# \*\*\*WDCA Appeasement DA\*\*\*

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### Notes

This disadvantage says that increasing engagement with China will facilitate China’s growing military power and its ability to challenge United States’ leadership in Asia. The premise is that China’s growing power will give it the capability to attack the United States or displace its military presence in Asia, and that China’s grand strategy is to maximize Chinese power at the expense of United States power.

The uniqueness claim is that the United States is beginning to recognize the failure of engagement and is shifting towards balancing China. Balancing is a term that refers the United States’ ability to work with regional partners to prevent China’s rise – by shoring alliance relationships with allies like South Korea and Japan, by moving the US military into contested areas like the South China Sea to deter Chinese aggression, and by refusing to expand economic ties with China. The TPP is an example of balancing China – it excludes Chinese participation but increases United States relations with the most of the other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The terms “balancing” and “containment” are used interchangeably in this file. While some authors believe that “containment” means to apply military force or economic pressure against China, other authors associate it more with balancing.

The link claim is that increasing engagement undermines political support for greater balancing, and risks appeasing China. Appeasement is offering a concession or a reward to aggressive power in order to avoid conflict. Appeasement will either demonstrate the United States is weak and lacks the resolve to stand up to an aggressive China (the diplomacy affirmative), or it will provide China with material gains that allow gain power relative to the United States (the TPP and space affirmatives).

The impact is that growing Chinese economic and military power destroys United States hegemony. Hegemony refers to the United States’ ability to dominate the world. The disadvantage says that the reason there have not been great power wars since 1945 is that the United States has been the most powerful nation in the world and has acted to prevent wars from breaking out. If the United States allows China to challenge it, then the US ability to exercise global leadership will be greatly undermined, and other countries such as Russia or Iran will also begin to challenge the United States.

The affirmative should primarily defend that engagement works and will change Chinese ambitions to challenge the United States in a hostile way. The affirmative should also aggressively challenge whether balancing is a viable strategy to contain China, and whether China even has the ability to mount a credible challenge against the United States in the first place.

### Glossary

Alliance: A relationship among people, groups, or states that have joined together for mutual benefit or to achieve some common purpose, whether or not explicit agreement has been worked out among them.

Antagonistic: Showing or feeling active opposition or hostility toward someone or something. (Google Dictionary)

Appeasement: A diplomatic policy of making political or material concessions to an enemy power in order to avoid conflict.

Asia Pivot: A US strategy that advocates building a greater presence in Asia, through strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening America's relationships with rising powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

Concession: A thing that is granted, especially in response to demands; a thing conceded. (Google Dictionary)

Containment: A military strategy to stop the expansion of an enemy. It is best known as the Cold War policy of the United States and its allies to prevent the spread of communism abroad.

Dialogue: A conversation or discussion to resolve a problem. (Google Dictionary)

Engagement: Contact between an international actor and a foreign public, including public diplomacy, communication and the deployment of international aid.

Espionage: The obtaining of information considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information.

Hegemony: Leadership or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others. (Google Dictionary)

Internationalism: A political principle which advocates a greater political or economic cooperation among nations and peoples

Multipolar: An international system in which more than two states are dominant.

Revisionism: The re-interpretation of the historical record

Unipolar: An international system in which one state is dominant.

\*\*All definitions sourced from Wikipedia, except where otherwise noted

## 1NC Shell

### 1NC – Appeasement DA (1/4)

#### A. The US is shifting to balancing based upon the perception of the China threat – that’s key to sustaining US military hegemony and preventing China’s rise

Lumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

A second strain of enhanced balancing sees the imperative of a strengthened military posture in Asia as part of a larger project of preserving the postwar liberal economic and security order. Concerned with more than just the traditional concept of strategic competition that preoccupies realists like Friedberg, neoconservative thinkers such as Robert Kagan and Robert Lieber regard a more robust containment of China as key to reasserting America's global leadership. Diverging from the popular declinist narrative of waning U.S. power in an age of austerity, they believe the country's advantages in size, population, demography, and resources augur an American renaissance, one that can only be derailed by irresoluteness. The course of modified retrenchment pursued by the Obama administration, in this view, amounts to a misreading of America's power potential. Without vigorous American engagement abroad, the U.S.-led global order responsible for unprecedented peace and prosperity will gradually wither away, as authoritarian states like China and Russia, with no stake in sustaining a set of rules and institutions they had no hand in creating, step to the fore. “International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition,” Kagan writes. “It is the domination of one vision over others—in this case, the domination of liberal principles…over other, non-liberal principles.” A shift away from an American-dominated world to multipolarity would likely yield chaos and conflict, as China, among others, moved to carve out its own sphere of influence and pursue economic autarky. Rather than accommodate a revisionist China, the United States needs to contain it by working for political change in Beijing, increasing military capabilities in the region, and shoring up alliances. As with confrontation, the adoption of enhanced balancing faces substantial hurdles. Robust internationalism is currently out of favor with a majority of Americans, who consistently express a wish for national leaders to focus on domestic reform and economic recovery. This anti-interventionist sentiment, which no administration can wish away, shows no sign of dissipating anytime soon and will most likely endure as long as the country suffers the aftereffects of the most severe economic recession since the Great Depression. If, as some commentators maintain, America has entered a new era of austerity—one marked by stifling partisanship in Washington, resource constraints, and a dwindling share of the pie for defense expenditures—the political and economic capacity required for a sturdy response to China's ascent will be in short supply. Nor is there any indication that the United States will soon have ideal strategic leeway for focusing on China; hopes for a lighter footprint in the Middle East and Europe, which the Obama administration viewed as a prerequisite for the rebalancing to Asia, have been repeatedly dashed and persistent turmoil in those regions will serve as the most likely spoiler to deeper engagement across the Pacific. Moreover, while not a radical policy option like confrontation requiring a shocking catalyst for adoption, enhanced balancing would sharply escalate tensions with Beijing and close off many avenues for interaction, a grim outcome that any administration would have to weigh against perceived benefits. Yet it is not at all inconceivable to envision a future administration taking such a risk. Indeed, while dismissed by some enhanced balancers as hollow, the rebalancing to Asia announced by Obama in November 2011 amounted to a tacit recognition that an increasingly assertive China required tipping the scales in favor of containment. Should the PRC's regional ambitions continue growing in tandem with its capabilities and influence, as seems likely, this trend will continue. Both in terms of its intentions, which remain murky and therefore open to alarmist interpretations, and its military and economic capacities, which most in Washington see as expanding, China is increasingly regarded as an adversarial actor. Historic practice, economic recovery, and maneuvering by political elites at home could guide America's China policy in a firmer direction over time. By tradition, the United States has not tolerated the emergence of peer competitors. Since its ascendance to world power status at the end of the nineteenth century, it has not shied away from countering authoritarian states (Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union) that aspired to regional preponderance. Should China press its various sovereignty claims with greater vigor and steadily work to limit U.S. operations in the Western Pacific, enhanced balancing will gain more converts. While a fiscally and politically hobbled America unable to defend its far-flung interests is a distinct possibility in the future, so too is one that is economically rejuvenated, whose proven capacity for self-correction and inbuilt advantages in resources, competitiveness, and scientific research and technology are augmented by the attainment of energy independence. With the wind in its sails, an empowered America might be unable to resist the temptation to restrain China by flexing its muscles via a military build-up in East Asia. In a heated political climate that has often been conducive to threat inflation, America's party leaders may come to see advantage in calling for a mobilization of greater resources to counter China. The Cold War, fueled and sustained for so long by the efforts of Republicans to brand their opponents as “soft” on communism and the defensive attempts by Democrats to burnish their anti-Soviet credentials, serves as an informative precedent. American voters, many of whom have long blamed job losses and trade deficits on unfair Chinese economic practices, might eventually be swayed by an alarmist narrative portraying the PRC as a threat to U.S. security. Indeed, the containment of China could potentially serve as a useful, much needed catalyst for clarifying America's global role by harmonizing the two political parties’ foreign policy agendas, which have been at loggerheads since the demise of the Soviet Union.

### 1NC – Appeasement DA (2/4)

#### B. Pursuing greater engagement creates political divisions that block balancing and allow China’s hostile rise

Lumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

While eschewing the radical tactics of confrontationists, enhanced balancers also believe that Sino-American relations are captive to conflict-inducing structural forces and call for a more robust U.S. posture in the Asia–Pacific to check China's ambitions. Yet unlike confrontationists, who argue that a state's polity is irrelevant to the foreign policy it pursues, enhanced balancers stress that the threat posed by the mainland is magnified by its authoritarianism. The United States could acquiesce to a democratic China assuming the dominant role in East Asia, according to this school of thought, as it would be less prone to aggression and viewed less menacingly by its neighbors. With prospects for such a democratic transition decidedly low for the foreseeable future, however, leading enhanced balancers such as political scientist Aaron Friedberg believe that the adversarial components of the Sino-American relationship are overtaking incentives for cooperation. By pursuing engagement out of the naïve belief that this will moderate Chinese behavior, Washington has been asleep at the wheel and is losing ground to a savvier Beijing in the struggle for regional leadership that is already under way. Enhanced balancing draws on an antagonistic reading of Chinese intentions. While agreeing with most China watchers that the PRC has largely sought to lower tensions with its neighbors and America to foster the stable international environment required for domestic stability and economic growth, Friedberg also sees a sleight-of-hand strategy at work that ultimately aims to supplant the U.S. as the Asia–Pacific's hegemon. Beijing realizes this cannot be achieved by conventional means of conquest. It focuses instead on “winning without fighting”: muting America's response to its growing power, sowing doubts of U.S. reliability among its regional allies, and developing “anti-access/area denial” technology that will restrict the ability of U.S. forces to operate near China's coasts by placing its Asian bases within range of Chinese missiles. If Washington cannot adequately respond to this challenge because of its political paralysis and fiscal constraints, Friedberg darkly warns, the military balance in the Western Pacific will tilt in favor of Beijing, leaving its neighbors no other choice but to accommodate its wishes. Such an outcome would be at variance with America's historic interest in blocking an adversarial power from gaining preponderance at either end of the Eurasian continent.

### 1NC – Appeasement DA (3/4)

#### C. China’s a predator state bent on territorial expansion – this causes war without US balancing

Mulgan 16 - professor of Japanese Politics, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia (Aurelia, “China’s Rise as a Predator State”, The Diplomat, 3/9, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-state//AK>)

China’s land grab and subsequent militarization of “islands” in the South China Sea have finally dispelled the myth that its rise will be peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact – that China has become a predator state. Rand’s Michael Mazarr wrote about predator states in the late 1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a predator state above all is “territorial aggression” – the predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two contemporary examples; the other is Russia in Europe. The best historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These examples teach us that predator states cause wars. Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist ideology – the active promotion of the idea that neighbouring territories (both land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often possess a sense of historical grievance or victimization that can only be “righted” by territorial grabs. Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the “politics of memory operates powerfully…causing [predator states] to react by forming aggressive, predatory instincts.” Besides territorial aggression, predator states exhibit several other distinguishing features. First, national policy demonstrates very high levels of militarization. Predator states divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion for purposes of power projection. The emphasis in military planning and weapons acquisitions is inherently offensive rather than defensive and is geared to intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive wars. The flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that “military, nationalistic, and territorial issues continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the states’ approach to the world.” In China’s case, nationalism has overtaken Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology. Second, predator states adopt a strongly strategic perspective on national advancement and display an associated willingness to use all the institutions and instruments of the state over which they maintain control – economic, cultural, military, technological, resource, trade, legal, media – in the pursuit of this overwhelming important strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of retaliatory instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010, including restricting the export of rare earth metals. The use of such “strategic” instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state retaliation to a whole range of long-term, so-called “market-based” investments. These include foreign acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas such as land, resource and water assets and critical infrastructure as well as in private-sector developments and industries. The “strategic” element cannot be discounted in these acquisitions because the line between private enterprise and state-owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise given the complex interweaving of business and state actors. In the end, everything becomes “strategic” in the sense of supporting national advancement and security. Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that negate the potential for predation against other states. Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders are only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law. Levels of domestic lawlessness are matched by international lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws or norms because they are inherently lawless themselves – they understand and respect only power in international affairs. China’s actions in the South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue. Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially benign hegemons. How should other states deal effectively with predator states? First of all, they need to recognize what they are dealing with and react accordingly. Predator states demand tough responses starting with vigilance, deterrence and containment. At the very least there must be reinforcement of surveillance regimes, the formation of counterbalancing coalitions, and a willingness to act across a whole range of spheres – military, economic, financial, trade and diplomatic – so that predator states’ actions are not cost-free. Other states must also accept that doing nothing is not an option. This only invites further provocation, which increases the risk of serious conflict.

### 1NC – Appeasement DA (4/4)

#### D. An unchecked Chinese hostile rise destroys US hegemony and risks global war

Cohen, 13 - directs the Strategic Studies program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Elliot, “American Withdrawal and Global Disorder” Wall Street Journal, 3/19, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952>

In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal from conventional military commitments abroad will be tested. In East Asia, an assertive China has bullied the Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact) over the Spratly islands, and China has pressed its claims on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands. At stake are territorial waters and mineral resources—symbols of China's drive for hegemony and an outburst of national egotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe, the new prime minister of an understandably anxious Japan, traveled to Washington in February, he didn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that an ally of long standing deserves and needs. In Europe, an oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while modernizing (as have China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal. Russia has been menacing its East European neighbors, including those, like Poland, that have offered to host elements of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe. In 2012, Russia's then-chief of general staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the same Russia that has attempted to dismember its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal to President Mikhail Saakashvili. In the Persian Gulf, American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." America's Gulf allies may not have treaties to rely upon—but they do have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that the U.S. would stand by them. Today they wait for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush) nuclear disarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless in its efforts to intimidate and subvert Iran's neighbors. They may wait in vain. Americans take for granted the world in which they grew up—a world in which, for better or worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and in many ways the entire international system. Today we are informed by many politicians and commentators that we are weary of those burdens—though what we should be weary of, given that our children aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truth is that defense spending at the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminently affordable. The arguments against far-flung American strategic commitments take many forms. So-called foreign policy realists, particularly in the academic world, believe that the competing interests of states tend automatically toward balance and require no statesmanlike action by the U.S. To them, the old language of force in international politics has become as obsolete as that of the "code duello," which regulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hear that international institutions and agreements can replace national strength. It is also said—covertly but significantly—that the U.S. is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor. Perhaps the clever political scientists, complacent humanists, Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simple doubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct. Perhaps the president should concentrate on nation-building at home while pressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nuclear disarmament and an unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including Americans) as he sees fit. But if history is any guide, foreign policy as a political-science field experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results. Syria is a harbinger of things to come. In that case, the dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, as incidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical weapons suggest. A world in which the U.S. abnegates its leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in which China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia, mayhem and chaos is the order of the day in the Middle East, and timidity and appeasement paralyze the free European states. A world, in short, where the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must, and those with an option hurry up and get nuclear weapons.

## Uniqueness

### Uniqueness: Balancing Now

#### The US is shifting from engagement to balancing – policymakers recognize engagement’s failure

Eisenman 16 - Assistant professor at UT at Austin Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, Senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (Joshua, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China”, Carnegie Council, 1/21, <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756//AK>)

Questioning Engagement Now, however, a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing that extensive U.S. engagement has failed to prevent China from threatening other countries. One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David M. Lampton, gave a speech in May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that, despite the remarkable "policy continuity" of "constructive engagement" through eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat."11 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: “Beijing's long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBS Newshour: "The longstanding consensus that China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down. In response to these misgivings about Beijing's intentions, there have been calls for Washington to actively shape China's strategic choices by enhancing U.S. military capabilities and strengthening alliances to counterbalance against its growing strength. Recent publications reflect increasing apprehension; most argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring "structural problem" in international relations that causes rising powers to become aggressive.

#### The next President will shift China strategy towards enhanced balancing

Lumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of Canada (Michael, “Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for Responding to China’s Rise”, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is 4)//SL

How prominently cooperation will feature in this blend, however, is open to debate. There are grounds for thinking that this relationship will be increasingly weighted more toward competition, in which case enhanced balancing may step to the fore as a strategic option. Should the power gap between Washington and Beijing narrow, future administrations may seek cover in strengthened defense cooperation with China's wary neighbors. Alternatively, a sharp uptick in capacity could tempt U.S. leaders to press their advantage by discouraging the PRC from entertaining hopes of “catching up.” It says much about America's distrust of China and its determination to preserve its regional leadership that policy toward China has hardened during the Obama administration, which has often been ambivalent about exerting U.S. influence abroad and has governed during a period of prolonged economic lethargy and multiple crises outside of Asia. Obama's successor will almost certainly display fewer inhibitions; a combative narrative has taken hold among Republicans and liberal internationalist factions in the Democratic Party that this president's caution has eroded U.S. credibility and invited aggression from the PRC and other actors. It is not difficult to imagine the next administration, having campaigned on the theme that a more muscular foreign policy is needed to restore U.S. leadership, being even less coy in responding to an assertive China and building on the enhanced balancing ideas represented by Obama's “pivot” to Asia. Indeed, over the long term, a less restrained stance toward China would not be inconsistent for a nation with an exalted sense of its place in the world and that is prone to flexing its muscles. For at least the next two or three decades, an increasingly tense Sino-American relationship marked by perpetual jostling for leverage is the most likely prospect.

### Uniqueness: Balancing Now

#### The US is abandoning engagement in favor of containment

Mearsheimer, 16- Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor University of Chicago Co-director, Program on International Security Policy University of Chicago (John, Interview with Peter Navarro, Huffington Post, 3/10, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html>

Now, in the 1990s, the Clinton administration did pursue engagement. There was little evidence of containment: and you could do that in the 1990s because China was then weak enough that it didn’t matter. So I believe in the 1990s that the Clinton administration really did believe in engagement and thought that containment was a bad idea and pursued this policy of engagement. But we’re now reaching the point where China is growing economically to the point where its going to have a lot of military capability, and people are getting increasingly nervous. So what you see is we’re beginning to transition from engagement to containment; and this, of course, is what the pivot to Asia is all about. Hilary Clinton, who is married to Bill Clinton and pursued engagement in the 1990s, is now the principle proponent of the pivot to Asia; and she fully understands that it is all about containment. Of course, what’s going to happen here given that we live in the United States is that we’re going to use liberal rhetoric to disguise our realist behavior. So we will go to great lengths not to talk in terms of containment even though we’re engaged in containment and even though the Chinese know full well that we’re trying to contain them. But for our own sake and for our public we will talk in much more liberal terms. So it’s liberal ideology disguising realist behavior.

### Uniqueness: Balancing Now

#### The status quo is moving towards constrainment – the US is increasingly using military force to deter instead of engagement

Heydarian, 15 - Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international affairs and political science at De La Salle University (“The Forces Awakening Against an Antagonistic China” National Interest, 12/22, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-forces-awakening-against-antagonistic-china-14702?page=show>

Today, we are beginning to see the emergence of a “constrainment” strategy against China. Smaller powers like the Philippines have resorted to lawfare (legal warfare) in order to leverage relevant provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against China’s blatant disregard for the very convention it has signed up to (see my analysis of the arbitration case here). For the Philippines, China’s assertive maritime posturing—regarding its deployment of military and paramilitary patrols to contested features, coercive occupation of contested features like the Scarborough Shoal and Mischief reef, harassment of Filipino fisherfolk, massive construction and reclamation activities across the Spratly chain of islands and destruction of the area’s ecology—are in clear contravention of regional principles such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the UNCLOS. More crucially, the Philippines is asking an arbitration panel (formed under Art. 287, Annex VII of UNCLOS) at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to also nullify China’s sweeping territorial claims, namely the notorious “nine-dashed line,” based on dubious claims of “historical rights.” This way, the Philippines hopes to use the moral force of international law to embarrass China into better compliance with modern international law. While it is easy to dismiss the Philippines’s legal maneuver as naïve and inconsequential, especially since arbitration bodies under UNCLOS lack compliance-enforcement mechanisms, it would be shortsighted to overlook the strategic consequence of Manila’s bold move to take Beijing to court. Non-claimant states such as Singapore, which has welcomed permanent American naval presence on its soil as a hedge against China, have repeatedly called for the resolution of the South China Sea disputes in accordance with international law. This could be interpreted as an implicit statement of support for the Philippines’s arbitration case against China. Even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has grappled with internal divisions and institutional atrophy, has emphasized the necessity for the rule-based resolution of the disputes. With the Philippines successfully overcoming the jurisdiction and admissibility hurdle, other regional states are in a position to also threaten China with a similar suit. While Vietnam has been dangling such option for quite some time, and is now carefully preparing its case, even non-claimant states such as Indonesia, which are fearful of China’s maritime assertiveness and welcomed greater military cooperation with America, have threatened to take China to court. In effect, the Philippines has unleashed a “legal multiplier,” which presents China with the prospect of multiple arbitration showdowns. If anything, since other regional states can now more credibly threaten China with a similar legal action, they are in a position to, at the very least, extract certain concessions in exchange for not filing a case per se. While China obviously has the option of rejecting any unfavorable arbitration verdict, the prospect of multiple legal suits will seriously undermine the Middle Kingdom’s claim to regional leadership and peaceful rise. Thanks to the Philippines’s lawfare, China could soon be branded as an international outlaw by a third-party arbitration body composed of one of the world’s leading legal experts. During the latest ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summits, China was desperate to torpedo any serious discussion of maritime disputes and was clearly isolated, especially as a whole host of regional countries and external powers ramped up their criticism of Chinese reclamation activities in the South China Sea. The core of a constrainment strategy against China, however, lies in the determination of America and its key allies to push back against growing Chinese military presence on the ground, which threatens freedom of (especially military) navigation and overflight in the area. Taming the Juggernaut China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea—embodied by its notorious “cabbage strategy” and various forms of “salami-slicing tactics” against smaller claimant states—entered an intensified phase throughout the early years of the Obama administration. But for long, President Barack Obama held back, relying instead on diplomacy and bilateral engagement with China. Back in 2013, he held an intimate meeting at the Sunnylands retreat center in California with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in order to develop an element of great-power rapport. Framing Sino-American relations as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” the Obama administration always emphasized engagement rather than deterrence. To be fair, Xi tried to assuage fears of impending great power conflict by claiming, “The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for two large countries like the United States and China.” But, quite controversially, he ended up calling for a “new model of great power relations,” which many interpreted as a demand for American recognition of Chinese core interests such as the Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. The Obama administration tried to double down on the engagement track when the two leaders met in the White House earlier this year, paving the way for the expansion of much-needed confidence-building measures between the two powers’ armed forces, especially in light of growing incidents of Chinese harassment against American aircrafts and vessels roaming the Western Pacific. Almost half a decade into the “Pivot to Asia,” the Obama administration has gradually—but with delays and seeming reluctance—stepped up its efforts to directly challenge Chinese expansionism in East Asia. After much hesitation, the United States finally cleared the deployment of destroyers well into the twelve-nautical-mile radius of Chinese-claimed features in the Spratly chain of islands. Whether intended or not, however, the Obama administration ended up mismanaging the PR campaign around its more robust Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations against China. By invoking the right for “innocent passage” as a legal justification for its FON operations, the Obama administration inadvertently lent credence to China’s (implicit) sovereignty claims over LTEs like Subi Reef, which have been artificially augmented in contravention of UNCLOS (see Article 60). A more accurate understanding of UNCLOS would suggest that the principle of innocent passage presupposes the existence of a territorial sea, which could not be the case when one talks about land features that are, in their natural state, invisible during high tide. Even if the United States chose to suspend the offensive military capabilities of the USS Lassen, for instance, shutting down its fire control radar and not flying any helicopters in the area, the right for innocent passage precludes activities (see Art. 18, Sec. 3, Part II of UNCLOS), which are “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State,” including “collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.” China also didn’t occupy any nearby naturally formed islands in order to use Subi Reef as its baseline to project a bumped-out territorial sea; Thitu Island is occupied by the Philippines. But one can’t deny that a storm is gathering against China’s revanchist maneuvers in the South China Sea. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has joined maritime patrols in the area, and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) could soon join the fray. The United States Navy is poised to conduct its second quarterly FON operations against China in the coming month, most likely targeting the Mischief Reef, which, similar to the Fiery Cross and Subi reefs, has been artificially augmented into an island with advanced military facilities and airstrips. Like never before, the Xi administration is grappling not only with growing diplomatic pressure and legal backlash, but it is also confronting an American-led maritime coalition of the willing, with little interest in Chinese domination of one of the world’s most important SLOCs.

### Uniqueness: Balancing Now

#### The engagement coalition is collapsing – Sino-US relations are dominated by competition, not cooperation

Shambaugh 15 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University (David, “In a Fundamental Shift, China and the US are Now Engaged in an All-Out Competition,” *South China Morning Post,* June 11th, 2015, [http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out)](http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out%29) // EDP

While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship. This balance has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now trumps economics in the relationship. The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China. Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both public’s view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers. The macro trajectory for the last decade has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits. Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time, provide similar stabilisation and impetus for movement in specific policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived, with only a matter of months passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes. The most recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia. But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws), human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction. This is the "new normal" and both sides had better get used to it - rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable. This has given impetus to an unprecedented outpouring of commentary and reports by Washington think tanks in recent months. I have lived and worked there a long time, and cannot recall such a tsunami of publications on US-China relations - and they are all, with one exception (Kevin Rudd's Asia Society report), negative in nature, calling for a re-evaluation of US policy towards China, as well as a hardening of policy towards China across the board. A qualitative shift in American thinking about China is occurring. In essence, the "engagement" strategy pursued since Nixon across eight administrations, that was premised on three pillars, is unravelling. The American expectation has been, first, as China modernised economically, it would liberalise politically; second, as China's role in the world grew, it would become a "responsible stakeholder" - in Robert Zoellick's words - in upholding the global liberal order; and third, that China would not challenge the American-dominant security architecture and order in East Asia.

### AT: Dialogues Now

#### Status quo engagement with China has been shallow, lacking in meaningful outcomes, and largely for symbolic purposes

Stanton 15 – Director of the Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing Hua University and former director of the American Institute in Taipei (William, “US Policy Towards Xi Jinping’s China,” *Thinking Taiwan*, September 19th, 2015, http://thinking-taiwan.com/u-s-policy-xi-jinpings-china/) // EDP

The second argument made by Nixon and Kissinger for improved relations with China and frequently deployed even now is quite reasonable in theory. It is that China’s size, power, and UN status as a permanent member of the Security Council make it unavoidable that we cooperate with China to resolve regional and global problems around the world. In practice, however, such cooperation has been largely illusory when you search for concrete positive outcomes from a U.S. perspective. For example, Nixon and Kissinger both hoped that one immediate payoff of the opening to China would be an end to Chinese political and military support for the Vietnam War, thereby bring about a quicker and more peaceful end to the conflict. That of course never happened. Another example of alleged cooperation is North Korea. From the first round of much ballyhooed Six-Party Talks in August of 2003 through the last round in August of 2007, Washington frequently praised Chinese cooperation and support for making the talks possible. In the final analysis, however, the talks did not halt North Korea’s nuclear program and Beijing consistently weakened UN resolutions and UN sanctions aimed at ending Pyongyang’s weapons programs. Meanwhile, a key reason for this failure from early on until now was that Beijing has never strictly enforced those UN sanctions against North Korea that might have made it more compliant. Luxury goods, for example, never stopped entering North Korea to bolster the Kim family’s hold on power. Whatever dissatisfaction Beijing feels toward Pyongyang’s disobedient leadership, it wants North Korea to continue to exist as buffer state dividing the Korean peninsula. Similarly, while I personally strongly support the Iranian nuclear agreement which the United States reached on July 14 in cooperation with China, Russia, Germany, the UK, and France, I find it rather odd that President Obama should have specifically thanked Xi Jinping for the role Beijing played in reaching the agreement. In the run-up to the agreement, media reports had indicated that in general Russia and China generally lined up against the U.S. and its three European partners in the negotiations, as is the case in all discussions of most UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, why thank China when surely it is as much in the interest of China as any other country worried about Islamic extremism to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program? The even greater irony in praising China for the nuclear deal, however, is the substantial evidence over the years of the key role the PRC itself played in advancing Iran’s nuclear program, as was also the case with Pakistan and North Korea. As Orde F. Kittrie reminded us in a July 13 article this year for *Foreign Affairs*, “little attention has been paid to the longtime leading suppliers of Iran’s nuclear program: ostensibly private brokers based in China who, according to U.S. federal and state prosecutors, have shipped vast quantities of key nuclear materials to Iran. Even at the peak of international sanctions against Iran, China has reportedly made little to no effort to stop these or other such brokers.” This is of course not news. In the Winter issue of *Washington Quarterly* in 2011, John Garver asked “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” He concluded that it was. On the one hand, he argued, Beijing wants to maintain an overall appearance of strategic cooperation with the United States to achieve its development goals, while on the other hand it wants to maintain access to Iranian oil and gas, a sector in which China had become the world’s leading foreign investor by far by 2010. China’s dubious record of not halting the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran is one of the key reasons for ongoing Congressional debate this summer over renewal of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the PRC that the Reagan Administration negotiated nearly 30 years ago and is set to expire in December. Thomas Countryman, the top State Department official on nonproliferation, in a congressional hearing on July 16 acknowledged China has yet to show “the necessary capability and will” to stop illicit transfers of sensitive technology to Iran. The other reason for the debate is concern that China adapted U.S.-designed coolant pumps for nuclear reactors for military purposes on its nuclear submarines. Nonetheless, most observers expect the agreement to be renewed given Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington and the huge commercial losses for the U.S. nuclear industry if it were not renewed. So it is clearly an instance of the United States also having a dual agenda of competing interests in China. The most recent example of alleged successful cooperation between the United States and China was the November 11, 2014 Joint Announcement on Climate Change. While clearly a positive symbolic gesture, critics have rightly pointed out that China is only promising to do what it was already planning to do try to save its own people from choking to death on pollution. Moreover, at this point it remains more aspirational than real. Much will depend on the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris this coming December which hopes to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate.

### AT: Dialogues Now

#### Current dialogues are symbolic – they don’t require substantive concessions

Dingli 16’ - Professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Founder and Director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security (Shen, “Strategic Dialogue Advances Partnership, with a Limit”, China-US Focus, June 14, 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-advances-partnership-with-a-limit//AK)

With Obama commanding the White House, he and the then Chinese President Hu Jintao concurred to combine SD and SED and entitle the combined edition as “strategic”. That is how S&ED has been coined. In this way, Beijing and Washington have continued their top-level institutional dialogues and lifted them to strategic height. Obviously, such talks help address various important issues between China and the US, and have often been effective in limiting negative developments. For instance, the past S&EDs have successfully nurtured, to various degrees, bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity and climate change. So far, these heightened talks have dealt with various issues of cooperation and competition. Categorically, they have yielded all sorts of outcomes, such as positive cooperation and improved collaboration. However, dialogues are not a cure-all. Thus far, no dialogue could resolve fundamental differences on the Taiwan issue and South China Sea issue.

#### No actual cooperation occurs as a result of dialogues

Dingli 16’ - Professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Founder and Director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security (Shen, “Strategic Dialogue Advances Partnership, with a Limit”, China-US Focus, June 14, 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-advances-partnership-with-a-limit//AK)

The US government, however, is keen to address the South China Sea issue, the DPRK nuclear issue, and some regional hotspot such as Iraq and Syria crisis. Exactly in these most important areas that could alleviate each’s strategic concerns, the S&ED has not been able to reconcile their divergent perspectives. The 8th edition of the S&ED doesn’t seem to narrow the vast gulf existing between Beijing and Washington. The Chinese list of cooperation made no reference to the South China Sea at all. The Chinese official media has reported Chinese officials’ view on this issue but made no reference of American officials’ views. Apparently, the US has taken Chinese moves in the South China Sea as destabilizing, which warrants Washington to launch its “rebalancing” in the region. The US is furthering its program of “freedom of navigation” in the name of international law to probe and shape China’s response. In fact, despite the S&ED, China-US mutual suspicion is deepening rather than decreasing over the past three years. This is not due to the fault of the dialogue itself, but due to the deteriorating strategic trust that even the S&ED has been unable to fix. After all S&ED is a means to help stabilize and improve partnership. However, when each’s strategic interests differ or even collide, a dialogue will not be able to resolve the problem. The best the dialogue could do is to assure that each side will take sensible decisions, ideally through mutual concession. This is what the S&ED of the Obama era has been about.

### Space Uniqueness: US Winning the Space Race

#### The US is soundly winning the space tech race

Hitchens and Johnson-Freese, 16 - Theresa Hitchens is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College (“Toward a New National Security Space Strategy Time for a Strategic Rebalancing” Atlantic Council Strategy Paper No. 5, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/AC\_StrategyPapers\_No5\_Space\_WEB1.pdf

It is important to reiterate that, at this stage, the United States does not face an imminent threat to national security space missions. Capabilities demonstrations by Russia and China are just that—demonstrations, and perhaps signaling. There is no Russian or Chinese ASAT fleet deployed that could defeat US space operations in a conflict; both nations are still behind the United States in the integration of space assets into military operations, as well as in on-orbit technology development. And no other potential adversary is even close to achieving equivalent space power. Further, no strategy should be based alone on perceptions of the current threats from nations deemed potential adversaries. The geopolitical stage shifts, sometimes rapidly, and former enemies become allies or vice versa. Countries’ fortunes rise and fall, including through domestic crises, and regional balances sometimes become upended. Risks, including the risk of unchecked conflict escalation, must also be considered.

#### Current Chinese efforts to modernize space will fail without greater cooperation

Nurkin, 15 - Senior Director, IHS Aerospace, Defense and Security Thought Leadership (Nate, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Nurkin%20Written%20Testimony%202%209%2015.pdf>

As much progress as China has made in the last ten to fifteen years, the space program still faces developmental tests that will require it to mature enhanced skills and structures and get beyond the mere leveraging of civil-military integration and innovation initiatives focused on single technologies rather than complete systems. China will be required to create new technologies and perfect complex systems to move its program forward, meaning that the space program is currently confronted with an innovation challenge that is likely to grow more acute in the next decade as its space technologies advance to parity or beyond that of its closest partners. China’s ability to address three significant gaps-- integration and mindset; technical and scientific; and organizational--will determine the pace with which China is able to meet its current innovation challenge.

### Space Uniqueness: US Winning the Space Race

#### Space arms race now --- America is winning through private sector innovation, information dominance, and “muscular defense”

Harrison 4/29 [Roger Gran Harrison is a former director of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, “The Invisible Arms Race,” American Interest, April 29, 2016, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/29/the-invisible-arms-race>]

An arms race is under way in space—insidious, invisible, and at this point probably inevitable. The Bush Administration’s dream that the United States could control access to earth orbit as the British had once controlled sea lines of communication has been, as the bureaucrats say, overtaken by events. So has the Obama Administration’s emphasis on international “cooperation” (the word appears 13 times in the first few pages of the Administration’s 2010 National Space Policy document), an approach that served chiefly to demonstrate that no international consensus on the future of space exists, and that none is likely. Even the sensible, if vague and entirely voluntary, “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” floated by the European Union and pushed hard by the State Department for most of a decade found only tepid support. It was easy for the Chinese and Russians to portray it all as just the latest example of Western imperialism. Earlier this year, the Code was quietly put to rest. Leading from behind on space, the United States has been outmaneuvered and left for dead. Not so the Chinese and Russians, who occupy the diplomatic high ground with their Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), all the time working feverishly to put their own weapons in space, and anywhere else they might do some damage, including, we can safely assume, in the cyber domain. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation describes a recent reorganization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) structure to emphasize “information dominance,” defined as the ability to exploit battlefield information while denying the enemy that same capability. The information satellites provide is key to power projection; there can be no “pivot” to Asia without satellites; so disabling or dismantling our space infrastructure is a high priority for Beijing. Kinetic hit-to-kill weapons like the one China tested in 2007 and again in recent years are one way of doing this, but hardly the most efficient. Far better in an “informationalized” war to ensure that the data satellites gather and transmit never makes it to the end user—or that it arrives there in a form that looks reliable but isn’t. It’s the perfect way for a country like China to leap over the present imbalance and arrive as a fully fledged and dangerous adversary at the next stage of conflict in space. The key words on this new battlefield are hack, dazzle, jam, and spoof. For their part, the Russians recently tested a small, maneuverable “Luch” satellite dangerously near a commercial communication satellite operated by Intelsat Corporation in geosynchronous orbit. Satellites that can maneuver freely in space have several legitimate functions; they can serve as space tugs, moving satellites from orbit to orbit, or refuel, inspect, or repair them. They might also be used to shadow national security satellites, modify their orbits, hit them with a burst of electromagnetic energy, collide with them or perhaps plant listening devices or limpet mines on them. Ten years from now, space will be filled with small, highly mobile satellites like this, many of them put into orbit by commercial operators for legitimate purposes, but many others by states for other, less benign reasons. Time to run up the white flag? Some Pentagon officials don’t think so, in large measure because the White House has quietly changed course in the face this evolving strategic challenge, first by admitting the problem (there isn’t enough international support for rules of order in space, and meanwhile the bad guys are catching up) and then by taking steps to do something about it. The vehicle for this change was the 2014 “Strategic Portfolio Review,” a bottom up reassessment of space policy that spawned dozens of action items now in the process of implementation. The Obama Administration hopes its revamped approach to space will provide a sound legacy for the next Administration and is working hard to build bipartisan support for its continuation and completion. The White House has forbidden talk of space weapons or space war, so Space Command commander John Hyten speaks instead of a more “muscular defense.” Particulars are highly classified, but enough hints have leaked into the public domain to indicate that muscular defense will include good deal of kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber offense —enough, it would seem, to satisfy congressional hawks, at least for the moment. Seismic changes are also afoot in how the Pentagon policy leadership views possible collaborators in space. The Defense Department’s key man on space policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Doug Loverro, argues that in our space confrontation with the Chinese and Russians we have two trump cards: our greater ability to form alliances, and a burgeoning and innovative commercial sector that none of our likely adversaries can hope to match. Historically we have been better at building alliances than the Chinese and Russians, but coalitions depend on trust and a common perception of the threat, which are lacking in space. Perhaps now we have abandoned our hegemonic ambitions <<card continues>>

### Space Uniqueness: US Winning the Space Race

<<card continues>> we will regain some of our old coalition-building chops, but in the meantime our opponents are having some success building coalitions against us, as they did in defeating the EU Code of Conduct. In particular, any initiatives aimed either explicitly or implicitly at the Chinese in space will have trouble garnering support. Space-capable nations, excepting Japan and a very few others, simply don’t see the Chinese threat as we do. The other supposed trump in the U.S. hand is more promising. Loverro argues for leveraging the burgeoning and innovative commercial sector to both multiply our capabilities and complicate the options of those who would dare try to cripple them. Two key figures in this evolution are former NASA Director Mike Griffen, who made some NASA money available for commercial space start ups, and Elon Musk, who used that money and a great deal of his own to bring Silicon Valley culture and entrepreneurial flare to the business of putting things in space. (Watch the video of his Falcon 9 first stage sticking the landing on a barge in the Atlantic to see how well he has succeeded.) In his considerable wake has come an explosion of commercial enterprises doing things in space that only governments used to be able to do; in some cases, they’re even doing them better. The advances in launch, surveillance, space situational awareness, and miniaturization have been astonishing, far beyond what heritage industry greybeards were predicting even five years ago. The Pentagon is now moving to take advantage. Consider space situational awareness (locating and tracking objects in orbit). The gold standard had been the government’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB. No more. Frustrated with the lack of data shared by JSpOC, the big commercial satellite operators formed something called the Space Data Association, which, in collaboration with the space tracking company AGI, has created a Commercial Space Operations Center (COMsPOC) that can map the location and movement of satellites more accurately than anyone has before. The Pentagon once tried to discourage all this. Now, like a hopeful hippo in ballet shoes, it has pivoted to exploit it, announcing earlier this month that the Air Force has signed up to receive a year of ComSpOC orbital data. In the long run, Air Force leaders hope to turn over responsibility for space traffic management and even GPS responsibilities to civilian agencies. Civil military cooperation has the potential greatly to improve space situational awareness, increase the carrying capacity of orbit, and allow the military to concentrate limited resources on the heavier strategic burden of contested space. The Defense Department thinks public/private collaboration will also improve satellite protection. The idea is to fill orbit with a multitude of government and commercial satellites providing communication, timing signals, images, and channels for command and control; then add the satellites of your friends and allies, making your hardware interoperable with theirs. It’s a variation on the nuclear strategy called “multiple aim point basing,” which is meant to complicate an adversary’s targeting options, deny them the expectation of success, and thereby persuade them not to attack at all. It might be called, if policymakers had a better sense of irony, the “thousand-points-of-light” approach to space.

### Space Uniqueness: US Winning the Space Race

#### China’s indigenous space program will remain weak without greater cooperation with the United States

Cheng, 9 - Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Dean, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits

Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages. Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas. What's the Point? So what would be the purpose of cooperation from the Chinese perspective? To sustain the ISS? China is hardly likely to be interested in joining the ISS just in time to turn out the lights. There is also the question of whether the other partners in the international station, such as Russia and Japan, are necessarily interested in including China, especially now that the most expensive work has already been completed. There is also the issue of transparency. While it seems logical that the principal partners for cooperation would be the Chinese and American civil space agencies, the reality is that the China National Space Agency is, in fact, nested within the Chinese military-industrial complex rather than being a stand-alone agency. Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair.

## Links

### Engagement Links

#### Rivalry is inevitable – expanding economic or political integration of China assists Chinese ascendancy

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Because the American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy. This strategy cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the earlier effort to limit Soviet power was, because of the current realities of globalization. Nor can it involve simply jettisoning the prevailing policy of integration. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally. These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic harm” on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition—all while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests. The necessity for such a balancing strategy that deliberately incorporates elements that limit China’s capacity to misuse its growing power, even as the United States and its allies continue to interact with China diplomatically and economically, is driven by the likelihood that a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high. China’s sustained economic success over the past thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent and thus undermining the traditional U.S. geopolitical objective of ensuring that this arena remains free of hegemonic control. The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even as China’s per capita income remains behind that of the United States in the near future, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth slows considerably in the future, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future, thus making the need to balance its rising power important. Only a fundamental collapse of the Chinese state would free Washington from the obligation of systematically balancing Beijing, because even the alternative of a modest Chinese stumble would not eliminate the dangers presented to the United States in Asia and beyond. Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come.6 China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological challenges to U.S. power, U.S. allies, and the U.S.-dominated international order. Its continued, even if uneven, success in the future would further undermine U.S. national interests. Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that values China’s economic and political integration in the liberal international order at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and long-term strategic interests, hardly amounts to a “grand” strategy, much less an effective one. The need for a more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue.

### Engagement Links

#### China will use the plan to end political support for containment until it’s too late to challenge it

Friedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 118-119)

In sum, the obstacles to a substantial increase in balancing are many and weighty. They are likely to be broken down by a protracted process of erosion, a sudden crisis or, perhaps most likely, the former followed by the latter. On the other hand, despite the Obama administration's recent disappointments, a gradual move in the opposite direction, toward even more engagement and less investment in balancing, appears to be much more plausible. Putting aside for the moment the question of what the optimal mix of elements would be from a strategic perspective, the political playing field is clearly tilted in a way that favors such a development. Uncertainty over China's trajectory could also help to make such a shift in the overall mix of U.S. strategy more likely. There will always be debates, as there are now, over the scope, pace, and significance of China's military buildup and the meaning and sincerity of its diplomatic initiatives. For as long as the country is ruled by a closed and secretive regime, there will be doubts among outsiders about the true nature of its intentions. If it takes care to conceal its motives and avoid premature confrontations, if it ensures that its interlocutors and trading partners continue to enjoy the benefits of engagement, if it can delay the responses of potential rivals and discourage them from cooperating effectively with one another, China may eventually be able to develop its strength to the point where balancing appears hopeless and accommodation to its wishes seems the only sensible option. For a rising power facing a still-strong rival, this would be a prudent path to follow. In fact, as I argue in the next three chapters, it is just such a strategy that has guided China's actions since the end of the Cold War.

#### China will pocket concessions from engagement – it won’t change behavior and it will become more aggressive

Wolf, 14 - Dr. Albert B. Wolf is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan (“The Unipolar Moment is (Almost) Over: What’s Next?” The Times of Israel, 5/1, <http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-unipolar-moment-is-almost-over-what-next/>

Lean Forward This is also known as engagement. Unlike other strategies driven by “Who gets more” thinking, under engagement we stop worrying about how big a slice of the pie China gets, and instead focus upon growing the whole pie. Under this strategy, we give up none of our commitments. Instead, we take up new ones. We attempt to influence China’s present and future behavior by using positive inducements (“carrots”), while ensnaring them and us in a web of increasingly intricate international organizations Scholars like Alastair Iain Johnston suggest that China’s participation in international organizations has had a moderating influence on Beijing’s foreign policy since the days of Mao. Jeffrey Legro argues that since Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued an “integrationist” strategy that has benefited its growth. Until outside events demonstrate that it’s current strategy is not working or has failed, Chinese elites have little reason to favor a course correction in a more aggressive direction. Downsides Has this ever worked? Some would suggest that engagement has never worked because declining states rarely try it. Declining powers are wary of trying it for fear that concessions given to rising powers today will be used against them in the future. China could pocket concessions and use them later in order to further America’s demise. China may also see this as little more than cheap talk: a U.S. ploy to get its way and maintain primacy on the cheap. After all, such a doctrine does not involve deeper defense cuts than what we have now.

### Engagement Links

#### New substantive acts of cooperation are concessions to China that embolden nationalists and creates the widespread perception of US decline

Pickrell 15(Ryan, PhD degree in International Politics and Diplomacy, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3, 10/26/15, NRG)

China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.

### Engagement Links

#### The history of appeasement has put the US and China on the brink of war – further demonstration of US weakness means China will be aggressive

Chang, 16 - Chang lived and worked in China and Hong Kong for almost two decades, most recently in Shanghai, as Counsel to the American law firm Paul Weiss. He has spoken at Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Penn, Princeton, Yale, and other universities and at The Brookings Institution, The Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, RAND, the American Enterprise Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and other institutions. He has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Pentagon (Gordon, “America Will Decide If There Is War in Asia” 6/24, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-will-decide-if-there-war-asia-16720?page=show>

Aggressors, like China, start wars. Yet whether history’s next great conflict begins in East Asia will not be determined in the councils of a belligerent Beijing. If you’re trying to set your watch to the sound of gunfire, you must, most of all, observe Washington. The region is in seemingly never-ending crisis because Chinese leaders believe their country should be bigger than it is today. As a result, China is pushing on boundaries to the south and east, using forceful tactics to both take territory under the control of others and close off international water and airspace. The dynamic of aggression has started, and at this point China will not stop until it is stopped. Unfortunately, Washington is in many ways responsible, or at least paved the way, for the latest round of Chinese provocation. That round began in the spring of 2012. Then, Chinese and Philippine vessels sailed in close proximity around Scarborough Shoal, in the northern portion of the South China Sea. To avoid conflict in that critical body of water, Washington brokered an agreement between Beijing and Manila. Both agreed to withdraw their craft, but only the Philippines honored the deal. That left China in control of the shoal. Beijing’s grab was particularly audacious. Scarborough lies just 124 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon, guarding the strategic Manila and Subic Bays. It was long thought to be part of the Philippines. The Obama administration did not enforce the agreement it had brokered, perhaps under the belief it could thereby avoid a confrontation with Beijing. The White House’s inaction just made the problem bigger, however. Emboldened Chinese officials and flag officers then ramped up pressure on another Philippine feature—Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese vessels have regularly operated—and the Senkakus, eight specks under Japanese administration in the East China Sea. You would have thought that Washington policymakers had learned the costly lessons of earlier eras when Western timidity opened the door to large-scale conflicts that could have been avoided. Britain and France, for instance, allowed the Third Reich to remilitarize the Rhineland in March 1936. That gambit secured one of Germany’s frontiers and eventually led to Hitler’s annexation of Austria in March 1938 and his bold grab of the Sudetenland the following September. Germany, after the infamous Munich pact, took the rest of Czechoslovakia by the spring of the following year. In the first half of August 1939 Hitler did not think Britain or France would go to war over Poland, and it’s not hard to see why. After all, they did nothing to stop him when they could have, in the Rhineland. Then they meekly stood by while he marched into large parts of Europe. By the latter part of that August the declarations of London and Paris that they would defend Polish borders sounded hollow and in any event were too late. German forces crossed the Polish border on September 1, and London and Paris, likely to Hitler’s surprise, declared war on Germany two days later. Unfortunately, America looks like it is following in the footsteps of Britain and France. The People’s Republic of China is not the Third Reich, but the dynamic in the second half of the 1930s and our era looks eerily similar. Then and now, an aggressive power seized what it wanted. Chinese leaders today, like Germany’s before, believe further advances will not meet effective resistance. Moreover, there is at this time, like there was in that decade, a momentum toward war. Hostile elements—many but not all of them in uniform—are in control of the levels of power in Beijing, as they were in Berlin. This month has seen those elements hit out toward their country’s south and east. To the continental south, in the Himalayas, Chinese troops intruded into Indian-controlled territory at four separate spots in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the ninth. To the maritime southeast, a Chinese vessel deliberately rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat on June 16. And last week about a dozen of China’s trawlers fished in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and confronted local patrol vessels, creating the third such incident in as many months. Moreover, to China’s east there was a series of incidents in the East China Sea. On June 15, a Chinese intelligence ship entered Japan’s territorial waters in the dark of early morning, loitering close to two islands off the main Japanese island of Kyushu. The intrusion was the first since 2004, when a submerged Chinese submarine transited a strait between two of Japan’s islands, and only the second by China since the end of the Second World War. The incursion followed an incident on June 9 when, for the first time ever, a Chinese warship, a frigate, entered the contiguous zone off the Senkakus. This, in turn, followed the June 7 intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane over the East China Sea by two Chinese jets. U.S. Pacific Command called the Chinese action “unsafe.” And this brings us back to Scarborough, which could be as important a turning point to our era as Sudetenland was to last century. “We see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things, survey type of activity, going on,” said Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to Reuters in the middle of March. As a result, the shoal could end up “a next possible area of reclamation.” Reclamation would make permanent China’s seizure and therefore constitute a game-changer if not immediately reversed. So far, the United States has sent warnings. On April 21, four ground-attack A-10s flew what the U.S. Air Force termed “an air and maritime domain awareness mission in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.” Then this month in Singapore at the Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in response to a question about Beijing’s possible reclamation of the shoal, spoke of “actions being taken both by the United States and by actions taken by others in the region which will have the effect of not only increasing tensions but also isolating China.” What “actions”? In late March, the New York Times reported that General Joseph Dunford was overhead at the Pentagon asking Admiral Harry Harris, the chief of U.S. Pacific Command, the ultimate question. “Would you go to war over Scarborough Shoals?” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to know. So far, very few Americans think Scarborough is worth a fight with the Chinese, and the White House seems reluctant to start a war anywhere. Therefore, the risk of conflict over those rocks appears to be extremely low. Yet, despite appearances, the situation could be dangerous. For one thing, the Chinese seem determined to do something provocative when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague hands down its ruling in Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China. Beijing has refused to participate in the case that will apply the rules of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to South China Sea issues, and most observers expect a decision favoring Manila in the next month or so. Chinese leaders could simply decide to show the Philippines who’s boss by ignoring the decision, defying U.S. warnings, and building an artificial island over the contested Scarborough. Beijing might think it can get away with such an act, but authoritarian leaders do not have a good track record in reading American intentions. Kim Il Sung was sure Washington would not come to the aid of beleaguered South Korea in June 1950. And at the time it looked like he had correctly read the Truman administration. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his January 1950 speech at the National Press Club in Washington, left South Korea outside America’s announced “defensive perimeter.” His language, whatever he intended, appears to have convinced Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin, Kim’s backers, that the North Korean was correct in his assessment that the United States would not fight. In June, Kim attacked in full force, and, despite everything, an unprepared, outgunned America went to war. Saddam Hussein made a similar error. In July 1990, April Glaspie, the American ambassador to Iraq, indicated to him that Washington had little interest in “Arab-Arab conflicts,” words he interpreted to mean the U.S. would not stop him from taking over neighboring Kuwait. The Bush administration could have prevented a generation of tragedy by making a firm declaration of resolve during that pivotal conversation. Instead, Saddam invaded and America had to create a multi-nation coalition and lead a full-scale invasion to free the oil-rich emirate. Today, it would be hard for China to predict what would happen if it started to reclaim Scarborough, in large part because it is not clear that Washington policymakers themselves know what they would do. America is now showing resolve in the South China Sea, but it’s unlikely that, after the feeble response in the first half of 2012, U.S. officials have impressed their Chinese counterparts with the depth of their concern. That makes the situation at this moment extraordinarily dangerous.

### Dialogue Links

#### Increasing dialogue causes crisis escalation because China thinks the US will back down to every provocation. Closing communication channels is vital to demonstrating resolve

Mastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, [https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL](https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads%29//SL) italics in original

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia. China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight. The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76 Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage.

### Dialogue Links

#### Threatening escalation is vital to crisis stability – de-escalation makes future crises inevitable because it plays into Chinese strategic thinking

Mastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL

The current mindset—that crisis management is the answer in all scenarios— will be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case “great battle” scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and reward, such as the 1962 Sino–Indian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. The idea that any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists), Xi still wants to avoid an armed conflict at this stage. In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic environment so as to focus on internal development.77 Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of China’s A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for China’s recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States needs to break free of its Cold War-based paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of limited war, escalation, and risk. Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for. The United States needs to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and allowing for the possibility of escalation—both vertically in force as well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S. interests. But only by mastering these two balancing acts—focusing on balancing resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis management—will the United States be able to maintain peace and stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests.

### Space Links

#### Increasing civil space cooperation causes espionage and leads to Chinese space dominance. The plan gives China the ability to fight the United States and win

Fisher, 15 - Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center (Richard, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf>

As with the former Soviet Union, China’s pursuit of regional and then global military power is not rooted in an existential threat, but in the CCP’s fears for its power position. This requires a CCP-led “rejuvenation” of China, entailing mobilization for greater power, ever more control over its own people, and then increasing control over others. Another result is China’s choice to be hostile to Western rules or concepts that may constrain China’s power. This justifies an essential Chinese rejection of American or Western conceptions of transparency and restraint, or verifiable weapons control in space which might constrain its power. This mirrors the CCP/PLA’s repeated refusal of U.S. requests to consider real nuclear weapons transparency and control, transparency over its nuclear and missile exports, and --from many of its neighbors and Washington -- fair settlement of territorial disputes which threaten war. The latter, especially in the South China Sea, is instructive. As it has gained military power in the South China Sea, China has sought to change the strategic environment and dictate new rules to increase its security at the expense of others. Once it gains commanding strength and position in space, will China do the same? For the United States, cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with Chinese space officials, especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this juncture, before China has achieved levels of “space dominance”, it is crucial to link any real cooperation with China to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S. security. Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space corporations, or government institutions at this time presents two risks. First it could encourage China to advance an illusion of cooperation with the U.S. and the West while differences on Earth become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S. options and actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any new access for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors.

### Space Links

#### All cooperation is illusory – the CCP is motivated to challenge US leadership and will use cooperation for espionage

Fisher, 15 - Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center (Richard, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf>

China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on Earth, or in space, China’s basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans. They are relying on China’s accumulation of space power to convince enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military realms. A 29 September 2014 editorial in the prestigious Aviation Week and Space Technology noted, “It is absurd that the U.S. Navy can conduct joint exercises with the Chinese navy but Congress bars NASA from working directly with Chinese engineers and scientists.” Well, to the shock of the U.S. Navy and its allies, when China accepted its first invitation to participate in the 2014 multilateral RIMPAC exercises, it brought along its own ELINT ship to record everybody’s electronic emissions — a threatening response demonstrating essential hostility to the intent of inviting China’s participation. This simply does not bode well for cooperation in space either. To boot, the U.S., Russia and Europe all have had their sad experiences with Chinese espionage targeting their respective space sectors. According to the testimony of a Chinese solid fuel rocket motor engineer interviewed by this analyst, what they learned from the Martin Marietta solid satellite kick motor used on a Chinese SLV in the early 1990s has enabled all of their solid rocket motors for their new ballistic missiles now targeting the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons. Europe’s Galileo navigation satellite program wanted China to be a partner, but when China obtained the technology it needed, it left and built its Compass system. At the 2007 Moscow Airshow, Russian space officials explained their attempt circa 1998 to promote business and cooperation by selling “internships” or access, to some 200 Chinese engineers, to Russian space companies. The Russians did not sell space station tech to China, but they now know why the Chinese space station looks like theirs. A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in space with China cannot be separated from China’s ambitions on Earth or out into space. Likewise, for the United States to “wall off” space cooperation with China and to treat it as a “special” realm only plays into China’s game. As long as it is ruled by the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan, militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like Pakistan, become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It is imperative for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering China’s expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to U.S. security than is space cooperation with China.

### Space Links

#### Deepening cooperation means China will steal US tech

Sterner, 15 - Eric Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He held senior staff positions for the U.S. House Science and Armed Services committees and served in DoD and as NASA’s associate deputy administrator for policy and planning (“China, Talk and Cooperation in Space” Space News, 8/6,

<http://spacenews.com/op-ed-china-talk-and-cooperation-in-space/>

It is clear what the Chinese might seek from institutionalizing and deepening a cooperative civil space relationship with the United States. Accelerating Beijing’s learning curve when it comes to space technologies and operations, intelligence collection, technology transfer and political prestige all flow from working with the world’s most advanced space power. Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit. The Defense Department notes that “China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to center on its civil-military integration policy as a means to leverage dual-use technologies to improve its defense industries. Despite improvements to its own indigenous technology development and industrial capacity, China continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. These acquisitions manifest in the form of joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and close business partnerships with, and technology imports from, highly developed countries, primarily of the West, that offer access to critical advanced technology sectors.” Consequently, the administration appears poised to put the U.S.-Chinese civil space relationship on a path that could eventually benefit the Chinese defense industry as soon as the congressional restrictions expire.

### Space Links

#### The espionage risk is high and empirically proven

Nurkin, 15 - Senior Director, IHS Aerospace, Defense and Security Thought Leadership (Nate, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Nurkin%20Written%20Testimony%202%209%2015.pdf>

A March 2014 Department of Justice report detailing major US export enforcement, economic espionage, trade secret and embargo-related criminal cases from January 2008 through March 2014 included over two dozen cases of prosecuted espionage regarding / theft of controlled items relevant to China’s space and broader aerospace programs, such as: multiple cases focused on thermal imaging cameras and aerospace grade carbon fiber as well as cases involving electronics used in military radar and electronic warfare; radiation hardened materials and gyroscopes; military accelerators; military optics; unmanned systems; rocket / space launch technical data; restricted electronics equipment; source code; and the theft of space shuttle and rocket secrets for China. China is also pursuing the illicit acquisition of advanced aerospace technologies from the United States via cyber-espionage, though direct attribution of cyber-attacks is exceptionally difficult. China’s cyberespionage capabilities and activities have received particularly acute attention since the release of a series of high-profile reports in early 2013, including reports from the US Defense Science Board, the private Internet security firm Mandiant, and a classified National Intelligence Estimate, elements of which were leaked to the press. Collectively, these reports and several subsequent U.S. government and private sector reports describe a significant and sustained cyber-espionage campaign against US companies in a variety of industries emanating from China and initiated by the Chinese government. Satellites, defense, aerospace and telecommunications were all listed among targeted industries.

### TPP Links

#### Selective globalization is vital maximizing US power – that requires Chinese exclusion from the TPP

Tellis, 14—Ashley, senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from U Chicago, former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia at the National Security Council. “Balancing Without Containment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace PDF report, Jan 22, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>, p. 50-51 –br

There is no doubt that Beijing’s inclusion in the liberal international economic order has constituted what Arvind Subramanian has called “a huge structural trade shock”114 that has not only upturned the traditional patterns of commerce involving China but actually propelled its rise as a new American competitor. To its credit, the United States has not responded to this challenge through protectionist instruments as it has done with other competitors in the past. Yet the dangers posed by China’s rise cannot go unaddressed. Responding to them through an economic strategy centered on maximizing relative gains through expanded trade relations among a closed circle of American allies currently represents an optimal approach to balancing economic opportunities and strategic necessities, even as the United States pursues further absolute gains through whatever openings present themselves at future WTO negotiations. The success of this approach, however, will hinge entirely on keeping China out of these regional free-trade agreements for as long as possible—or at least until the United States can retrieve its economic position, the specter of Chinese ascendancy recedes in significance as a strategic threat, or China agrees to forego the disproportionate advantages it has enjoyed as a result of its consciously imperfect integration into the liberal trading system. If U.S. policymakers are to pursue the selective deepening of globalization as a means of elevating American growth in the prospective future—with a view to simultaneously incurring both improved absolute gains and superior relative gains—they will have to reject presently any Chinese overtures about joining high-quality free-trade agreements such as the TPP. To date, U.S. officials have equivocated, stating blandly as National Security Adviser Susan Rice recently did that Washington “welcome[s] any nation that is willing to live up to the high-standards of this agreement to join and share in the benefits of the TPP, and that includes China.”115 While the diplomatic necessity for appearing inclusive is understandable, the strategic necessity for excluding China is overwhelming if Washington is to enjoy improved relative gains vis-à-vis Beijing.

### TPP Links

#### Increasing trade increases Chinese power - China receives higher relative gains from trade than the US

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Although this last development has generated wealth and welfare gains globally, it has also produced several unnerving strategic consequences. It has made many of China’s trading partners, especially its smaller neighbors, asymmetrically dependent on China and thus reluctant to voice opposition even when China’s policies leave them disadvantaged.21 China’s economic integration has also produced higher relative gains for itself, even with its larger trading partners, such as the United States—not in the narrow sense pertaining to the bilateral terms of trade, but in the larger strategic sense that its overall growth has risen far faster than it might have had China remained locked into the autarkic policies of the pre-reform period. U.S. support for China’s entry into the global trading system has thus created the awkward situation in which Washington has contributed toward hastening Beijing’s economic growth and, by extension, accelerated its rise as a geopolitical rival. Furthermore, China’s growing economic ties have nurtured and encouraged various internal constituencies within China’s trading partners to pursue parochial interests that often diverge from their countries’ larger national interests with regard to China.22 Finally, economic integration has shaped the leadership perceptions of many of China’s trading partners in ways that lead them to worry about their dependence on and vulnerability to China. Even if such worry is sometimes exaggerated, it weakens their resistance to both Chinese blandishments and coercion.23 Given these outcomes, it should not be surprising that Beijing has consciously sought to use China’s growing economic power in a choking embrace designed to prevent its Asian neighbors from challenging its geopolitical interests, including weakening the U.S. alliance system in Asia. Beijing’s commitment to sustaining high economic growth through deepened international interdependence, therefore, provides it not only with internal gains—a more pliant populace and a more powerful state—but consequential external benefits as well, in the form of a growing military and deferential neighbors who fear the economic losses that might arise from any political opposition to China. These gains are likely to persist even as China’s economic growth slows down over time—as it inevitably will—so long as Beijing’s overall material power and its relative growth rates remain superior to those of its neighbors.24

#### Increasing economic engagement undermines effective balancing

Friedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 109)

After 1989 there was an irreducible measure of tension between American efforts to engage China economically while at the same time countering the growth of its military power. By continuing to open its markets and invest its capital, the United States was contributing substantially to the rapid expansion of China's GDP. This fueled Beijing's sustained military buildup, which in turn stimulated Washington to strengthen its Asian alliances and bolster its own forces in the region. Continued engagement thus helped to create the need for more balancing.

### TPP Links

#### Slow Chinese growth increases regional containment of China and moderates its behavior

Glaser and Funaiole, 15 – \*senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS AND fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie and Matthew, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown” 11/16, <http://csis.org/files/publication/151116_Glaser_Funaiole_Geopolitical.pdf>

Overinvestment in economic initiatives leaves Beijing susceptible to the same vulnerabilities that threaten the Chinese economy. Should the Chinese economy stumble, aspects of the AIIB and OBOR will need to be scaled back. The knock-on effects of an economic slowdown could diminish China’s future role in the region. The smaller countries of Asia have tolerated Chinese assertiveness in exchange for economic gains and because they fear that challenging China could cause Beijing to punish them economically. If China is no longer able to afford those benefits, many smaller countries may be less willing to show deference and more willing to push back against Chinese threats to their interests. In the South China Sea, where in recent years China has incrementally altered the status quo in its favor, such a development could have a positive effect. Myriad steps taken by some of the other claimants to the disputed land features, as well as by the United States, Japan, and other concerned members of the international community, have not persuaded Beijing to moderate its assertiveness and seek cooperative solutions to the extant territorial disputes. Any reduction in Chinese influence may diminish the disincentives that smaller claimant states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) face vis-à-vis China. Firmer and coordinated policies among Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, combined with greater unity among all the ASEAN member countries, might induce Beijing to conclude a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea that ensures disputes are managed peacefully and in accordance with international law.

### TPP Links

#### China will use engagement to consolidate economic power and challenge the U.S.

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Because these twin expectations have not materialized, China’s rise as a new great power promises to be a troubling prospect for the United States for many years to come. China’s economic growth derives considerably from its participation in the multilateral trading system and the larger liberal international order more generally, but its resulting military expansion has placed Beijing’s economic strategy at odds with its political objective of threatening the guarantor of global interdependence, the United States. At the moment, China displays no urgency in addressing this conundrum, aware that its trading partners hesitate to pressure Beijing because of the potential for economic losses that might ensue. Given this calculation, Chinese leaders conclude that their country can continue to benefit from international trade without having to make any fundamental compromises in their existing disputes with other Asian states or their efforts to weaken U.S. power projection in Asia. So long as the United States does not alter the intense “global codependency” that currently defines U.S.-China economic relations, China is content to maintain the current arrangement.32 China still seeks to cooperate with the United States whenever possible, but only when such collaboration is not unduly burdensome in the face of common interests, does not undercut its geopolitical ambitions to undermine U.S. primacy, and does not foreclose future options that might one day prove advantageous to China. Because China recognizes that its quest for comprehensive national power is still incomplete, it seeks to avoid any confrontation with the United States or the international system in the near term. Rather, Beijing aims to deepen ties with all its global partners—and especially with Washington—in the hope that its accelerated rise and centrality to international trade and politics will compel others to become increasingly deferential to China’s preferences. Should such obeisance not emerge once China has successfully risen, Beijing would then be properly equipped to protect its equities by force and at a lower cost than it could today, given that it is still relatively weak and remains reliant on the benefits of trade and global interdependence. The fundamental conclusion for the United States, therefore, is that China does not see its interests served by becoming just another “trading state,” no matter how constructive an outcome that might be for resolving the larger tensions between its economic and geopolitical strategies. Instead, China will continue along the path to becoming a conventional great power with the full panoply of political and military capabilities, all oriented toward realizing the goal of recovering from the United States the primacy it once enjoyed in Asia as a prelude to exerting global influence in the future.

### AT: Engagement Helps Moderates

#### Zero empirical evidence supports the boost moderates claim

Friedberg 11 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, co-director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies (Aaron, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 261-262)

If the efforts of outsiders to promote political change in China have thus far accomplished little, it is hard to see how doing less in this regard will achieve more. Some of the "enhanced engagers" do not appear to care very much about this. Their goal, stated with varying degrees of candor, is to build the best possible ties with China regardless of how it is ruled. Others continue to harbor hopes of change but believe that the United States can do more to hinder it, by taking steps that hard-liners can cast as hostile or disrespectful to the Chinese people, than to speed it along. Conversely, more engagement, more deference, more reassurance, and less criticism should help to undercut the arguments of conservative hyper-nationalists and bolster those of the more liberal, cosmopolitan, and reform-minded members of the Chinese elite. This is a pleasing theory, but one that has virtually no empirical evidence to back it up. The idea that China's leadership contains hawks and doves, liberals and conservatives, "good guys" and "bad guys" seems plausible to Americans familiar with their own patterns of domestic politics. Indeed, there may be people among the think tankers and university professors who now opine publicly on questions of foreign and domestic policy to whom these labels could reasonably be applied. Within the Chinese governing elite, however, there appears to be far more unanimity than difference. Here, as senior CIA analyst Paul Heer points out, "the hard-liners versus moderates dichotomy is a false one." Certainly since the purges that followed the 1989 Tiananmen "incident," the range of acceptable debate on domestic questions has become much narrower. On these issues, writes Heer, China's leaders are "all moderates, and they are all hard-liners." On economic policy, there has been no serious challenge to Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented reforms. Regarding politics, however, "Chinese rulers are all hard-liners, since they retain a commitment to socialism, albeit with Chinese characteristics, and to Communist Party rule."36 Supposing that factions of some kind do exist, it is by no means obvious how their influence would be affected by external events. The notion that a low-key, nonconfrontational American approach will favor China's "moderates" has an intuitive appeal. But the opposite is at least equally plausible. If Washington adopts a softer, more acquiescent stance, Chinese "hard-liners" will no doubt try to take the credit, arguing that the change was a direct result of tough policies, like the sustained military buildup, that they championed. Attempts at accommodation could wind up strengthening precisely the groups and individuals it was intended to weaken.

### AT: Engagement Helps Moderates

#### Engagement can’t spur moderates

Eisenman 16 - Assistant professor at UT at Austin Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, Senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (Joshua, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China”, Carnegie Council, 1/21, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles\_papers\_reports/756//AK)

To improve U.S. policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict requires going beyond simplistic applications of international relations theory. It means opening the 'black box' of China's policymaking process to understand why it makes the decisions it does and how this process has and is changing. Unfortunately, barriers continue to prevent the U.S. from better understanding and responding to China. Most importantly, Friedberg identified a "yawning ideological chasm" that inhibits the success of U.S.' engagement, arguing that: "The very different domestic political regimes of the two pacific powers" make the liberalization of the Chinese political system essential for "a true trans-Pacific entente." CPC repression inhibits change in China and presents "a significant additional impetus to rivalry.20 American policymakers' beliefs about China are rooted in their own preconceived views and experiences in China. Since Americans began visiting the PRC in the early 1970s, rosy assessments have become commonplace. As the Sinologist Robert Scalapino observed after his 1973 visit: There is serious risk that one may be badly misled by what one sees, hears, and instinctively feels [in China]. This is partly due to the tendency within all of us to superimpose our own values and cultural perspectives on another environment. Such tendency surely exists, and for some, it represents an ever-present bias. Their writings consequently reveal far more about their own views of their own social order than about China. Each individual, in any case, carries his prejudices with him in some measure, and he may well reinforce them as he goes.21 "Because China is so vast," James Palmer recently observed in the Washington Post, "its successes can be attributed to whatever your pet cause is.22 In short, Americans see what we want to see in China, and what we want to see most, argues Michael Pillsbury, is ourselves: "In our hubris, Americans love to believe that the aspirations of every other country is to be just like the United States. In recent years, this has governed our approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. We cling to the same mentality with China."23 American misunderstanding has been facilitated by Beijing's courting of influential Americans. China has done a better job at using engagement to improve American perceptions of China than America has done in changing Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions. The Communist Party of China (CPC) uses bilateral engagement to assess U.S. capabilities, collect intelligence, and manipulate their American counterparts. Extensive economic, educational, scientific, cultural, and personal ties allow the CPC to build a large, loose coalition of Americans to carry the message that Beijing is Washington's indispensable partner.24 U.S. officials, however, are generally ignorant of CPC objectives and tactics toward them, collectively known as the United Front Doctrine. Americans interact with only a "thin outer crust" of Chinese policymakers.25 Each institution has an office that deals specifically with foreign visitors, and the party maintains dozens of front groups that conduct hundreds of interactions and conferences every year with Americans. The CPC's International Department's front organization is the China Center for Contemporary World Studies; the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and the China Institute of International Relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' front groups; the Ministry of State Security's is the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and so on. The CPC has also created entities specifically to conduct "host diplomacy" with Americans, including the Hong Kong–based China–United States Exchange Foundation, which "promotes the positions of the Chinese government through the research grants it gives to American institutions.26 These groups both observe Americans and work to influence their views through dialogues and the distribution of English-language propaganda with titles such as The Strength of Democracy: How Will the CPC March Ahead.27 Information asymmetry is a longstanding aspect of U.S.-China relations, but has become increasingly problematic since President Xi Jinping took power in 2011. In July 2015, China enacted new laws regulating all aspects of Chinese interaction with foreigners, including a national security law that covers every domain of public life in China—politics, military, education, finance, religion, cyberspace, ideology and religion. These initiatives are "aimed at exhorting all Chinese citizens and agencies to be vigilant about threats to the party.28 They help explain why Washington's engagement strategy has been unable to change party leaders' perceptions or successfully support moderates over hawks. The consequence of Americans knowing so little about the CPC and its strategies and tactics towards them is that many Americans continue to be badly misled by what they hear and see in China. The extensive U.S.-China engagement architecture has produced analytical limitations, or blind spots, within the U.S. policy community that if remain unaddressed are likely to produce the same types of intelligence failures that have occurred repeatedly in U.S.-China relations since 1911. The only way to redress these systemic deficiencies is to move beyond engagement and containment and adopt a nuanced strategy that prioritizes high quality human intelligence about Chinese leaders and policymaking and incorporates them effectively into U.S. policymaking towards China.

## Internal Links

### Hostile Rise Inevitable

#### Hostile rise is inevitable – offensive realism is the dominant Chinese IR paradigm and Xi embraced the prospect of an inevitable confrontation with the US

Topping 15-Military and Strategic Studies Scholar (Vincent, “Tracing a Line in the Water: China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region and its Implications for the United States”, August 2015, University of Calgary, [http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary\_2015\_topping\_vincent.pdf)//SL](http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2602/4/ucalgary_2015_topping_vincent.pdf%29//SL)

For decades, China has kept the same discourse: it is seeking peaceful development, it will never seek hegemony, and security alliances in Asia are a relic of the Cold War that should be discarded. Nonetheless, in recent years (and especially since the arrival of Xi Jinping as the President of the PRC), there has been an increasingly severe dichotomy between words and actions. Whereas the official Chinese discourse had long been that China was still a developing country that should not be pushed too hard otherwise it could destroy its social cohesion and enhance the pressure on its domestic tensions,39 and whereas China had for decades kept Deng Xiaoping’s motto of “keeping a low profile and never seek leadership,” now China wants to be recognized as a leading power in the world and is “striving for achievements.” Chinese international relations expert and Dean of the International Relations department at Tsinghua University Yan Xuetong had been preaching since at least 2010 that China and the United States should drop the pretense that they are partners in this new century and accept that they are competitors that will more often than not have divergent and conflicting interests.40 After all, according to Yan, “China’s endeavour to regain its historical place as a world leading power and the United States’ refusal to relinquish its sole superpower status constitutes their greatest political conflict.” 41 In the words of Alastair Iain Johnston, “this is quite an admission about China’s interests” as it goes against every single policy statement and declaratory policy that China has issued over thirty years.42 This could be disregarded as a Chinese realist’s perspective who is trying to further his point of view and agenda. However, when Xi Jinping came to power, he projected his vision of China for the future, which entailed that the country needed to undergo a “national rejuvenation” (fuxing zhi lu, 復興之路). According to Yan, this is “a phrase that literally refers to resuming China’s historical international status as the world’s most advanced state in early Tang Dynasty (618-917 AD). Today this phrase specifically refers to China’s efforts to catch up with the United States in terms of comprehensive national power […] the competition for international leadership between China and the United States will be inevitable” (emphasis added).43 This also points out to one inconvenient truth about Chinese politics, one that will definitely leave a bitter taste for American policymakers that have been working tirelessly to “socialize” China in the international system and who thought liberalism would convert China to the benefits of the current international order: not only realist (along with ultra-nationalist) thinkers in China are not on the fringe of Chinese politics, they are very much in the mainstream. 44 International relations theory is still somewhat of a new phenomenon in China, but Chinese experts have quickly appropriated realism (and especially John J. Mearsheimer’s version of offensive realism) as one of their own.45 It is now, and has been for a while, the most dominant paradigm of international relations in China.46 Some theorists in China like Wang Jisi, Dean of the International Relations department at the prestigious Peking University, have been trying for years to strike a conciliatory note to reconcile differences and bridge the gap between China and the U.S., but his attempt (and those of likeminded colleagues) to do so is mostly the exception, not the rule.47

### Hostile Rise Inevitable

#### Prefer our evidence – multiple Chinese actions confirm the hostile rise thesis:

#### a. Current territorial expansion and the history of great power wars

Marston 16- Works in a major Washington, DC think tank and writes on Southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy (Hunter, “More Trade Won’t Stop China’s Aggression”, June 13, 2016, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587?page=2)//SL>

China’s brazen and “improper airmanship,” buzzing an American surveillance plane in the skies above the East China Sea last week, is but the latest signal of Beijing’s proclivity for risk and willingness to undermine both its regional reputation and economic stability in order to stake expanding claims in Asia. Western observers have not relinquished the perennial hope that China’s global economic interconnectedness will constrain its proclivity to military conflict. But this belief is misguided and not borne out by history. In fact, as China’s economic and military power rise, it has shown an increased tolerance for risk and raised the likelihood of future war. China has repeatedly harassed Indonesian, Vietnamese and Philippine ships in the latter’s territorial waters, claiming that Chinese citizens have been fishing there “since ancient times,” entitling them to vast maritime sovereignty. Its island construction on top of shallow reefs is another component in Beijing’s strategy to assert dominance over the South China Sea. The near-collision of the Chinese fighter jet with the U.S. spy plane last week follows a string of gutsy, high-risk encounters. Only last month, two Chinese jets flew within fifty feet of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, commented, “It’s clear that China’s tolerance for risk has risen in the last several years and remains high, though luckily below the level at which deadly force is likely.” Despite high-level progress from Beijing and Washington on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in recent years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be testing the strategic limits of the outgoing Obama administration’s patience. Poling added, “What is most worrying to me is that it took less than six months for Beijing to violate the air-to-air annex to CUES that Presidents Obama and Xi inked during the latter’s visit to DC. That suggests that no matter how hard we might try, China is not willing to have its behavior in disputed waters bound in any way, including by bilaterally agreed-upon rules and norms.” Do Chinese military forays in the East and South China Sea signal Beijing’s clear quest for regional domination and the inevitable ratcheting up of tensions with other Pacific powers? Will increasingly risky provocations lead to military conflict as China stakes its claims? Or does China’s dependence on global trade for continued economic growth at home preclude war in the foreseeable future? The past has repeatedly proved wrong those who assume that a rising power’s economic connectivity obviates the inevitability of great power military conflict. Peacenik theorists of the pre–World War I era opined that the level of interconnectivity in global markets had rendered obsolete the great-power warfare of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Likewise, in the interbellum period before the breakout of World War II, advocates of appeasement wagered that a militarizing Germany would not threaten continental peace due to its deep economic ties with the rest of Europe. Obviously, both schools of thought overestimated the ability of global economic connectivity to deter military aggression. What makes scholars think China is different today? Of course, the scale of interpenetration of global markets has risen and bound major powers such as China and the United States, as well as regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ever more tightly together. But just as proponents of peace were proven wrong in the twentieth century, echoes of the past are perceivable in Asia and Europe today. Despite its dependence on the EU for revenue from gas exports, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Likewise, European dependence on Russian gas has not prevented the EU from leveling heavy sanctions against Russia for its bellicosity. Nationalist impulses often trump economic considerations that would otherwise impel autocrats toward moderation. Just as the Communist Party in Beijing is beholden to a public whose education hammered home the lessons of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western imperialists, Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy—and mythos—flows from a narrative of western domination that has prevented Russia from attaining the greater world power that Russians feel their nation deserves. Similarly, though Beijing is investing in massive infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and pursuant to the sixteen-member <<card contines>>

### Hostile Rise Inevitable

<<card continues>> Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement, Beijing’s behavior indicates that it will prioritize security interests over regional economic integration, peace and stability. Material facts dictate that China’s increasing economic wealth and concordant military might will allow Beijing to exercise greater power in its backyard and on the world stage. These factors afford the CCP a greater ability to risk reputational and economic costs to achieve its national security goals.

China has shown its capability to drive a wedge in ASEAN to suit its purposes. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, tensions in the South China Sea became so acute that the regional grouping failed to deliver a joint statement for the first time in history since its 1967 founding. Facing a barrage of diplomatic pressure from Beijing, the ten member states were unable to agree on whether to mention even the location of a Philippines-China standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both sides and occupied by the Philippines until Chinese ships seized it in 2012. Beijing similarly undermined ASEAN unity in April when it announced that it had come to an agreement with Cambodia, Brunei and Laos—to the surprise of others—that the South China Sea dispute should not jeopardize relations between China and ASEAN. The United States supports ASEAN centrality as a strategic bulwark against China’s attempts to impose unilateral faits accomplis. For its own reasons, Beijing prefers to deal with ASEAN claimants one-on-one so as to reduce the capacity of the group to stand with a unified voice contra its security interests. Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in Washington, has written, “Instead of serving as a platform to manage bilateral and multilateral cooperation among member states, ASEAN may become an arena where bilateral and multilateral cooperation are contested.” As the two superpowers battle for influence within ASEAN, China has demonstrated its ability to use both charm and threats to advance its interests. Moreover, as Nick Bisley of La Trobe University writes, despite a U.S. China policy that blends containment with moral suasion, “it is far from clear that China can be contained or cowed into submission.” Ultimately, “the region’s two major powers have irreconcilable visions for Asia’s future.” If that is the case, expect rocky times ahead as differences of interest not only manifest in further naval and air confrontations, but also introduce further friction into competing visions of the economic and security architecture of Asia. The result is a net loss for all countries concerned.

#### b. Official documents and Chinese diplomacy

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in Beijing who disagree with China’s current strategic approach, its dominating elements are not a mystery. Chinese officials insistently argue that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and should be dismantled; that the United States’ Asian allies and friends should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure to do so will inevitably produce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current presence and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is fundamentally exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To not take seriously official Chinese government statements along these lines is to not take China seriously. That Beijing does not hope to realize these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it would clearly replace the United States as Asia’s leading power. If that does not represent a PRC grand strategy, what would?

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#### c. Prior engagement failures

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommendations in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions. Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we certainly do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances, not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor. Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behavior is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being socialized into the international system and it is far too early for Washington to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance toward Beijing. The issue here is how long the United States should pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protecting U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change), Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about; in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”58 “Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.- China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American strategic primacy in Asia.

### AT: China Lacks Capability

#### China is heavily expanding modernization and it increases conflict escalation risks

Chase & Chan 16-\*Senior Political Scientist & \*\* a project associate at the rand Corporation.(Michael &Arthur, “China’s Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities” http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1bz3vx1, The Washington Quarterly)//SL

Strategists often think of strategic deterrence as synonymous with nuclear deterrence, the top of the escalation ladder; China does not. In fact, China’s strategic deterrence concepts are evolving and expanding, along with strides in strategic weapons capabilities, reflecting Beijing’s increasing concerns about external security threats and a growing emphasis on protecting Chinese interests in space and cyberspace. After relying on relatively rudimentary strategic deterrence capabilities for decades, China has developed and deployed a variety of new strategic weapons systems in recent years. An important turning point was the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the United States in May 1999, which Chinese leaders viewed as deliberate. This incident motivated Beijing to devote even greater resources to improving the capabilities of the PLA by focusing on asymmetric approaches to exploiting potential U.S. military vulnerabilities and developing advanced, high-technology weapons to deter—or, if necessary, counter—U.S. military intervention in any conflict involving China. According to an article by two Chinese military researchers, China’s development of advanced weapons and equipment must adhere to the principal that “what the enemy fears is what we develop,” an approach that was reportedly first articulated following the May 1999 Embassy bombing and that continues to guide China’s approach to developing its strategic deterrence capabilities today.3 Reflecting the progress China has made in its strategic weapons programs since this guidance was put forward, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) displayed an impressive collection of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles during the elaborate September 2015 military parade the Chinese Communist Party held to mark the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of WWII. China is also continuing to develop and test even more advanced strategic weapons, such as new anti-satellite (ASAT) systems capable of holding U.S. space systems at risk, more modern road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that could further enhance China’s nuclear deterrent posture or perhaps give Beijing its own conventional prompt global strike capability Yet, there is much more to China’s thinking about strategic deterrence than new weaponry. Indeed, PLA publications indicate that China’s broad concept of strategic deterrence is a multi-dimensional set of military and even non-military capabilities combined to protect Chinese interests. For China, powerful military capabilities of several types—including nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare—are all essential components of a credible strategic deterrent.5 Chinese military publications indicate that non-military aspects of national power—most notably diplomatic, economic, and scientific and technological strength—also contribute to strategic deterrence alongside military capabilities. For Chinese strategists, however, the military components have the most immediate, direct ability to influence a potential adversary’s decision-making calculus. The broad contours of China’s concept of integrated strategic deterrence have remained relatively consistent, albeit with some elaboration and development over the years including a growing emphasis on its space and information components. Indeed, the increasing importance PLA strategists attach to deterrence in space and cyberspace should come as no surprise, as this tracks with China’s assessment that military competition in those domains is intensifying and that the struggle for information dominance is likely to prove decisive in future wars.7 As the concept of integrated strategic deterrence has evolved to keep pace with China’s emerging interests and changes in military technology, the capabilities supporting it have undergone an impressive transformation. Indeed, at least some parts of this integrated strategic deterrence concept went beyond the PLA’s actual capabilities initially, as China lacked many of the required force structure elements to fully support it. However, Chinese strategic deterrence capabilities are now rapidly catching up with the concept of integrated strategic deterrence. This is true across the nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare domains. China is deploying a more credible nuclear deterrent composed of silo-based ICBMs, some of which are equipped with MIRVs; more survivable road-mobile ICBMs; and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Beijing is also strengthening its conventional military forces. In particular, the air, naval, and missile capabilities most relevant to countering U.S. military intervention provide China with increasingly potent conventional deterrence capabilities, which constitute an increasingly important part of its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture. As a result of these improvements in nuclear, conventional, space, and information warfare forces, Chinese military publications are now replete with references to how China can conduct strategic deterrence operations, both under general peacetime conditions and in crisis scenarios. According to a recent publication by the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU), practical examples could include actions such as displaying advanced weapons, carrying out military exercises, adjusting military deployments, increasing readiness levels, or even carrying out information attacks or limited firepower strikes as a warning to a wouldbe adversary.8 <<card continues>>

### AT: China Lacks Capability

<<card continues>> The combination of these developments in China’s strategic deterrence concepts and the PLA’s growing strategic deterrence capabilities could have serious implications for the United States. In particular, China’s growing capabilities will likely intensify challenges related to extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies, some of whom may be concerned that China’s growing strategic weapons capabilities will undermine the willingness or ability of the United States to come to their aid in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. As China continues developing advanced strategic weapons capabilities, the PLA will be able to offer leaders in Beijing a variety of new options, some of which might lead them to consider changes in China’s traditional policies and strategic and operational concepts, such as its longstanding nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy. Finally, China’s further development of its integrated strategic deterrence concepts and capabilities is likely to create escalation risks that could make the prospect of a crisis or conflict over potential flashpoints, such as Taiwan or maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, more dangerous for the United States than any situation it has faced since the end of the Cold War.

### AT: China Lacks Capability

#### China’s material capabilities are high and growing

Chen 14 - Assistant Professor of Public Relations and Public Administration, University of Macau, Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin (Dingding, The Diplmat, “China is a Different Kind of Global Power,” June 28, [http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-is-a-different-kind-of-global-power/)//SEP](http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-is-a-different-kind-of-global-power/%29//SEP)

Renowned China scholar David Shambaugh published an article in The National Interest, asking a very important question: is China a global power? His conclusion is that China is not a global power, at least not yet. His main argument is that China is still very limited in five important dimensions of global power, i.e., international diplomacy, military capabilities, cultural presence, economic power, and domestic system. They are many good points in Shambaugh’s argument. For example, he points out that China has been rather reactive and passive in global affairs. This has been true for the last three decades, since China embarked on the “reform and opening” movement in 1978. Deng Xiaoping’s famous doctrine “keep a low profile” has essentially become China’s grand strategy since then. At times, China’s diplomacy appears clumsy and difficult to make sense of. China is still learning how to present herself in a sophisticated way on the global stage. Shambaugh is particularly right when he says, “China does not lead. It does not shape international diplomacy, drive other nations’ policies, forge global consensus, put together coalitions or solve problems.” However, his main argument that China is not a global power is flawed for three important reasons. First, in Shambaugh’s article the definition of global power is not always well-defined. Clearly, Shambaugh is using the U.S. as model of global power. But the U.S. is not just a global power, it is a global hegemon in many ways. Indeed, the influence of the U.S. on other states is unprecedented in human history, thus rendering it unfair to compare China or any other global power to the United States. In addition, the U.S. was fortunate in some sense because World War I and World War II basically destroyed other great powers, thereby simply handing superpower status to the United States. It is impossible for China to become another U.S. for a variety of historical, cultural, and social reasons. In this sense, whether or not China is a global power must be judged upon China’s relationships with many other equal states. Also, Shambaugh underestimates the significance of material capabilities. Out of five indicators used by Shambaugh to judge China’s status, two of them (military power and economic power) are material factors. The other three, particularly cultural presence, are usually byproducts of material power. One should keep in mind that the U.S. was similarly regarded by the so-called advanced European powers as a backward culture even though its economy became the largest one in the late 19th century. The U.S. then was not a strong military power nor a diplomatic power. So the point here is that it is perfectly normal that a country first becomes an economic power, then a military power, and lastly a cultural power. In sum, one could argue that all other good things, like cultural influence and so on, eventually derive from material capabilities. Secondly, even if Shambaugh’s definition of global power is correct, he overestimates the utility of pursuing an active diplomacy. In other words, active diplomacy might not be a good thing. Just look at the mess in Iraq right now. Many scholars have rightly pointed out that the current crisis in Iraq has a lot to do with George W. Bush’s decision more than 10 years ago to invade Iraq based on flawed intelligence and ulterior motives. The Bush administration was certainly engaging in active diplomacy, but Iraq and the whole Middle East region would be better off if the U.S. had adopted a more passive approach to Iraq. This is a lesson that proponents of active diplomacy take to heart. Finally, Shambaugh’s prediction of China’s development is overly pessimistic. Although he is right that people should not be overly optimistic about China’s future and declare China the winner too soon, his analysis of China’s many pressing domestic problems is nothing new. Problems such as income inequality and environmental issues have existed for the past three decades in China and those didn’t stop China’s development.

### AT: China Lacks Capability

#### Chinese capabilities are catching up and it risks war if unchecked

Bosco, JD LLM Harvard, 16

(Joseph, senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as China country desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and taught a graduate seminar on US-China-Taiwan relations at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-expects-the-us-roll-over-15688 4-6](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-expects-the-us-roll-over-15688%204-6))

Former Pacific Commander and former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair has rendered yet another valuable public service, this time as head of Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (SPF). The organization has produced a comprehensive report assessing China’s evolving strategic posture and presenting alternative scenarios for the U.S.-Japan alliance response to the ensuing threats and opportunities. While the paper is dispassionate and clear-eyed about the risks and openings presented by China's rise, the implications are ominous. The paper posits four possible outcomes for a future China: a powerful and benevolent state; a powerful and aggressive state; a weak and inward-looking state, or a weak and aggressive state. The study offers a caveat, however: “It is dangerous to base an Alliance strategy on a single future for the China of 2030 . . . [It] . . . will not fall neatly into any of the four alternatives . . . The most likely scenario is elements of different futures. Theoretical neatness aside, the report also states that "current trends project a somewhat more powerful and aggressive China than the United States and Japan have dealt with in the past." Indeed, on its own terms the report already identifies China's present course as increasingly threatening. We don't need another ten to fifteen years to know from the preponderance of evidence that we already face the worst-case scenario: a powerful and aggressive China that is on course to become even more powerful and more aggressive. The even more powerful nature of this "future" China, the report prognosticates, would consist of a predominantly market-based economy with growth of five to seven percent; increased restrictions on foreign businesses in China; strongly mercantilist policies overseas; and high defense spending approaching that of the United States. Most of these characteristics are already true of today's China or are rapidly becoming the status quo. As for the aggressive part of the picture, this "future China" would use its "economic and military advantage . . . to support its current core interests—primacy of the CCP, reunification with Taiwan, secure administration of Tibet and Xinjiang, and success in pursuing its claims in the East and South China Seas"—again, all of which China is now doing. (An additional area would be expansionist claims vis a vis India and the Indian Ocean which China is not yet pursuing vigorously.) Support for the near-certainty of an increasingly powerful and aggressive China can also be found in other sections of the text. For example, Xi Jinping is said to see his “new model of great power relations” as the key to a stable U.S.-China relationship. The report offers two alternatives to understand “Beijing’s calculus for achieving this stability”. In a best-case scenario, the Chinese seek to ensure that competitive elements in the U.S.-China relationship remain firmly under control— roughly analogous to the period of U.S.-Soviet détente during the Cold War. During that earlier period of détente, the Soviet Union cracked down on internal dissent, conducted an increasingly interventionist foreign policy in Latin America and Africa, and invaded Afghanistan—hardly a posture the West would want China to emulate. Additionally, there is the report's “less benign assessment” of China's new model. China is using the framework of great power relations to seek U.S. acquiescence to China’s definition of “core interests,” which include maintaining China’s political system, territorial claims, and way of shaping and applying international rules and regimes. In other words, the United States would accept China’s regional, and quite possibly global hegemony. Under both the “best case” and “less benign” scenarios, the U.S. response must be either capitulation or confrontation.

### Hostile Rise Kills US Hegemony

#### China rise threatens US hegemony

Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, National Interest, 10/25, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204//AK>)

The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China’s economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest, but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate, and it is hard to know who is right. But if those who are bullish on China are correct, it will almost certainly be the most important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century, for China will be transformed into an enormously powerful country. The attendant question that will concern every maker of foreign policy and student of international politics is a simple but profound one: can China rise peacefully? The aim of this chapter is to answer that question. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in world politics. Offensive realism offers important insights into China’s rise. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil. It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays. Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor. Among other advantages, the United States has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we are not concerned with that situation here. Instead, the focus is on a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against the United States, where China controls much more relative power than it does today, and where China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, we are talking about a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today.

### Hostile Rise Kills US Hegemony

#### A modernizing China will pursue regional and global hegemony – trades off with American hard power

Mearsheimer 14 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, National Interest, 10/25, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204//AK>)

In addition to pursuing regional hegemony, a rising China will have strategic interests outside of Asia, just as the United States has important interests beyond the Western Hemisphere. In keeping with the dictates of offensive realism, China will have good reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas so as to cause Washington trouble in its own backyard, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. military to move freely around the world. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union formed a close alliance with Cuba in good part for the purpose of interfering in America’s backyard. In the future, relations between the United States and a country like Brazil will perhaps worsen, creating an opportunity for China to form close ties with Brazil and maybe even station military forces in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, China will have powerful incentives to forge ties with Canada and Mexico and do whatever it can to weaken America’s dominance in North America. Its aim will not be to threaten the American homeland directly, but rather to distract the United States from looking abroad and force it to focus increased attention on its own neighborhood. This claim may sound implausible at present, but remember that the Soviets tried to put nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1962, had more than 40,000 troops in Cuba that same year, and also provided Cuba with a wide variety of sophisticated conventional weapons. And do not forget that the United States already has a huge military presence in China’s backyard. China will obviously want to limit America’s ability to project power elsewhere, in order to improve Beijing’s prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. However, China has other reasons for wanting to pin down the United States as much as possible in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, China has major economic and political interests in Africa, which seem likely to increase in the future. Even more important, China is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and that dependence is apt to grow significantly over time. China, like the United States, is almost certain to treat the Persian Gulf as a vital strategic interest, which means Beijing and Washington will eventually engage in serious security competition in that region, much as the two superpowers did during the Cold War. Creating trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere will limit its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and Africa.

### Hostile Rise Kills US Hegemony

#### China rise is a definitive threat – detrimental to US global hegemony and will create significant competition for influence in key areas

Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* October 25th, 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>) // EDP

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## Impacts

### Impact: US Hegemony Good

#### US leadership prevents a laundry list of scenarios for global catastrophe – it accesses every impact

Dobriansky, 15 - Paula J. Dobriansky served as under secretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2009. She is a senior fellow with the Future of Diplomacy Project at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. (“We Asked Paula J. Dobriansky: What Should Be the Purpose of American Power?” The National Interest, 8/25, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-asked-paula-j-dobriansky-what-should-be-the-purpose-13678>

The purpose of American power, which includes military, economic, diplomatic, ideological, legal and cultural components, is to protect the entire range of our national-security interests. While we face many pressing domestic challenges, America cannot afford to focus on them alone. Americans cannot be secure and prosperous without a stable, rule-driven international order. Terrorism, refugee flows, pandemic diseases, pollution, cyberattacks, economic decay, nuclear proliferation and military aggression can directly threaten our security and prosperity even when they arise overseas. We cannot handle these threats successfully in an ad hoc fashion. American power must be continuously applied to maintain political, military and economic international institutions and alliances that, with effective U.S. leadership, can safeguard global stability, economic growth and the rule of law. This does not mean that every foreign dispute or fight concerns us. But we must counter fundamental assaults on the existing global liberal order. This task is particularly crucial today, since the post–Cold War international framework is under attack by numerous challenges, including Islamic fundamentalism, growing Sunni-Shia strife, Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and become the preeminent power in the Middle East, Russian revanchism, and China’s efforts to exercise dominion over Asia and strong-arm its neighbors. In addition to these hard-power threats, the world faces numerous humanitarian crises, ranging from famines, environmental devastation and extreme weather events to flows of refugees and displaced persons. While the United States cannot solve all of these problems, consistent with our moral values, it has been a world leader in rendering humanitarian assistance and helping to alleviate poverty worldwide. America must always retain the ability, when necessary, to use its power unilaterally. However, the United States has been most successful when it has worked with international institutions and alliances, partnering with like-minded countries and combining their resources and capabilities with our own. Furthermore, the best way to deal with potential international threats is to deter them from arising or at least defeat them before they become acute. This requires continuous American leadership and credibility, especially in upholding our international commitments, to reassure our allies and deter our enemies.

### Impact: US Hegemony Good

#### Hegemony solves great power war, economic collapse, and proliferation

Brooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0>)

Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.

### Balancing Solves China Rise

#### Balancing is the only choice – China’s rise is inevitable and engagement won’t preserve American primacy – loss of hegemony drives dangerous transition wars and revives interventionism

Tellis, 14—Ashley, senior associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD from U Chicago, former special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning and Southwest Asia at the National Security Council. “Balancing Without Containment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace PDF report, Jan 22, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>, p. 14-15 –br

The prospect that China might one day become “the greatest power in the world,” riding to that apex on the back of American investments in maintaining a liberal international order, should be disturbing to the United States. Whatever else it may imply, the loss of American hegemony would be dangerous to U.S. security because it would entail a diminution of strategic autonomy, the first and most important benefit of possessing greater power than others in a competitive environment. Being the most powerful entity in the global system for over a century has not only increased U.S. safety by allowing the United States to defeat threats far from its shores but also permitted Washington to shape the international environment in ways that reflect its own interests. This capacity to configure the milieu in which it operates to its advantage in all arenas—economic, military, geopolitical, ideational, and institutional—implies that Washington can constrain the choices of other states far more than it is constrained by them. This critical measure of relative power affords the United States greater immunity than its competitors enjoy.37 The loss of American primacy to China, therefore, would put Washington at Beijing’s mercy far more than is currently the case. Consequently, as long as the international system remains rivalrous and harbors threats to U.S. security, the United States has no alternative but to preserve American hegemony. Such preeminence provides greater security than the alternative of equality with, let alone subordination to, others. It allows the United States to attract the resources necessary to maintain the most innovative economic system on the planet, a capacity that permits it to enjoy a high standard of living and produce the formidable military instruments that enable it to impose its will on rival powers. It affords the United States the luxury of being able to defend itself by conducting military operations closer to the homelands of its adversaries than to its own. It enables Washington to maintain a robust system of alliances that offers the promise of collective defense against common threats and provides significant reservoirs of capability for expeditionary operations abroad. It gilds the attractiveness of American ideas, customs, and fashions internationally and thus procures legitimation by means that go beyond mere force. And it permits the United States to protect its national equities through various international institutions that represent a “rule-based” order and secure favorable outcomes for Washington without it having to repeatedly apply raw power. The United States would lose many of these benefits were China to rival or replace it as the most powerful state in the international system. And China’s ascent to this pinnacle would be doubly painful because Beijing has benefited disproportionately from an international system that was originally intended—and is still meant—to advance American interests in the first instance. Concerns about the consequences of losing U.S. preeminence might matter less if it were certain that Chinese primacy would not fundamentally undermine American interests. Such an expectation, however, is absurd in any competitive system. For all their affinities, even the rising United States drove deep nails into the coffin of British hegemony, a reality that London, blinded by its illusions about its “special relationship” with Washington, often failed to see during America’s own ascent to power. As Correlli Barnett acidly concluded, “For the Americans—like the Russians, like the Germans, like the English themselves in the eighteenth century—were motivated by a desire to promote their own interests rather than by sentiment, which was a commodity they reserved for Pilgrim’s Dinners, where it could do no harm.”38 Naturally, American power in turn would be similarly threatened by Chinese ascendency, even if Beijing currently denies any intention to challenge U.S. preeminence.

### Balancing Solves China Rise

#### A balancing strategy is vital to preventing China’s hostile rise – increasing economic integration threatens US leadership and risks existential impacts

Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley\*\* and David\*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations\*, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues\*\*, “U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)

The principal task that confronts U.S. grand strategy today, therefore, is adapting to the fundamental challenge posed by China’s continuing rise. Integration, the prevailing U.S. approach toward China and the one followed assiduously since the 1970s, has undoubtedly contributed to China’s rise as a future rival to American power. None of the alternatives usually discussed in the debates in Washington and elsewhere about how to respond to China’s growing strength satisfy the objective of preserving American primacy for yet another “long cycle” in international politics. These alternatives, which include embracing and participating with China, accommodating Beijing through some kind of a Group of Two (G2) arrangement, or containing China à la the Soviet Union, all have severe limitations from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and could in fact undermine the larger goal of strengthening Washington’s preeminence in the global system.33 Accordingly, the United States should substantially modify its grand strategy toward China—one that at its core would replace the goal of concentrating on integrating Beijing into the international system with that of consciously balancing its rise—as a means of protecting simultaneously the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. position at the apex of the global hierarchy, and the strength of the liberal international order, which is owed ultimately to the robustness of American relative power. There is no better basis for analyzing and formulating U.S. grand strategy toward China than connecting that strategy directly to U.S. vital national interests—conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans’ survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.34 U.S. vital national interests are as follows: ■ prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of conventional and unconventional attacks on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions; ■ maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia that promotes peace and stability through a continuing U.S. leadership role and U.S. alliances; ■ prevent the use and slow the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, secure nuclear weapons and materials, and prevent proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons; and ■ promote the health of the international economy, energy markets, and the environment. China’s Challenge to U.S. Vital National Interests Although Washington seeks a cooperative relationship with Beijing regarding nonproliferation, energy security, and the international economy and environment, the primary U.S. preoccupation regarding these national interests should be a rising China’s systematic effort to undermine the second vital national interest mentioned—that is, to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Asia, diminish the vitality of the U.S.-Asian alliance system, and ultimately displace the United States as the Asian leader. Success in attaining these objectives would open the door to China’s ability to undermine the first and third interests over time. As noted earlier, Beijing seeks to achieve these goals: ■ replace the United States as the primary power in Asia; ■ weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia;35 ■ undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power; ■ use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to PRC geopolitical policy preferences; ■ increase PRC military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention in the region; ■ cast doubt on the U.S. economic model; ■ ensure U.S. democratic values do not diminish the CCP’s hold on domestic power; and ■ avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade. President Xi signaled China’s aims to undermine the Asian balance of power at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in early 2014 when he argued that “Asia’s problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia’s security ultimately must be protected by Asians.”36 The capacity of the United States to deal successfully with this systematic geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic challenge by China to U.S. primacy in Asia will determine the shape of the international order for decades to come.

### AT: Allies Won’t Support Balancing

#### Asia will join the US in counterbalancing China

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As the Obama administration considers the merits of new strategies to cope with China’s rise, it would benefit from focusing on the one silver lining produced by China’s flirtation with neonationalism. A key component of any effective U.S. “balancing” strategy lies in nurturing a balancing coalition of like-minded regional partners. Once an insurmountable task, mounting regional fears over Chinese aggression have arguably rendered the Asian landscape more conducive to such an endeavor than ever before. A decade ago, a handful of Asian “Middle Powers” with little history of collaboration began flirting with new avenues of defense cooperation. What began as tentative steps broke into an open sprint the last two years, largely driven by anxiety over China’s rise. As each has strengthened its ties with Washington, new relationships have blossomed among Japan, India, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and others. China’s neighbors, it seems, are reevaluating their own “engagement” strategies and concluding that a more overt balancing posture offers the best insurance against Chinese aggression. While the initial tangible impact may appear modest, the strategic calculus in these capitals is rapidly changing.

### AT: Balancing Bad Impact Turn

#### They can’t win offense – the failure of engagement causes a reversion to containment

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Containment and Engagement The policy of choice for the great majority of China watchers, the foreign policy establishment at large, and U.S. policymakers for more than 40 years, containment and engagement draws on a long heritage of essentially liberal ideas about international order. As with confrontation and enhanced balancing, the objective of containment and engagement is perpetuating American preeminence in the Asia–Pacific. It aims to do so, however, by supplementing politico-military pressure to check Chinese ambitions with an interlocking, mutually beneficial web of economic, institutional, and cultural links that incentivizes China to cooperate with the global order rather than challenge it: sticks and carrots. An underlying assumption of this approach is that reliance on overtly hostile measures to ensure Chinese compliance with international norms will only confirm the mainland's worst assumptions of U.S. intentions and turn it into an enemy with a revisionist agenda. Aside from being provocative, most containers and engagers deem such measures unnecessary. “China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future,” Robert Ross concludes in a typical assessment. In stark contrast to confrontationists and enhanced balancers, these observers draw attention to a myriad of deep-seated economic and demographic problems in China that they see as constraining its development and likely to divert resources needed for an assertive foreign policy, problems that afford some latitude for modulated containment and the pursuit of initiatives aimed at muting the more corrosive elements of the Sino-American rivalry. A defensive, risk-averse foreign policy would seem to be a logical course for a country consumed with implementing much-needed economic reform, meeting the growing demands of a restless populace, and hemmed in on all sides by vigilant regional actors wary of its expanding influence. In fact, this is exactly how containers and engagers interpret Chinese grand strategy in the post–Cold War era. China's overriding priority is to sustain the remarkable economic growth of the past 30 years, which its leaders regard as key to maintaining political and social stability among a populace that can no longer be swayed by appeals to ideology. A stable international environment is conducive to this focus. While Beijing chafes at America's military presence in the region, particularly its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan, and longs for a transition to a multipolar world where U.S. power is constrained, it recognizes both the need for avoiding confrontation and advancing its economic and security interests through constructive relations with Washington. While cautioning against overreacting to a threat that has been exaggerated in some quarters, containers and engagers do not take a cooperative, peaceful China for granted. According to their logic, the Chinese government's acute sense of aggrievement over historical episodes of international humiliation and its responsiveness to a pugnacious streak of nationalism among its people is worrisome, as are its uncertain long-term intentions, at best shaky commitment to the liberal global order, and rapid military modernization. As a hedge against China's rise veering off in an antagonistic direction, they call for preserving the U.S.-led hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia. To Beijing's great irritation, this policy also entails maintaining the flow of arms to Taiwan to uphold the credibility of America's security commitments throughout the region, as well as holding the Chinese government's feet to the fire for human rights violations and pressing it to make itself more accountable to the population, the long-held assumption being that a more democratic China will be less prone to aggression. The great appeal of containment and engagement for U.S. decision makers is that, more than any other choice of strategy toward China, it preserves the greatest number of options and has hitherto proven sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving conditions in the Sino-American relationship. Most importantly, this blend of deterrence and conciliation has largely succeeded in keeping a lid on tensions between China and its neighbors in a region rife with flashpoints and has made some progress in integrating the PRC into the existing international order. It seems well suited for today's challenging strategic environment, in which the United States is buffeted by resource constraints, extensive global commitments, and anti-interventionist popular sentiment as it looks to preserve its leadership role in Asia by means short of confrontation. Yet over the coming years, this longstanding policy, which has worked well while China has remained relatively weak and preoccupied with internal development, will be subjected to unprecedented strains. Whether it seeks to translate its growing power into increased regional clout or attempts to outwardly deflect domestic discontent through aggressive posturing, acting out of strength or weakness, the PRC is likely to present new security challenges that will test the support of voters and policy elites alike for engagement. If moderate efforts to encourage China's further adjustment to U.S. preferences in the realms of security, trade, and global governance are seen as falling short or, even worse, displaying timidity in the face of Chinese assertiveness, a stronger emphasis on containment will surely result.

### AT: Balancing Bad Impact Turn

#### But this is still unique offense for us – delaying a transition to balancing increases the risk of major war

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Regardless of how wide the gap between their military capabilities is at present, the combination of Chinese momentum and American restraint cannot help but accelerate the pace at which the divide narrows. If the optimists are wrong, and the balance is already dose or, regardless of the objective reality, if China's leaders believe it to be, then unilateral restraint could turn out to be a very dangerous policy indeed. While most advocates of enhanced engagement pay lip service to the importance of preserving a favorable military balance, their reading of the current situation, combined with their strong desire to avoid antagonizing Beijing, inclines them toward inaction rather than action. When the time comes to make decisions, they are likely to be wary of deploying additional forces to the Western Pacific, developing new weapons specifically designed for a possible conflict with China, going "too far" in tightening defense ties with U.S. friends and allies, or creating new multilateral mechanisms to enhance strategic cooperation among Asia's democracies. If their arguments carry the day, the shift in the regional balance of military power toward China will accelerate. There are several dangers here. Because of the long lead times involved in designing, building, and deploying new capabilities, it is hard to quickly reverse unfavorable trends in the balance of military power. If today's leaders fail to make sound decisions when conditions are reasonably tranquil, their successors may find it very difficult to respond in a timely fashion in the future if the Sino-American relationship unravels or if China becomes unstable and unexpectedly aggressive. An unduly muted reaction to China's ongoing buildup could also increase the risk of misperception, miscalculation, and unintended conflict. Washington's seeming passivity could be taken, not as a sign of self-confidence, but as an indication of a waning commitment to some or all of its longtime friends and allies in Asia. Depending on how they assess the military balance, planners in the People's Liberation Army may already be more optimistic about their capabilities than outsiders realize. Even if they are not, absent a vigorous American response, their sense of assurance can only grow with time. In some future showdown with a third party, Beijing might assume that Washington was disinterested, deterred, or both, only to find out too late that it was neither. The fact that the U.S. government has a history of not always being dear, even in its own collective mind, about how it would respond until confronted by aggression makes this an even more plausible, and worrisome, scenario.l7 As it works to reassure Beijing by not overreacting to its initiatives, the United States may also succeed, albeit inadvertently, in demoralizing its own friends. There are already signs of anxiety emanating from some Asian capitals about America's willingness and ability in the long run to maintain its position of regional military preponderance. What seems like a prudent, measured response could appear from the other side of the Pacific as an indication of resignation and the start of a slow retreat. Overreaction doubtless has its dangers, but underreaction could wind up triggering a cascade of appeasement that will hasten the very outcome that American strategists are now trying to prevent.

#### Engagement is on-balance more risky – it better explains status quo aggression and will cause a major war down the road

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The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks. In classical balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power creates a coalition among other powers. China's expansionist actions have already created a substantial democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent China from starting a major war.

### Space Impact: Espionage Turns the Case

#### Espionage turns both advantages – it threatens US military space assets and decimates US leadership

Pollpeter, 15 - University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (Kevin, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for the hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs”, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Pollpeter_Testimony.pdf>

China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. It seeks increased influence and independence from foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving China’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political system. Over the long term, China seeks to transform the international system to better suit its interests, but seeks to integrate itself into the existing international system over the short term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment into one in which it is dominant. China’s pursuit of space power is intended to carry out this strategy. China views the development of space power as a necessary move for a country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, China’s goal is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a comprehensive, long-term approach to its space program that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding, the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its space program can prosper. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space. China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership. Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At its current trajectory, China’s space program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space program, will at some point be good enough to adequately support modern military operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of its own destiny. Military Benefits China’s space program assists the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to achieve information superiority, defined as the ability to freely use information and the ability to deny the use of information to an adversary. Based on their analysis of U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical component in making the PLA into a force capable of winning “informatized” wars and recognize the role space plays in the collection and transmittal of information and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary. Indeed, nearly every Chinese source describes space as the “ultimate high ground,” leading many Chinese analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the preeminence of the space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the initiative is to achieve space supremacy.

### Space Impact: Espionage Turns the Case

#### PLA space capabilities could cause war in space and will be used to target the United States

Fisher, 15 - Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center (Richard, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf>

While the PLA does not offer public briefings or budget information about its space combat programs, there is a considerable body of “secondary” literature presumably based on strategy or doctrine, which has long appeared to justify the development of a PLA capability to wage war in space. Occasionally, however, statements by top officials appear. According to Chinese press reports on 5 December 2012, newly elevated Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General Xi Jinping gave a speech to a Second Artillery (SA) audience. Almost nothing of the content of that speech was reported, until the late 2014 surfacing of a journal article by SA veteran General Sun Mingfu. In that speech, General Sun said that “President Xi made clear the need ‘to enhance the build-up of ground-based anti-satellite combat force to ensure the timely formation of combat capability’, and to “accelerate the development of strategic anti-missile capability.” This article quickly disappeared off of its hosting web page and a famous Chinese military-technical blog “KKTT” that gave it prominence soon disappeared as well. On 14 April 2014, Xi was reported to have given a speech before a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) audience in which he called for an “integrated air and space capability.” This phrase was also used by former PLAAF commander General Xu Qiliang during the 2009 PLAAF 60th anniversary, and by military academic commentators which listed space weapons the PLA should acquire. Perhaps Xi Jinping also gave the PLAAF specific space warfare preparation guidance. While there has been some discussion in the PLA of a new service or a “Space Force,” today it appears that current services of the PLA are being encouraged to develop individual space combat capabilities. Based on an accumulation of data, it is possible to conclude that the PLA’s apparent goal is to exercise denial and then dominance in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and then to extend control into the Earth-Moon system. Since the early 1990s China has developed four, possibly five, attack-capable space-combat systems. China may be the only country developing such variety of space weapons to include: ground-based and air-launched counter-space weapons; unmanned space combat and Earth-attack platforms; and dual-use manned platforms. It is also important to consider that the PLA’s projection into space is an integral part of China’s development of military capabilities to dominate the Asia-Pacific region, and then to project power globally into the 2020s and 2030s. The PLA requires increasing space control in order to assure that space-based Information Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) systems can provide targeting and other and support for missile, air, naval and ground forces, future intercontinental Prompt Global Strike (PSG) forces, and for the forces of client/partner states. Sustaining superiority in LEO, in turn, will require control of the “High Ground,” or the Moon and Deep Space. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership’s intertwined pursuit of global military power and dominant space power has three main motivations: 1) to help sustain the power position of the CCP; 2) to aid the CCP’s pursuit of economic-political dominance in key regions to best assure resource/commercial access; and, 3) to eventually displace the United States from its position of global leadership. Space power will also be used to support new Chinese-led or promoted anti-U.S./anti-democratic coalitions as it will be used to crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with the democracy on Taiwan.

### Space Impact: Espionage Turns the Case

#### The CCP will use space dominance to directly challenge US hegemony in Asia

Fisher, 15 - Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center (Richard, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf>

Fears for political survival and ambitions for global leadership remain the basis for China’s current surge for global military power and space power. The greatest impetus for the most recent phase of PLA modernization and buildup was the shock of the 1989 Tiananmen rebellion -- the only time the Party’s power position was actually threatened by popular, though unorganized, reformist and democratic demands. In addition to ruthlessly crushing any potential for democratic dissent, the transitioning CCP leadership of Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin decided to begin the broad military and space modernization and buildup we see today. At first focused on coercing Taiwan and then securing control over disputed territories, the early 1990s saw the start of many PLA programs increasing its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capability targeted on the “First Island Chain.” These include the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s 4th generation J-10 fighter and its J-20 5th generation fighter, and the large Xian Aircraft Corporation Y-20 heavy jet transport. China’s aircraft carrier ambitions predate Tiananmen but second generation nuclear attack and ballistic submarine programs received greater emphasis. This period also saw the beginnings of the PLA’s first “reconnaissance strike complex” of terminally guided medium-range missiles, and the ability to target them with high resolution surveillance, navigation and communication satellites. In addition, the PLA started developing its second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system along with a new anti-satellite (ASAT) system, tested successfully on 11 January 2007. The early 1990s also saw the beginning of China’s second manned space program, code named the 921 Program. With substantial inputs from Russian space companies the 921-1 or Shenzhou spaceship made its first unmanned flight in 1999. While the PLA’s General Armaments Department (GAD) took control of the manned space program in 1998, we did not learn of this until former CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin congratulated former GAD Director and then Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan as “chief director of the manned space program” after the April 2002 landing of Shenzhou-3. The dual-use nature of China’s manned space program was starkly demonstrated by the first manned Shenzhou-5 mission in 2005, when Astronaut Yang Liwei shared his ship with two optical surveillance cameras. A little over a year later in December 2004, the current phase of PLA modernization and space development was signaled by the “New Historic Missions” enunciated by Chairman Hu Jintao, in which the PLA started preparing to defend the CCP’s global interest, in addition to its regional ambitions. Over the following decade, better combat systems for regional dominance emerged, with new aircraft carriers, amphibious projection ships, and new large airborne projection transports designed to enable the PLA to defend more distant CCP interests. Since the late 1990s, space systems have played an increasing role in the PLA’s “Informationalization” strategy, providing commanders with higher resolution optical and radar satellite surveillance, new space electronic intelligence tools, space-based data relay and new infrared-multispectral early warning satellites. Space information systems give PLA platforms global navigation and communication capabilities, as they help to target increasing numbers of precision-guided missiles and bombs. These capabilities are essential to the fulfillment of Chinese objectives which include the “recovery” of Taiwan, consolidating military control over disputed regions in the East and South China Seas, and undermining and eclipsing American-led alliance relationships in Asia. China’s space ISR power will also be used to help military allies and clients. Having helped North Korea, Iran and Pakistan to become current or imminent nuclear missile powers, it makes sense that China would directly or indirectly assist their future space ISR requirements. In a scene that could be repeated elsewhere, today China is pushing to help rearm Argentina, which has already agreed to lease a critical space tracking and control facility to China. A Chinese-armed Argentina with access to Chinese space ISR may be able to better threaten war to take the Falkland Islands. Even if Britain settles for a negotiated transfer, China will gain regional prestige for having “defeated” a Western power, further reducing U.S. influence in Latin America. By the 2020s and the 2030s, the PLA’s development of space projection and combat capabilities could become the leading element of the next phase of PLA modernization. Networks of larger more capable/survivable surveillance satellites, combined with networks of smaller more survivable satellites, will provide more secure navigation, communication, and targeting for larger numbers of power projection platforms such as nuclear powered aircraft carriers, large amphibious projection ships, very large military transport aircraft, and a next generation of export weapon systems. These could include a new generation of “Prompt Global Strike” systems, enabled by high data rate optical data-relay satellites. These could be joined by more ground-based or air-launched ASAT systems, new LEO-based laser or kinetic armed space combat platforms, and Space-to-Earth combat platforms.