# \*\*WDCA Chinese Politics DA Answers\*\*

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**File Overview**

This file contains the affirmative answers to the Chinese Politics Disadvantage. The affirmative can choose among many arguments to make. Non-TPP affirmatives should respond by claiming that President Xi’s credibility is already declining, which will doom economic reforms inevitably; that hardliners in the Chinese government would not care about the plan; that Xi’s political dominance actually inhibits his ability to implement economic reforms; and that if the Chinese economy did indeed collapse, no instability or regime collapse would result.

For the TPP affirmative, there are a few additional answers available (primarily because this disadvantage has the strongest link to TPP). The first argument is that including China in the TPP will boost their economy, and that failure to include them will hurt their economy. The second argument is that integrating China into the TPP will spur the very economic reforms that the negative claims are necessary.

## General Answers

### Uniqueness Answers

#### Xi’s credibility is declining

The Guardian 5/4 (“China’s Xi Jinping denies House of Cards power struggle but attacks ‘conspirators’, http://mindanaoexaminer.com/chinas-xi-jinping-denies-house-of-cards-power-struggle-but-attacks-conspirators-the-guardian/)

Experts also see Xi’s decision last month to take on the title of commander-in-chief of China’s joint battle command centre as a potential indicator of trouble at the top. Since coming to power Xi has amassed an unusual plethora of official titles including general secretary of the Communist party, president of the People’s Republic of China, chairman of the central military commission, leader of the national security commission and head of the leading group for overall reform. One academic has dubbed him the “chairman of everything”. Roderick MacFarquhar, a Harvard University expert in elite Communist party politics, said: “Xi Jinping’s donning of uniform and giving him his new military title is a warning to his colleagues that he has the army behind him. Whether he actually has or not, one doesn’t know. But that is his bulwark, as it was Mao’s.” However, MacFarquhar said the new title could be a sign of weakness rather than strength, noting that not even Mao Zedong had accumulated such a glut of titles. “Chairman Mao never needed titles. Everyone knew who was in charge,” he said. Xi has made a high-profile anti-corruption campaign one of his administration’s key missions, disciplining hundreds of thousands of officials, including top party and military figures. But experts say the war on corruption has generated discontent among officials, caused political paralysis and fueled suspicions Xi is using the campaign as a pretext to purge his political enemies.

#### Economic crises are mounting; reforms insufficient now

Whitehead 5/9 (Adam, twenty five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management, in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese Political Rift”, 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-political-rift?page=2#)

The timing of this political fight could not be worse for what has become known as the Great Maturity Wall of Chinese debt that comes up for redemption and/or refinancing this year. The PBoC will be forced to step into the breach and engineer attractive refinancing terms in the domestic capital markets to ease the passage of this pig through the python. The banking sector is already trying to convert its bad debt to equity, so any attempt to also convert the Maturity Wall into equity will face a crowded and difficult market environment. The debate in the analyst community over whether China's economy has become like America's pre-Credit Crunch has continued to rage since George Soros made the comparison. The growth of debt and GDP in tandem is to be expected. The growth of debt in an economic slowdown, as a counter-cyclical stimulus, is also to be expected. The problem for the China watchers is that the size of the debt mountain has grown much larger than the GDP that it has stimulated. The situation therefore appears to be unsustainable.

### Uniqueness Answers

#### Xi’s credibility is down & reforms are stalled

The Economist 4/2 (“Beware the cult of Xi”, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695881-xi-jinping-stronger-his-predecessors-his-power-damaging-country-beware-cult)

By cracking down and puffing himself up, Mr Xi is neither buying himself security nor helping to keep China stable. He is using the party’s own thuggish investigators to take on graft. But they have a greater interest in settling political scores than in ensuring laws are applied fairly. That gets in the way of good administration, if only because officials are scared of spending money in case it attracts a probe. By cowing the media, Mr Xi created a press reluctant to challenge officials by exposing the dodgy-vaccine trade as soon as it was discovered at least a year ago. By the time such scandals eventually come to light, they pose even greater threats to the party’s, and Mr Xi’s, credibility. Mr Xi has pledged to give market forces a “decisive role”, and put “power in a cage” by establishing the rule of law. But he is providing neither the country with prosperity and freedom, nor reassuring the rest of the world with stability. Abroad, anxieties about him keep growing: his muscular efforts to assert control in the South China Sea have been driving countries across Asia closer to the American camp. Earlier in Mr Xi’s rule, observers had wondered whether, after establishing himself, he would turn to carrying out the reforms that he says he wants. But hopes are fading that a big reformist push will ever materialise. Mr Xi appears to have little time for the politically irksome business of making the party follow the law, closing down loss-making state-owned firms, or bringing about much-needed social changes, such as scrapping restrictions on access by rural migrants to urban public services. The task of preserving his power is a full-time job.

#### Political instability now

Whitehead 5/9 (Adam, twenty five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management, in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese Political Rift”, 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-political-rift?page=2#)

It has become clear that China is entering a period of domestic political friction. A classic proto-Soviet dialectic between the peasants and the bourgeoisie is being played out at a higher level. Thus far, it has not erupted onto the streets. Both leaders of each faction are losing focus on the economy as they focus on each other. A leadership vacuum and internal political struggle will therefore undermine the economy and also perceptions of Chinese risk. China's debt mountain will then command a higher risk premium in recognition of the deteriorating political landscape. President Xi's enigmatic response to the palace coup rumors only served to confirm that there is indeed just that happening in real time. In his opinion, there are "cabals and cliques" inside the party that risk "compromising the political security of the party and the country." In a scene reminiscent of the Night of the Long Knives, he then went on to say that: "There are careerists and conspirators existing in our party and undermining the party's governance."

### No Link

#### Anti-Americanism doesn’t link to dialogue like the aff

Gross 7 (Neil, Asst Pf Sociology @ Harvard, 1/14, “The many stripes of anti-Americanism”, http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/01/14/the\_many\_stripes\_of\_anti\_americanism/)

Second, in most countries, anti-Americanism involves more distrust than outright bias. The distinction is crucial. Where there is distrust, people may be skeptical of US motives and claims, but are open to considering the American point of view. Anti-American bias, by contrast, occurs when policies and actions undertaken by the US government and American corporations are seen as expressions of an unchangeable national identity and character, such that dialogue over disagreements is deemed to have no value. It is distrust rather than bias that seems to characterize Chinese anti-Americanism, for example. Political scientists Alastair Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, who contributed the China chapter, observe that Chinese "amity" toward the United States is in decline as China asserts itself as a budding superpower. However, Chinese dislike for US economic and cultural power is "still quite distant from the level of hatred and bias" the Chinese direct at Japan and the Japanese.

#### Capital doesn’t generate reforms – Xi is too strong now

Pei 5/6 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's political stalemate”, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)

Observers of the Chinese economy can be forgiven for their puzzlement over an apparent paradox. While China undoubtedly now has its most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, the country's economic policy appears to be defying the wishes of the new strongman, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Take, for example, the progress of radical structural reform, which is part of Xi's blueprint for an ambitious overhaul of the economy. Since its much heralded unveiling in late 2013, little structural reform has happened. Worse still, in recent months, the Chinese government has adopted policies obviously aimed at maintaining short-term growth at the expense of long-term structural reform. For instance, instead of forcing zombie companies into bankruptcy and channeling resources into consumption, Beijing has once again opened the credit spigot to fund fixed-asset investments -- mainly infrastructure -- and keep moribund companies, most of them state-owned, on life support. In the first quarter alone, according to the People's Bank of China, Chinese banks increased their loans by a mammoth 4.67 trillion yuan ($720 billion), a new record. The immediate impact of this monetary stimulus might have propped up the Chinese economy, as reflected in the recovery of gross domestic product. However, the long-term consequences will be ugly. China's debt-to-GDP ratio will increase, overcapacity will continue to plague the economy and the eventual cost of recapitalizing the financial system will explode. Behind this apparent disconnect between Xi's power and the difficulties he has encountered in executing his reform plan lies a political stalemate which, if prolonged, could produce even worse economic uncertainties and consequences. One manifestation of this stalemate -- bureaucratic paralysis -- is well-known. Xi's anti-corruption drive has frightened and alienated many Chinese officials. Denied what they consider legitimate rewards for toiling for the party, resentful bureaucrats have been on a work stoppage in the hope that deteriorating economic performance will force Xi to call off the anti-corruption campaign and return to business as usual.

### No Link

#### Chinese anti-Americanism is purely rhetorical – No real political effect or popular sentiment

Wong 14 (Edward, staff @ New York Times, “In New China, ‘Hostile’ West Is Still Derided”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-turns-up-the-rhetoric-against-the-west.html?\_r=0)

Some have questioned the sincerity, or pointed out the hypocrisy, of the party’s tirades against the West, noting that many party officials have children or other family members living and even applying for citizenship overseas. Mr. Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, attended Harvard University under a pseudonym. “How can Chinese officials really be anti-American?” asked Zhan Jiang, a media studies professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. “Anti-foreign sentiments will always be present in China because of China’s unique history,” he said. “However, the public’s opinion of the West will not change because of what the party says.”

### Xi Fails

#### Xi is too strong now – undermines reforms & generates backlash

Pei 5/6 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's political stalemate”, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)

The challenge for Xi is that the campaign against corruption is yielding diminishing returns. To be sure, it has been effective in limiting theft by greedy officials, but it cannot motivate them to do anything positive. For local officials, far removed from the center of power, their only weapon is passive resistance. There is now a political stalemate between the system and its strongman. Another stalemate is less well-known and even harder to analyze because it is occurring in a much higher and more opaque realm of the Chinese party-state. Xi's remarkable success in achieving political dominance has demolished the delicate balance of power at the top of the regime. The consequences of the transformation of what may be called a multipolar political order into a unipolar one in Beijing have been profound. Decision-making authority has been centralized to an unprecedented degree, inevitably creating resentment among senior leaders who have seen their influence marginalized.

### No Instability

#### No instability – CCP is seen as legitimate and no one wants regime change

Lundquist 12 (David, Tsinghua University western philosophy lecturer, ‘Why China Won't Collapse”, 6-22, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-isnt-headed-collapse-7046?page=1>)

China is said to be headed for collapse for several reasons, any and all of which might combine to overwhelm its increasingly expensive repressive apparatus. Within this supposed house of horrors is corruption, exorbitant housing prices, costly education, an antsy middle class and college graduates with dreams deferred—not to mention frustration stemming from China’s shortage of females, dubbed China’s “bachelor bomb.” But those reasons take a narrow view of political change, assuming dissatisfaction will morph into regime change. For a more nuanced perspective, economic analysis has to give way to political analysis. One well-articulated China-collapse theory comes from Gordon Chang, who says that the country is enjoying the tail end of a “three-decade upward supercycle” spurred by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, globalization and demography. Chang’s analysis might be entirely on point, but it doesn’t suggest a dramatic collapse. For one thing, although China is slowing, a hard landing is looking less likely. But Chang has more than economic arguments. And that’s where his case weakens severely; he foresees economic weakness aggravating deep-seated tensions in Chinese leadership and society, tensions which in turn will bring conflict among decision makers and general discontent among the masses. It’s a plausible picture, but the evidence behind it is lacking. We must ask: How exactly could an economic crisis destabilize China? That is, how do graphs and pie charts become chaos in the streets? Charting Revolutions The textbook example of a similar change might be Iran’s 1979 revolution, widely thought be propelled by a dramatic fall in global oil prices. But the Chinese economy is no oil-addicted dictatorship, and China has no Ayatollah Khomeini antagonizing it through sermons on scratchy cassette tapes. Contrary to the banal collapse theories, there are reasons to believe that a slowing Chinese economy will bring a chill of calm to the simmering cauldron of society. China is a modern, complex polity with an adept, agile government. In his landmark work Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that violence is a mark of modernizing societies. To Huntington, modernity meant three things: the government gains recognition as the legitimate wielder of force; the division of labor is divided between military, administrators, scientists and the judiciary; there is mass political participation, by which Huntington meant all forms of participation, be it democratic or totalitarian (as in the Cultural Revolution). By Huntington’s standards, the PRC is a quite modern polity, one he would deem “civic” because its institutions are developed beyond its level of political activity. In short, the system can withstand economic pressure. Indeed, Beijing is well-prepared to confront, divert or grant concessions to popular discontent. With firm institutions established, a state is less susceptible to economic vagaries, something Chang’s argument doesn’t consider. By proactively heading off economic distress, the PRC might even stand to gain trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. After all, as Western governments rushed to ease the liquidity crunch of 2008–2009, baffled and nervous citizens said nary a word of protest as unelected bureaucrats worked their money-printing and bailout magic. Only after the crisis, years later, did diverse Occupy Wall Street movements include this as a minor detail in their failed campaign against capitalist excesses. A faltering economy does not necessarily cause disorder, even when effective institutions are absent. A recent New York Times editorial opposing Western sanctions on Iran broaches this notion, arguing that the Iranian people might stand up to oppression once well-fed and prospering. The same very well could be true for China. Reform in China There are hundreds of thousands of conflicts between the Chinese people and the state every year. But putting aside egregious land-grab cases like the one in the southern Chinese village of Wukan last year, they rarely rise to the level of violence—much less regime-change—as many such events are simply labor disputes. The participants have little notion of a future democratic China, unlike some of their middle-class counterparts, who in contrast have few material incentives to protest but much to lose. “Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions,” Gordon Chang recognizes. But reform is another story. No Chinese citizen goes unaffected by the government’s heavy-handedness—the paternalistic, technocratic, socialist or vulgarly utilitarian blemishes in its laws and administration. That means there’s a lot to fix. Unfortunately, important domestic-reform initiatives often receive comparatively little attention from Western media, fostering the perception that China is a radically illegitimate oligarchy powered by the blood of its treasured working class. This is a distorted picture that panders to democratic, wishful thinking about Chinese society. The truth is that however slowly and ham-handedly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accrued political capital by improving the lives of its people in ways many bygone regimes could not. In late February, the World Bank issued a report entitled "China 2030.” Its suggestions for China’s economic health include decreasing state ownership of major industries, establishing protections for society’s most vulnerable citizens, as well as calls for tax reform, reduced carbon emissions and green energy. Lost in the foofaraw of a lone Chinese man interrupting a bank press conference to defend state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was the fact that the PRC’s State Council coauthored the report. A Chinese government body signed off on prescriptions counter to the interests of SOE monopolists—a milestone for the development of civil society there. SOEs have been criticized in China as price manipulators and as magnets for rent seeking. For example, oil companies like Sinopec have stymied fuel-quality regulations and refused to supply petro to stations, running them out of business. Often shielded by nationalistic sentiment, SOEs have now come under assault by academics and newspaper editorials that echo the World Bank report, identifying SOEs as special interests, distinct from public interests. Elsewhere in China, regional governments are having a crack at mending the controversial hukou system, which threatens to fragment China into two entrenched groups: legally recognized urbanites and migrant workers, the latter of whom generally enjoy no entitlement to medical care or education in the cities where they’ve come to toil. In a country of peasants, internal migration is not just a matter of civil rights. It’s a matter of economic transformation, as those former farmers have settled into cities and long forgotten tilling a field. As China’s population urbanizes, policy makers have proven adaptive and willing to experiment. The CCP has demonstrated a concern for China’s social fabric. Beijing has decreed that television programming, including wildly popular dating shows, avoid the depths of crass sexual and material indulgence. Obviously, such policies might be in the ultimate interest of self-preservation (especially given Hu <<<<<card continues>>>>>

### No Instability

<<<<<card continues>>>>> Jintao’s less than subtle warning about Western culture’s ideological penetration of China). And it’s debatable whether traditional, native values are what China or any country needs for stability or prosperity. Granted, on some reform proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, conflict has emerged. But do these disagreements reveal cracks in the party leadership, as Chang implies? Probably not. First, these are practical differences among technocrats who are after the same thing: stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that China’s decision making is more consultative and decentralized than before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers, provinces and municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system. Finally, interest groups and factions are nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, it’s unrealistic to think factional tension could paralyze party leadership, military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show potential for violence and greater lawlessness. What’s more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus on China, has shown how factions can coexist and even thrive by nearing some sort of competitive equilibrium. This may explain the relative quietude of Chinese elite politics since 1989. Why China Won’t Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the economic. China’s institutions are still significantly ahead of the demands of its society. Beijing’s apparent influence by Huntington’s theories is not surprising, as his works are popular among the PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian CCP junta keeps the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of China’s massive, aging population. Hard landing or soft, don’t look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012. Collapse theories are rooted in idealism, but they’re no more likely to pan out because of it.

### No Regime Collapse

#### No regime collapse risk

Jones 14 (David Martin, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis)

All these works reveal how pragmatically, proactively and largely successfully the CPC has adapted and reformed itself in the years since Tiananmen. It is increasingly apparent that the Chinese party-state model has developed the capacity to change over time and adjust to new political and economic realities, both globally and locally. The party has shown that it can renew itself, alter its leadership and its ideology, and adapt to external and internal threats to its authority with a shrewd combination of prudence and ruthlessness. The CPC accords with Gramsci’s prescient view of the role of the modern, mass, socialist party, which is to be ‘the collective intellectual’ mirroring the political formula of Machiavelli’s Prince and representing the collective will of the state (1973: 186). Whether this political formula can be indefinitely maintained it is perhaps, as Zhou Enlai responded to Henry Kissinger in a different context, too soon to tell.

#### No collapse—legitimacy is durable and their predictions are serially false

Bell 12 (Daniel A., Huffington Post, 'China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society', July 9, Why China Won't Collapse (Soon), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/chinese-government-legitimacy\_b\_1658006.html, d/a 9-11-12)

Or so we are told. Such predictions about the collapse of China's political system have been constantly repeated since the suppression of the pro-democracy uprisings in 1989. But the system didn't collapse then, and it won't collapse now.¶ The key reason such dire predictions are taken seriously -- especially in the West -- is that non-democratic regimes are seen to lack legitimacy. A political regime that is morally justified in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab Spring has shown.¶ But this view assumes the people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the large majority of Chinese people support the single-party state structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many large scale surveys into the legitimacy of Chinese political power and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus : the degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people from telling lies and the results are always the same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of government. The central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus.

## TPP-Specific Answers

### Economic Exclusion Turns

#### Exclusion causes Chinese unrest & regime instability

Wang 2/10 (Fei-Ling, 2016, Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Significant Challenges and Profound Opportunities”, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/01/2016127134617824774.html)

The full impact of China’s staying out of the TPP will take some time to show. It is however clear that China will face significant challenges. The TPP is poised to alter the “apolitical” international trade game that China has got used to and gamed lucratively well for many years. It also highlights the differences and deficiencies of the Chinese political economy that could ignite and energize domestic discontent, resistance, and protests over China’s lack of IPR and rule of law, environmental protection, and labor rights. “China is an economic giant with heart diseases,” claimed a Chinese scholar, and the norms and values promoted by the TPP are bound to aggravate China’s problems. (10) China’s crucial access to the world market in general and the American market in particular could be significantly reduced and displaced by the similarly endowed TPP member nations. International capital flow and manufacture chains are likely to move and relocate elsewhere at China’s expenses. Moreover, China’s overall international stature and power are negatively affected. As the U.S. President Barak Obama gloated in his statement about the TPP, the Chinese are not in to make the rules for international trade. Indeed, as this author has learned first hand, the vision of this political consequence has helped to overcome considerable domestic resistances to the TPP deals in places like the U.S. Congress and the Japanese society. In combination, the forthcoming impact of the TPP is likely to erode China’s trade position, slow down further its economy which is already showing signs of weaknesses, undermine Beijing’s diplomatic power, and ultimately affect the CCP one party rule and the PRC sociopolitical stability. It is therefore perhaps no exaggeration for some Chinese analysts to sound panicky over a life under new trade rules, the “economic NATO,” made by Beijing’s ideological opponents.

#### Chinese involvement improves China’s economy & world trade

Li & Whalley 12 (Chungding, Institute of World Economics and Politics Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, John, Department of Economics Social Science Centre University of Western Ontario, “CHINA AND THE TPP: A NUMERICAL SIMULATION ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS INVOLVED”, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18090.pdf)

From these results, it seems clear that China will benefit from TPP participation (see Figure 11). On production side, China will increase output separately by 3.816%, 1.967% and 0.59% under the three different trade costs elimination cases. On the welfare side, China will gain about 1.125% under whole trade costs elimination situation. Trade for China also will increase significantly under TPP participation. Other TPP member countries, the US and OTPPC will all gain in terms of total production, welfare, export and import. Countries outside of TPP (ROW) will lose in - production, welfare, export and import. Total world production, welfare and trade will all rise which suggests that regional trade liberalization will in aggregate benefit global trade and welfare. Japan is a different case in that although not a member of TPP, still gains in production, welfare and trade. Comparing specific impacts on TPP member countries, OTPPC will gain the most, China the second, the US the third and Japan the least. TPP effects will increase as trade costs decrease more. These results thus suggest that China will gain if China joins TPP and China’s engagement will further improve other TPP member countries’ production and welfare.

### Economic Exclusion Turns

#### Inclusion solves Chinese economic dislocations

Aslan 15 (Buhara, Assistant Specialist, International Economic Analysis Division, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Merve Mavus Kutuk, Assistant Specialist, International Economic Analysis Division, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Arif Oduncu, Director, International Economic Analysis Division, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership: Policy Options of China”, China & World Economy / 22–43, Vol. 23, No. 6, p. 42)

It is found that the Chinese economy is negatively affected when only the TTIP is realized. The decrease in China’s GDP could be up to 0.5 percent (see Figure 6). When both the TTIP and the TPP are realized and China is excluded, the combined damage to the Chinese economy is higher than the damage of the case of the TTIP alone being realized, and the decrease in China’s GDP could be as high as 1.8 percent (see Figure 9).Nonetheless, inclusion of China in the TPP while being excluded from the TTIP results in up to a 1.7-percent increase in Chinese GDP, suggesting that the positive impacts of China’s participation in the TPP would compensate for the negative impacts of the TTIP. According to the results of the present paper, the Chinese Government should reconsider its exclusion from the TPP. Although participating in regional FTAs, such as China–RCEP, China–GCC, China–Norway, China–India and China–Korea FTAs, will have positive effects on the Chinese economy, the benefits of being part of the TPP would likely outweigh those from these FTAs, and offer higher GDP and trade increases for the Chinese economy. Therefore, it is recommended that China should pursue being part of the TPP to offset the negative impacts of the TTIP.

### Economic Exclusion Turns

#### Chinese inclusion revitalizes the TPP & improves China’s economy

Gordon 14 (Bernard, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of New Hampshire, 4/11, “Bring China Into TPP”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bring-china-tpp-10227?page=2)

China in the TPP would be a large development. As with its WTO participation a decade ago, TPP membership would help move China to a more open economy, which is among the reasons China’s reformers urge early participation. Last year, when Robert Zoellick observed that with Japan in the TPP the group would represent almost 40 percent of global GDP, he concluded “Japan’s involvement is a very big deal.” China’s involvement would be an even bigger deal and just how big, especially for the U.S., is suggested in a study of a proposed China-U.S. Economic Partnership, soon to be published by the Peterson Institute. As a result of the bilateral FTA it projected, the study concluded that U.S. exports would grow by 13 percent, particularly in America’s service, agriculture and advanced-manufacturing sectors. Within a decade the gains to the U.S. would be $170 billion a year, nearly a full percentage point of GDP. The TPP of course is much more than about trade. Well beyond issues of market access and tariffs, its more than two dozen chapters deal with state-owned enterprises, issues of government procurement, small and medium businesses, labor and the environment, intellectual property, and more. That range of issues tells two stories. The first is that the single most important thing to know about the Trans-Pacific Partnership is that it will set the rules of the global economy’s main actors in the years ahead. For the United States, which in the postwar years played the major rules-setting role for global trade, nothing is more important than that future rule-making role.

### Economic Reform Turn

#### Only an external economic event can prompt frozen reforms now

Pei 5/6 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's political stalemate”, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate?page=2)

In the months ahead, as the crucial 19th party congress -- scheduled for the fall of 2017 -- approaches, this inchoate force can be expected to mount a series of actions to frustrate Xi's moves to further consolidate his power. Specifically, they are likely to vigorously oppose any attempts to stack the deck in the Politburo and its powerful standing committee or to revise the party's rules on age and term limits. Such political subterfuge cannot possibly fool Xi. But he has few options. He could go all out by putting another mega-tiger -- a very senior incumbent or retired official -- in jail on corruption charges. But this high-risk move could precipitate a complete breakdown of elite unity and even open political warfare with his enemies. At the same time, it is inconceivable for him to concede to their unspoken demands of sharing power and restoring collective leadership. Without an external shock of some kind, this systemic political stalemate is hard to break. At the moment, both Xi and his rivals have placed their hopes on what happens to the Chinese economy.

#### Transparent inclusion signals provide leverage for economic reformers in China

Bush 13 (Richard, Sr. Fellow @ Brookings Inst., 12/3, “Transcript: Cross-Straits Series - Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia”, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-cross-straits-series-trans-pacific-partnership-and-asia)

And I've suggested, China needs a new round of economic reform. The elements of TPP are – touch on the kinds of reforms that have to be made. So a new group of Chinese economic reformers could use TPP as their own leverage. And then there's the Taiwan issue. You know, is China going to put itself in a position where it has to be a political bully to keep Taiwan out? Now, for that to work, the United States and other major TPP members have to be very firm that they are going to treat Taiwan's entry into TPP on its economic merits. I hope that's the case. Taiwan, of course, has to make the concessions that allow the United States and others to do that. But then the ball is in China's court. The good news here is that China is already moderating its views of TPP. Originally, it was just another instrument of U.S. containment, and now they want to hear more, they want transparency.

#### TPP causes critical Chinese reforms, spurs broad cooperation

Naughton 15 (Barry, So Kwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 10/7, “What Will the TPP Mean for China?”, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/)

Third, TPP increases the pressures within China for more decisive economic reforms. China launched the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ) two years ago, partly in order to pilot measures of external liberalization that would be useful in a new round of reform. The possibility that TPP would be agreed to was a consideration, and part of the impetus for the Shanghai FTZ. However, the FTZ has so far under-performed expectations. Now, the new trade agreement will present officials with a clear benchmark of global best practice. The TPP will give advocates of economic reform within China a new argument to support more substantial opening measures. The TPP challenges China to up its game in economic opening, regulation, and economic diplomacy. If China chooses, TPP can be the catalyst for a new round of global engagement that China sorely needs.