will soon seep into anv legalistic structures which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will replace the form.' 1:1 The repression of such power realities is, however, impossible; the political actor must simply 'seek their point of maximum equilibrium'. This conception of the balance of ultimately aimed, in Morgenthau’s words, 'to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it'. First, it was designed to prevent universal domination, to act as a deterrent to the ambitions of any dominant great power and as a safeguard against any attempt to establish **its** sway over the rest of the system.]-'4 Second, it was designed to preserve the independence and freedom of the states of the system, particularly the small states. **1"** I Only through the operation of the balance of power between great powers can small powers gain any genuine independence and any influence in the international system.1-" However, as Morgenthau pointed out, whilst, in domestic society, the balance of power operates in a context characterized by the existence of a degree of consensus and by the presence of a controlling central power, these factors are lacking in international relations and, thus, the balance is both much more important and yet much more flawed, the maintenance of equilibrium being achieved at the price of large-scale warfare and periodic eliminations of smaller states.] 7

### Ext. #3 – Inevitability

#### States inherently compete with each other through any means necessary – realism is the only possible system

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 35)

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

#### States naturally act based upon external influences of competition – this necessitates realism

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17)

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars. Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, war is a continuation of politics by other means.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.

### Ext. #4 – Communicative Engagement Fails

#### China & the US have real differences that can’t be wished away by utopian engagement

Lynch 2 (Marc, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), p. 217-218)

From this perspective, then, socialization of the targeted actor into an unchanged status quo is the wrong model for engagement. This is one of the biggest differences in the outcomes envisioned by rationalist and commu- nicative conceptions of engagement — rather than socializing the rising state into existing institutions, deliberation aims at producing new institutions acceptable to both sides. This contradicts the general tenor of the American approach to engagement, which aimed at ‘encouraging China’s integration into the world community, thereby fostering China’s adherence to interna- tionally recognized norms and standards of behavior’.21 Despite occasional remarks that the United States welcomed the emergence of a ‘stable and thriving China’ that ‘not only abides by international rules but that plays an active and responsible role in setting them’, the overwhelming model was socialization into the status quo rather than communicative reshaping of international order.22 Dialogue about regional order ideally creates institutions which reflect the interests of all consequential actors, which requires a significant concession by the more powerful actor. This will likely generate opposition in the stronger state. Robert Kagan’s (1997) rage at the idea that China be given a voice in the shape of international institutions — ‘until now, officials have not talked about letting China participate in making international rules’ — reflects this common objection. From a strategic perspective such institutions seem suboptimal in terms of the distribution of power, replacing a most desirable set of institutions (which reflect American preferences) with a less desirable set of institutions (which reflect some combination of American and Chinese preferences) when the distribution of power does not demand it. From a communicative perspective, it means establishing legitimate institutions through a deliberative process which all concerned parties accept as valid. Such a willingness to construct mutually acceptable institutions through dialogue without a primary concern for power or relative gains is the core distinction between a communicative and strategic approach to engagement. China and the United States, like most great powers, have real disagreements and conflicts of interest which cannot be talked away. To the extent that those differences are the product of imperfect information or unjustified suspicions, however, communicative engagement clears the ground for recognition of the real terms of agreement and disagreement.

### Ext. #4 – Communicative Engagement Fails

#### Consensus is impossible and China won’t reciprocate US open-endedness

Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger 98 (Mark and Philip, Professor of Town Planning at Newcastle University and Professor of Land Economy at the University of Cambridge, “Deconstructing communicative rationality: a critique of Habermasian collaborative planning,” Environment and Planning, 30(11), p. 1981-1982)

Communicative action is, therefore, inherently political and powerful, as it is unable to control the individual thought-processes of stakeholders or guarantee that all partici- pants will act in an open and honest manner all the time. And so long as there is a possibility that individuals will not wish to build trust, understanding, and new relations of power among participants, nor wish to generate "social, intellectual and political capital which can endure beyond the particular collaborative effort" (Healey, 1997, page 264), then a truly successful communicative action process is infeasible, as power and political action will remain dominant determinants.∂Communicative planning is founded on the rationale that individuals will decide 'morally', and that negotiative processes within collaborative discourse arenas are founded on truth, openness, honesty, legitimacy, and integrity. It fails to include the possibility that individuals can deliberately obfuscate the facts and judgments for their own benefit, and for the benefit of their own arguments. Forester (1989) systematically addresses this issue, but little has been said by Habermas or the other planning translators on how communicative planning should take account of this. They believe that individuals will simply alter their persona once a more collaborative process has been agreed to. We suggest that this expectation is simply too optimistic for practice to incorporate. We call on the planning theorists at this point to debate the potential impact of individual stakeholders employing strategic behaviour within collaborative planning, and to discuss how 'the self question' could be mitigated at the micropolitical level other than through the even more optimistic and generalised call for the redesign of institutions. The style of language utilised and the type of knowledge shared can also never be constant or universal. In such a heavily politicised arena as planning, con- sensus is completely Utopian—there will always be winners and losers—and it will never be possible for all individuals to abandon their political positions and act neutrally. The assertion that individuals put across their own principles in an open and honest manner, and are then subjected to 'mutual mind-changing' as other indi- viduals' principles conflict, fails to show any regard for the benefits of argumentation. If everyone is to agree, or achieve consensus, what would be the purpose of individuals with differing opinions initially participating in the discourse arena, only if there is a slight possibility that their views will find favour with the majority? Would not communicative planning solely benefit the moral majority, however defined, and pos- sibly exclude minority interests—in some cases, the very sections of society it is seeking to support? Forester (1996) and Healey (1997) claim that the rituals associated with communicative practices require a minimum degree of commitment and trust on the part of the parties to enable them to proceed.

### Impact Calculus Answers-Utilitarianism Good

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equal and unconditional human dignity

Cummisky 96 (Philosophy professor Bates College, David, Kantian Consequentialism, pg 145-146)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has." 12 But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that "rational nature exists as an end in itself" ( GMM429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a nonvalue-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant's normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth" that transcends any market value ( GMM436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

### Impact Calculus Answers-Utilitarianism Good

**Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks**

**Green, 02** – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. **Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language**. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 **That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer**. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. **One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss**. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. **Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.**

### Impact Calculus Answers-Utilitarianism Good

**Only consequentialism can resolve conflicting moral values**

**Bailey, 97** (James Wood 1997; “Oxford University Press; “Utilitarianism, institutions, and Justice” pg 9)

**A consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision about whether a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of expression**. 16 In some circumstances the effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to justify our banning it, but in others they may be not malign enough to justify any interference in freedom. I? **A deontological theory, in contrast, would be required either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agents from interfering in the free expression of others and from impairing the moral equality of others, or to admit defeat and claim that no adjudication between the two rights is possible. The latter admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no principled resolution of a serious policy question**. But the former conclusion is hardly attractive either. Would we really wish to establish as true for all times and circumstances a lexical ordering between two side constraints on our actions without careful attention to consequences? Would we, for instance, really wish to establish that the slightest malign inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of expression is adequate grounds for an intrusive and costly censorship? Or would we, alternatively, really wish to establish that we should be prepared to tolerate a society horrible for women and children to live in, for the sake of not allowing any infringement on the sacred right of free expression?18 **Consequentialist accounts can avoid such a deontological dilemma. In so doing, they show a certain healthy sense of realism about what life in society is like. In the world outside the theorist's study, we meet trade-offs at every tum. Every policy we make with some worthy end in Sight imposes costs in terms of diminished achievement of some other plausibly worthy end. Consequentialism demands that we grapple with these costs as directly as we can and justify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them with moral sophistries or to ignore them as if we lived in an ideal world.**

### Impact Calculus Answers-Nuclear War Outweighs

**Nuclear war outweighs, even if its improbable**

**Sandberg et al. 8** (Anders, Ph.D. in computational neuroscience from Stockholm University, and currently a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, Milan Cirkovic, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. He is also an assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, Jason Matheny, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?” [http://thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction //](http://thebulletin.org/how-can-we-reduce-risk-human-extinction%20//) AKONG)

Humanity could be extinguished as early as this century by succumbing to natural hazards, such as an extinction-level asteroid or comet impact, supervolcanic eruption, global methane-hydrate release, or nearby supernova or gamma-ray burst. (Perhaps the most probable of these hazards, supervolcanism, was discovered only in the last 25 years, suggesting that other natural hazards may remain unrecognized.) Fortunately **the probability of any one of these events killing off our species is very low**--less than one in 100 million per year, given what we know about their past frequency. **But** as improbable **as these events are, measures to reduce their probability can still be** worthwhile.For instance, investments in asteroid detection and deflection technologies cost less, per life saved, than most investments in medicine. **While an extinction-level** asteroid **impact is very unlikely,** its improbability is outweighed by its potential death toll**.** The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, **humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter.** We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law. Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations.

### AT: Probability Outweighs

#### They’re wrong about our risk assessment and resigning to skepticism about all predictive claims is comparatively more dangerous

Fitzsimmons 7 (Ph.D. in international security policy from the University of Maryland, Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

In defence of prediction Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain’. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that ‘what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.’34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining ‘a standard of judgment’ from ‘knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense’. Scientific inquiry into the ‘laws of probability’ for any given strate- gic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s implication seems to be that the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant**.** Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others’ presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not ‘what is your inferred causation, General?’ Above all, not, ‘what are your values, Mr. Secretary?’ ... If someone says ‘a fair chance’ ... ask, ‘if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?’ If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences ... Once differing odds have been quoted, the question ‘why?’ can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert’s basis for linking ‘if’ with ‘then’ gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.’35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strate- gic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May’s point – prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers’ beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency**.** Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm**,** or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker’s sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy**.** In this way, prediction enhances rather than under-mines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in plan- ning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the dis- tinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy**.** As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome – that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relation- ship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz’s work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of <<card continues>>

### AT: Probability Outweighs

<<card continues>> uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tenden- cies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational impli- cations, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz’s ‘standard of judgment’ for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambig- uous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future.

### AT: Probability Outweighs

#### Just because catastrophic scenarios are rare doesn’t mean they’re impossible; we can assess probabilities and which policies are necessary

Matheny 7 (Jason G., ∗ Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2007 DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2007.00960.x)

We may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large num- bers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprece- dented events (Kunrcuther etaL,2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administra- tions and rarely do risk assessments value the exis- tence of future generations.18 We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives. Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect. It might be feared that consideration of extinc- tion risks would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and con- tent global population are likely to reduce the prob- ability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects. Discussing the risks of "nuclear winter." Carl Sagan (1983) wrote: Some have argued thai the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a rea- sonable upper limit) and the death of every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For me. the difference is consid- erably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in nu- merical terms. I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the slakes are one million limes greater for extinction than for the more modesl nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evo- lutionary history of the planet, and the significance of Ihe lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

### AT: Probability Outweighs

#### There should be a high barrier of disproving our analysis – worst case thought is inevitable but ours is based in probability not possibility

Vlek 9 (Charles, professor emeritus of environmental psychology and decision research in the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, Groningen University, A PRECAUTIONARY-PRINCIPLED APPROACH TOWARDS UNCERTAIN RISKS: REVIEW AND DECISION-THEORETIC ELABORATION Erasmus Law Review [Volume 02 Issue 02] http://www.erasmuslawreview.nl/files/Vlek\_-\_issue\_Pieterman\_d.d.\_27\_augustus.pdf)

A basic proposition inherent to the PP is that more caution is justified when there is greater uncertainty about possible negative consequences and/or about the seriousness of those consequences. Another proposition is that any risk problem always implies at least two choice alternatives: go/do not go, accept/reject, or permit/restrict. Also, there are at least two 'states of nature\*: there is a serious threat or there is not. This elicits two possible basic decision errors: (1) a false positive, when you take costly precautions while there actually is no threat, and (2) a false negative, when you neglect real danger. The gravity of these two errors is relative to the corresponding benefits of deciding 'correctly': being costly precautious when there is a threat, and being profitably careless when there is none. A further point is that a precautionary decision often is provisional; a revised choice can be made when new information becomes available. When one knows more about the possible consequences of a target course of action, about their manageability by further safety measures, and/or about feasible alternatives, then the initial cautious decision may be revised, and the original goal(s) may be achieved in a safer way. Thus there are in fact not two but three basic decision options: do, do not do, or defer (see Section 4.4.4). The fundamental problem not of the PP but of uncertain-risk situations, is the great uncertainty about the possibility of serious harm. This may lead one to call it a normative principle, but only if one does not accept the rationality of temporarily shrinking back from a course of action that might lead into disaster.\*\* 4.2 Nature and seriousness of potential harm What is a 'serious threat\* that could initially trigger and later justify precaution? It must be something that could thoroughly disrupt a person's, life, harming its positive development, bringing about long-term trauma, and causing very high costs of recovery, reversal, or compensation. Or, at the societal level, a serious threat might cause severe social disruption, environmental damage, and political shock, which would take many years, numerous debates, and considerable funds to overcome. In view of these considerations, the notion of serious harm may be assessed in terms of the criteria assembled in Box 2; these link up with basic results from riskrisk- perception research. Psychologically, a focus on possible worst cases or potential catastrophality is more obvious the greater the uncertainty about its actual, often very unlikely, occurrence.59 This 'probability neglect\* may be enhanced by the emotions surrounding images of disaster.60 Godard's61 warning about radical 'catastrophism' lines up with Starr's,62 who ascribes present-day 'hypothetical fears\* (e.g. of global warming, irradiated foods, and GMOs) as arising from a primitive instinct to suspect the unknown, which leads to the PP - seen by Starr - as a barrier to an adaptive future.63 Thus, under great uncertainty, worst-case analysis may be inevitable, but 'worst-case thinking' may be a tricky affair, which should be guarded from improper influences and considerations, such as special interests, exaggerated fears, and unreasonable assumptions. In cases of catastrophic potential, however, there is a high burden of proving their impossibility.

### AT: Structural Violence Outweighs

#### War results in more structural violence – conflict increases inequality

Folk 78 [Jerry, Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, “Peace Educations – Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach,” Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of handthe workof researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studiesprogram shouldtherefore offerthe student exposure to thequestions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

#### Structural violence framing doesn’t solve for the material harm. Focus on structural violence precludes tangible solutions because it does not mandate that those in positions of privilege modify their actions

Dubal 12 (Sam physician-anthropologist with medical degree from Harvard, Renouncing Paul Farmer: A Desperate Plea for Radical Political Medicine, <http://samdubal.blogspot.com/2012/05/renouncing-paul-farmer-desperate-plea.html>)

Politics has become a matter of ethics, and Partners in Health is deeply embedded within this historical turn as it claims ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’. Indeed, ‘structural violence’, the very phrase which Farmer has popularized (itself introduced by Johan Galtung in – tellingly – 1969), is precisely so powerful and widespread because it substitutes indignation for accusation. As Loïc Wacquant implies in his critique of Farmer, the concept of ‘structural violence’ timidly eschews assigning any agency for this violence, which becomes- in Farmer’s own words - “ostensibly ‘nobody’s fault’”. It is precisely in this turn that the parrhesia is avoided, the danger of self-exposure averted. In the rhetoric of being a ‘partner’ to the poor, the realities of class analysis fall softly but fatally out of Farmer’s theory and work. An elite, bourgeois group of doctors, activists, and donors help the poor out of moral sentiment**[12],** refusing or erasing their own class responsibilityin what Marx rightly called out as ‘conservative, or bourgeois, socialism’: A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society…To this section belongeconomists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind**…**The Socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society, minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. -Karl Marx, ‘The Communist Manifesto’, 1848.