# \*\*WDCA Appeasement DA Aff Answers\*\*

[\*\*WDCA Appeasement DA Aff Answers\*\* 1](#_Toc461029962)

[File Notes 1](#_Toc461029963)

[General Affirmative Answers 2](#_Toc461029964)

[Engagement Now 3](#_Toc461029965)

[No Containment Tradeoff 4](#_Toc461029966)

[Moderates Turn 5](#_Toc461029967)

[China is Peaceful 8](#_Toc461029970)

[No Hegemony Impact 12](#_Toc461029974)

[Balancing Fails 13](#_Toc461029975)

[Space Affirmative Answers 17](#_Toc461029979)

[Chinese Space Dominance Now 18](#_Toc461029980)

[Tech Transfer Inevitable 20](#_Toc461029982)

**File Notes**

This file contains the affirmative answers to the Appeasement Disadvantage. The affirmative should primarily defend that engagement works and will change Chinese ambitions to challenge the United States in a hostile way. The affirmative should also aggressively challenge whether balancing is a viable strategy to contain China, and whether China even has the ability to mount a credible challenge against the United States in the first place.

## General Affirmative Answers

### Engagement Now

#### Engagement now

Eisenman, 16 – Assistant Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs and Distinguished Scholar at the Robert Strauss Center at the University of Texas at Austin, and Senior Fellow for China Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (Joshua, “Beyond Engagement? Rethinking America’s China Policy” Book Review, Journal of Contemporary China Volume 25, Issue 100, 2016, 10.1080/10670564.2015.1132962)

For five decades, the US has aided China economically, rhetorically and politically with the underlying objective to mollify, and if possible, avoid, the rising state’s propensity to pursue revisionism using force. In practice, America’s engagement-based China strategy means that scores (if not hundreds) of US policymakers in numerous government agencies correspond regularly with their Chinese counterparts across a wide breadth of issues. In September 2014, President Xi Jinping said there were over 90 official mechanisms for US–China exchange.1 Yet, even as US policymakers have sought to integrate China and use cooperation to shape its choices, Beijing’s increasing bellicosity has raised concerns that engagement may not prevent Chinese aggression.

#### US-China economic trade is high and growing

Morrison, 15 – specialist in Asian Trade and Finance at the Congressional Research Service (Wayne, “China-U.S. Trade Issues” 12/15, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf>

U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past three decades. Total U.S.- China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $591 billion in 2014. China is currently the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. In addition, according to one estimate, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in China totaled $364 billion in 2013. Many U.S. firms view participation in China’s market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors (GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2014. In addition, U.S. imports of low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers, and U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities ($1.26 trillion as of September 2015). China’s purchases of U.S. government debt help keep U.S. interest rates low.

### No Containment Tradeoff

#### The plan doesn’t prevent a shift to containment

Mattis, 15 - Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown Foundation (“U.S. Policy Towards China: Imposing Costs Doesn't Mean Ending Engagement” 9/10, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-policy-towards-china-imposing-costs-doesnt-mean-ending-13810?page=show>

The idea of imposing costs or forcing China to face consequences for its actions is easily misunderstood as abandoning the carrot for the stick as a matter of U.S. policy toward China. On some issues and for some analysts, moving from a cordial to an adversarial approach may well be the case in areas such as South China Sea or cyber. Even these, however, are selective, based on Chinese actions in particular areas, and focused on continuing the basic U.S. policy of shaping the choices Beijing can make while encouraging a positive course. Shaping Chinese choices necessarily requires a mix of incentives and disincentives, but the latter can only be as strong as the will to act upon them. It is worth noting that even Michael Pillsbury in his harshly critical book on U.S.-China relations, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, does not advocate replacing the carrot with the stick. His policy proposals deal most strongly with better assessing China, dealing with Beijing as it is run under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and avoiding being duped. They boil down to how President Barack Obama characterized the way to run foreign policy: “Don’t do stupid stuff.” The idea that imposing costs and consequences on China for actions inimical to U.S. interests means abandoning incentives to browbeat Beijing seems premised on the assumption that such consequences mean the beginning of a containment strategy and the end of engagement. Engagement is not going away. Suggestions of its demise are premature. If you want to persuade or dissuade someone, the only way to ensure your signal was sent, received, and understood is to meet face-to-face, keep dialogue open, and ensure senior officials understand how the other side interprets actions. Apart from that supercilious point, the U.S.-China relationship, regardless of ostensibly shared interests, is not a fragile flower that will wilt at the first frost.

### Moderates Turn

#### Turn – plan bolsters Chinese moderates

Li, 15 – professor, East China Normal University, School of International Relations and Area Studies (Xiaoting, “Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America?” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations

Volume 41, Issue 3, 2015, DOI:10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study indicates the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to accommodate the hegemonic dominance and to expand its own strategic leeway against the latter. Consequently, engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily overwhelm the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American primacy has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world. The endurance of competition, however, does not imply that conflict is inevitable. In fact, facing the reality of rising power, realist theory does not uniformly predict catastrophe or recommend containment: To classical realists, the future is always unwritten, and so wise diplomacy matters (Kirshner 2012:65–66).13 Despite China’s impressive development to date, for example, it is far from certain that the PRC will achieve parity with the United States in economic, military, and technological strength for the foreseeable future (Beckley 2011). Many PRC elites seem to realize this too and hence prefer to keep China committed to peaceful development, by working with rather than against America (Bader 2012:122–123; Sutter 2012:149–150). As noted recently by a renowned Singaporean expert, those “doves” still hold considerable sway in opposition to an aggressive, nationalist approach in Chinese foreign policy (Mahbubani 2014). Under the circumstances, sustained US engagement helps to strengthen the moderate Chinese groups and individuals by signaling that American intentions toward China are not inimical and that there is much room for promoting mutual understanding and benefit. Within this context, a belligerent Chinese posture toward America will appear less appealing or defensible in domestic debates. Engagement, in other words, reduces the likelihood of conflict by preventing the formation of a strong consensus among the ruling elites of an emerging power that the hegemon constitutes an unappeasable threat, a consensus that is a foremost necessary condition for balancing or confrontational behavior (Schweller 2004).

### Moderates Turn

#### Engagement on balance increases the risk of peace – tensions are manageable and just call for greater engagement

Hart 15 – Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, San Diego, and director of Chinese policy at American Progress (Melanie, “Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China,” *Center for American Progress,* September 29th, 2015, [https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/)](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/%29) // EDP

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad. Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China’s economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation’s growing strengths to shape the international environment in China’s favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China’s new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments are misguided. The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China’s most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party’s right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China’s capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States.

### Moderates Turn

#### Xi’s China is prime for strategic bargains and conditions because of his unique policy outlook

Rudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, The World Post, 4-20-2015, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report\_b\_7096784.html)//SL](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html%29//SL)

2. Xi is a powerful leader the U.S. can do business with if it chooses. Three concepts define how Xi Jinping’s leadership differs from that of his predecessors: 1. His personal authority 2. His deep sense of national mission 3. And an even deeper sense of urgency Xi’s audacious leadership style sets him apart from the modern Chinese norm. Both in personality and policy, he represents one part continuity and two parts change. Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng (Deng Xiaoping 邓小平), and possibly since Mao (Mao Zedong 毛泽东). Whereas his predecessors believed in, and by and large practiced, the principle of collective leadership, Xi Jinping is infinitely more primus than he is primus inter pares. As a Party blue blood, he also exudes a self-confidence that comes from someone utterly comfortable with the exercise of political power. Xi is driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country: first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring China’s place as a respected great power in the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing the party’s future as the continuing political vehicle for China’s future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist and a Party loyalist. He is deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party itself. His core, animating vision centers on his concept of the “China Dream” (zhongguomeng 中国梦) which in turn has two objectives: to achieve a “moderately well-off China” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) by 2021 when the Party celebrates its centenary; and “a rich and powerful” (fuqiang 富强) China by 2049 on the centenary of the People’s Republic. Realizing the China Dream, according to Xi, requires a second phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting deeper market reforms to achieve his national objectives, while implementing new restrictions on individual political freedom. In fact, he sees this as the essence of “the China Model” (zhongguo moshi 中 国模式) in contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited to China. For Xi, China must seize the moment of “extended strategic opportunity,” following 10 wasted years when necessary reforms were postponed, and corruption allowed to run rampant. China’s domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the country’s foreign policy direction. In Xi’s worldview, an increasingly “rich and powerful” China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. No longer will China “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou 韬光 养晦 决不当头), Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now pursue an “activist” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为) foreign policy that maximizes China’s economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in the longer term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of China’s “grand strategy” needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao 有中国特色的新型大国外交), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi 新型大国关系) with the United States. Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture. Xi Jinping’s sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a hurry. For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.

### China is Peaceful

#### China can’t challenge the US – the gap is too large

Brooks and Wohlforth, 16 – both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, “The Once and Future Superpower Why China Won’t Overtake the United States” Foreign Affairs, May/June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160520&sp\_mid=51424540&sp\_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone won’t make China the world’s second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower. China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it is worth.

### China is Peaceful

#### Mutual interests, interdependence, and the power gap dissuades China

Rudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, “How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and China”, The World Post, 4-20-2015, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report\_b\_7096784.html)//SL](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html%29//SL)

5. Armed conflict between the U.S. and China is highly unlikely in the coming decade. Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was. However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two scenarios: Either an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval vessels followed by a badly managed crisis; or Through a collision (accidental or deliberate) between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously Japan or the Philippines. In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines between the two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility of accidental conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the South China Sea, where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and where mil-to-mil protocols are undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal predisposition to refrain from an assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to submit them to any form of external arbitration. Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail. In the medium term, the report analyzes the vulnerability of the U.S.-China relationship to the dynamics of “Thucydides’ Trap,” whereby rising great powers have historically ended up at war with established great powers when one has sought to pre-empt the other at a time of perceived maximum strategic opportunity. According to case studies, such situations have resulted in war in 12 out of 16 instances over the last 500 years. Jinping is deeply aware of this strategic literature and potential implications for U.S.-China relations. This has, in part, underpinned his desire to reframe U.S.-China relations from strategic competition to “a new type of great power relationship.” In the longer term, neither Xi Jinping nor his advisors necessarily accept the proposition of the inevitability of U.S. economic, political and military decline that is often publicized in the Chinese media and by the academy. More sober minds in Xi’s administration are mindful of the capacity of the U.S. political system and economy to rebound and reinvent itself. Moreover, Xi is also aware of his own country’s date with demographic destiny when the population begins to shrink, while the populations of the U.S. and those of the North American Free Trade Agreement economies will continue to increase. For these reasons, the report concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in the medium to long term remains remote. This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to the idea of expanding China’s regional and global footprint by economic and political means. This is where he will likely direct China’s diplomatic activism over the decade ahead. 6. Chinese political, economic and foreign policy influence in Asia will continue to grow significantly, while China will also become a more active participant in the reform of the global rules-based order.

### China is Peaceful

#### China is incapable of threatening US global power – geographical boundaries, economic dependence, military inferiority

Thompson 14 – Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute, doctorate in government from Georgetown (Loren, “Five Reasons China Won’t be a Big Threat to America’s Global Power,” Forbes, June 6th 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-be-a-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#79fb13131b5c)> // EDP

It certainly doesn’t help matters when Chinese military leaders attending [international](http://www.forbes.com/international/) forums describe America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administration’s restrained response in Ukraine to “erectile dysfunction.” However, there is no need to make the administration’s Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War, because for all its dynamism China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were. This is partly due to intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on China’s ability to continue advancing. Those limits don’t get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining China’s power potential. 1. Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, China’s potential for territorial growth is severely limited by geography. To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the world’s largest ocean (there are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and China’s historical claim to Taiwan, there isn’t much opportunity for wars of conquest on China’s periphery. Ironically, China’s disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have. 2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in 1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that “within a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline.” The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled China’s economic miracle has already begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out. In the years ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending. 3. Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a springboard to economic development. According to the CIA’s 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of China’s gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible wasn’t drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes China’s prosperity — per capita GDP is below $10,000 – much more vulnerable than America’s. China has sold over $100 billion more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy won’t persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests. China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it can’t run the risk of really scaring its trading partners. 4. Political culture. Because the Communist Party monopolizes power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political system. Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption. Bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The Guardianreports that military posts are sold “for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each,” creating a “vicious circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost.” Favoritism towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in massive inefficiencies. President [Xi Jinping’s](http://www.forbes.com/profile/xi-jinping/) crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New York’s Tweed Ring. But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas China’s political culture offers no such solution. <<card continues on next page>>

### China is Peaceful

<<card continues>> 5. Military weakness. That brings me to the subject with which most defense analysts would have begun this commentary – Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that the Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of China’s military buildup, which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering anti-ship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but the threat they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clear. For instance, Beijing doesn’t have the reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much has been written about China’s supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which can’t reach America; the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage. Beijing’s decision to sustain only a modest — some would say minimal — nuclear deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional political processes in Washington impair our nation’s economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.

### No Hegemony Impact

#### Hegemony doesn’t prevent global threats

Mearshimer and Walt 16’ - JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School (John and Stephen, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing//AK>)

Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid. Other defenders of liberal hegemony argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to deal with new, transnational threats that arise from failed states, terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, and the like. Not only do the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans offer inadequate protection against these dangers, they claim, but modern military technology also makes it easier for the United States to project power around the world and address them. Today’s “global village,” in short, is more dan­gerous yet easier to manage. This view exaggerates these threats and overstates Washington’s ability to eliminate them. Crime, terrorism, and similar problems can be a nuisance, but they are hardly existential threats and rarely lend themselves to military solutions. Indeed, constant interference in the affairs of other states—and especially repeated military interventions—generates local resentment and fosters corruption, thereby making these transnational dangers worse. The long-term solution to the problems can only be competent local governance, not heavy-handed U.S. efforts to police the world.

### Balancing Fails

#### Non-unique and turn – balancing is failing – engagement is a better way to ensure a peaceful Chinese rise

Mendis and Wang, PhDs, 16

(Patrick, Rajawali senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Government’s Ash Centre for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard. He served as a Pentagon professor and US diplomat during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and is currently serving as a commissioner to the US National Commission for Unesco, an appointment by the Obama administration. Joey, defense analyst and a graduate of the Naval War College, the National Defense University, and the Harvard Kennedy School. He has written a number of works on national and international security, and has received two consecutive awards from the Royal United Services Institute for his essays. [http://www.scmp.com/print/comment/insight-opinion/article/1938610/why-us-will-gain-nothing-seeking-contain-china 4-27](http://www.scmp.com/print/comment/insight-opinion/article/1938610/why-us-will-gain-nothing-seeking-contain-china%204-27))

In the midst of escalating tensions between the US and China, particularly in the East and South China seas, serious questions are being raised about the future of peace, security and prosperity in the region. Reflecting on these tensions, we need to return to the founding principles that originally brought wealth and mutual prosperity to both nations. Much has been written about China’s “peaceful rise”. And with this meteoric rise there has been an increase in military modernisation and its assertiveness. This has raised concerns among China’s neighbours regarding its intentions. Beijing, for its part, has not helped to clarify these intentions. Instead, President Xi Jinping (習近平) muddled the situation when he declared that China would not “pursue militarisation” of the South China Sea, then proceeded to install surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody Island in the Paracels and conduct exercises to shoot down unmanned aircraft. It has created not only a credibility issue but also elevated concerns about his ability to command the military. For its part, the US has responded to China’s rise by blowing the dust off of the old containment playbook of the former Soviet era and modifying it with an element of economic engagement. This “congagement” (containment and engagement) would seek to contain China militarily while continuing to engage it economically. China wants peace and prosperity in the region. Yet, its actions create precisely the opposite conditions. Washington claims it welcomes China’s peaceful rise. Yet, it treats China like a parvenu that doesn’t fit into the American-led world order. Therefore, Beijing continually needs to be humbled. If Washington really wants peace and prosperity in the region, words must be matched by deeds. Cold-war mindsets like “mutually assured destruction” will not work in the more nuanced Sino-American relationship. The Chinese experience, beginning with colonial America, has been more a case of economic engagement that worked towards “mutually assured prosperity”. Washington should continue to focus on building much needed trust, promoting fair competition and ... paving the road towards ‘mutually assured prosperity’ America’s commercial venture with China goes back to the founding of the nation, when the American revolutionary war privateer, Empress of China, made its maiden voyage from New York harbour in December 1784 to Canton (now Guangzhou) with a cargo of Spanish dollars, ginseng, furs, lead and wine, returning home the following May with tea, silk and porcelain. Since the reform and opening up in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), China’s significance to the world economy has increased significantly. China’s fixation with the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and other sea lines of communication is not without cause; its export economy survives by these trade routes. And any disruption to these routes would have a significant impact not only on China’s economy but also the global economy. Recognising this fact and the potential disruption to the US economy, Washington should not only support Beijing in maintaining a healthy trade relationship, but continue to focus on building much needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-based institutions, and paving the road towards “mutually assured prosperity”. Washington and Beijing are currently pursuing over 80 bilateral dialogues. These initiatives should continue to promote cooperative efforts that serve both nations, rather than viewing the dynamics of this relationship as zero-sum. It is time to return to the vision of US Founding Fathers of a commercial nation that is “a shining city upon a hill”. The rise of China is a fait accompli. To suggest that the US should contain China and, if necessary, go to war is, in the words of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, “as dangerous as it is wrong”. It makes even less sense when the US is borrowing money from China, in the form of Treasuries, to finance that possible conflict. Containment is a policy with numerous contextual elements that cannot simply be transferred from the Soviet era. <<card continues>>

### Balancing Fails

<<card continues>> The US attempts to contain China may make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. China is not the new Soviet Union. In time, China’s “peaceful rise” will show its true colours. It is not clear whether its current behaviour is a product of regional hegemonic aspirations or simply manifesting its internal contradictions, factions and rivalry in the one-party system. The question of who can contain China is one that only the Chinese can answer for themselves. In the meantime, the US needs to remain vigilant and engage. In the end, China has to capitalise on its “soft power”, with its Confucian ethics and cultural heritage from which America’s Founding Fathers once sought inspiration. Beijing should promote peaceful relations with its neighbours, influence potential allies and return to its official policy of a peaceful rise with clarity in words and consistency in actions. That’s quintessentially “living in harmony” with the Tao – the Chinese Way.

### Balancing Fails

#### China is pushing back against balancing now

Carpenter, 16 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted, “How Beijing Is Countering U.S. Strategic Primacy” 6/21, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/how-beijing-is-countering-u-s-strategic-primacy/>

In addition to its diplomatic maneuvers, the United States has been active on the military front. The introduction of U.S. naval vessels into the South China Sea, ostensibly to assert the right of freedom of navigation, was calculated to send a message to Chinese leaders. Plans for deploying a theater missile defense system also seem at least secondarily aimed at China, although the behavior of North Korea’s unpredictable regime was the primary reason. But Beijing has not just passively observed these U.S. actions. Instead, it has pursued a variety of countermeasures. One move was the attempt to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Predictably, the United States and its principal allies defied that ADIZ by conducting military flights without notifying Chinese authorities, but establishing the diplomatic position was important, and it carried with it the possibility that other, more neutral, countries would ultimately honor the requirements. Notably, Beijing appears to be considering taking the same step in the even more volatile South China Sea. China has not ceded the field to the United States regarding attempts to influence key strategic players. Beijing has tried to reduce tensions with India, settling one of the border disputes with that country and initiating a hotline between the two military commands to reduce the danger of incidents. And trade between the two Asian giants continues to grow. China has now emerged as India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade surpassing $80 billion in 2015. Beijing is even courting some formal U.S. security allies. Not only does bilateral trade and investment with South Korea continue to grow, but Beijing has skillfully exploited South Korean historical grievances directed at Washington’s principal East Asian ally, Japan. That point became evident this past summer when South Korean President Park Geun-hye disregarded Washington’s wishes and attended the ceremony in Beijing marking the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. Park not only attended the celebration, she was an especially honored guest, occupying the chair on the dais directly to one side of Chinese President Xi Jinping. The other chair of honor was occupied by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Not surprisingly, Beijing has attempted to strengthen ties with Moscow as part of a strategy to counter Washington’s primacy strategy in Asia. That approach has met with only limited success, but there are mounting signs of policy coordination between Moscow and Beijing as Washington becomes ever more intrusive militarily into regions close to the Chinese and Russian homelands. Beijing has taken two measures that demonstrate a growing intention to play offense, not just defense. China now plans for the first time to deploy ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific. That is a major change in Beijing’s deployment of forces. Until now, Chinese leaders have been content with a land-based, purely second-strike nuclear deterrent. Putting part of its strategic arsenal aboard submarines both increases deterrent survivability and creates the specter (however remote) of a first-strike capability. The other component of an offensive rather than purely defensive Chinese strategy is its growing diplomatic and economic (and possibly strategic) penetration of Latin America. Premier Li Keqiang’s high-profile visit to several major South American countries in the spring of 2015 was a potent symbol of that intention. But more important has been the deployment of Chinese economic assets. China has now displaced the United States as Brazil’s largest trading partner, and Beijing has been making multi-billion dollar loans to various Latin American governments. Washington is clearly worried about the influence that might accompany such economic maneuvers. In March 2015, President Obama made an announcement that surprised most observers, declaring Venezuela’s leftist regime to be a national security threat to the United States. What puzzled experts is that this move came on the heels of Obama’s policy of rapprochement with Cuba and the previous willingness of his administration (and its predecessors) to regard the behavior of Caracas as an annoyance rather than a threat. What had changed? One major development took place in January when the Chinese government agreed to a multi-billion-dollar investment in Venezuela to help offset the impact of the global oil price slump on that country. In addition, there were reports in March of an impending $5 billion loan to Caracas from China, which would have brought the cumulative total to $45 billion. Perhaps Obama’s announcement was just coincidental timing, but it seems more likely that it was a recognition of, and a firm response to, a perceived Chinese geopolitical foray into Washington’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. All of this suggests that China does not intend to be a passive victim of U.S. primacy. Beijing may operate at a disadvantage with respect to a geopolitical power struggle against the United States, but it does have some assets to deploy. And it fully intends to do so. Washington may find that its effort to maintain a position of primacy in East Asia is more challenging than it ever anticipated.

### Balancing Fails

#### Balancing Fails – Impossible to galvanize allies because of their economic ties to Beijing

Carpenter 16-Senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest (Ted Galen, “America’s Doomed China Strategy”, May 26, 2016, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/americas-doomed-china-strategy-16365?page=2)//SL>

Two developments in the past month indicate that Washington’s mixed policy of engagement and containment (or “congagement”) toward China has begun to tilt more toward containment. The first development was the visit of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to India in mid-April and the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement on military logistics. The other episode is President Obama’s just-completed trip to Vietnam and the announced lifting of the long-standing arms embargo on that country. As usual, American officials insist that the marked change in U.S. policy toward Hanoi is not in any way directed against China. But such statements strain credulity, especially when viewed in the larger context of U.S. warships conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in the South China Sea and bluntly reminding Beijing of America’s security obligations to the Philippines under a bilateral defense treaty. The containment side of U.S. policy has gone from merely assembling some of the necessary components, to be activated at a later date if necessary (first gear), to the initial phase of activation (second gear). More emphasis is likely to be placed on China as a serious strategic competitor, if not an outright adversary. But developing any kind of a containment policy against China is almost certain to prove hopelessly difficult. Despite the sometimes inflammatory rhetoric coming from Donald Trump and some other China bashers, the bilateral economic relationship remains quite extensive and crucial. China is America’s second largest trading partner. In 2015, the United States exported $116 billion in goods to China while importing $482 billion. Disrupting that relationship would be extremely costly and painful for both countries. That point underscores one key reason why reviving anything even faintly resembling the Cold War–era containment policy that worked against the Soviet Union is a hopeless quest. America’s economic relations with the USSR were minuscule, so there was little sacrifice on that front in taking a hardline stance against Moscow. That is clearly not the case today regarding America’s economic connections to China. There is also the matter of assembling a reliable alliance against Beijing. Conducting a containment policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was feasible because (at least during the crucial formative stages) neither the United States nor its key allies had much of a political or economic relationship to lose with Moscow. The costs, therefore, of shunning Moscow were minimal. That is clearly not the case with China. Most of the East Asian countries, including close U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, already have extensive economic links with Beijing. Indeed, China is Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of that country’s total trade. It would not be easy for those countries to jeopardize such stakes to support a confrontational, U.S.-led containment policy aimed at Beijing. Tokyo undoubtedly has concerns about China’s behavior in the East China Sea (and about overall Chinese ambitions), but it would still be a reluctant recruit in a hostile containment strategy. Indeed, as time passed during the Cold War, even the containment strategy directed against the Soviet Union proved increasingly difficult for U.S. leaders. That was especially true after the early 1970s, when West Germany’s policy of Ostpolitik sought better relations with communist East Germany, and indirectly with Moscow and the rest of the Soviet bloc. As connections deepened between democratic Europe and the USSR, support for hard-line U.S. policies began to fade. That point became evident in the 1980s, when U.S. leaders attempted to persuade their European allies to reject the proposal for a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, fearing that it would give Moscow an unhealthy degree of policy leverage. Much to Washington’s frustration, key European allies rejected the advice. If the United States attempts to mobilize regional support for a containment policy against China, it will start out operating in an environment even less conducive than the policy environment regarding the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Washington’s courtship might be welcomed by very small countries, such as the Philippines, that are already on extremely bad terms with Beijing. Larger powers, though, are more likely to see what benefits they can entice and extract from Washington, without making firm commitments that would antagonize China and jeopardize their own important ties to that county. There is a final reason why an overt containment policy against China would be a poor option for the United States. Several troublesome global or regional issues will be difficult to address without substantial input and cooperation from China. It is nearly impossible, for example, to imagine progress being made on the difficult and complex issue of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs without China’s extensive involvement. The United States needs to lower, not increase, its level of confrontation toward China. That also means restoring respect for the concept of spheres of influence. In attempting to preserve U.S. primacy in East Asia and the western Pacific, U.S. leaders are intruding into the South China Sea and other areas that logically matter far more to China than to America. Such a strategy is likely to result either in a humiliating U.S. retreat under pressure or a disastrous military collision. A containment strategy is a feeble attempt to evade that reality.

## Space Affirmative Answers

### Chinese Space Dominance Now

#### Chinese space dominance is inevitable

Fisher, 15 - Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center (Richard, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf>

China’s increasing space power, however, like its growing economic and political power, cannot be “contained.” Russia appears ready to greatly expand space and military cooperation with China as part of a larger strategic alignment, while the European Space Agency is edging toward greater cooperation with China. These attractions may only increase if China has the only LEO manned space station in the mid-2020s. Already a top commercial space service and technology provider, China will use its gathering space diplomacy tools to aid its pursuit of economic, political and military influence in critical regions like Africa and Latin America.

#### US has already lost space leadership to China

Pollpeter et al 15 [Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, Fan Yang, “China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States,” A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream\_Report.pdf]

Diplomatic Implications Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and economic capabilities, it can also work to increase China’s soft power. According to Joseph Nye, “soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.” 629 Although measuring the effects of soft power is difficult, Nye writes that it rests “on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” 630 China’s burgeoning space program is used as one of the many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, and political power. It reinforces the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well and also a country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more attractive, especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions. China’s strategy thus appears to be a combination of seeking cooperative activities with the main space powers while at the same time seeking leadership opportunities with lesser space powers through such activities as its leadership of APSCO and its agreements to build Beidou stations in several countries in Asia. These activities reinforce the image that China can interact with the major space powers as equals while also creating an “alternative universe” where China can lead space activities free from the interference of the other major space powers. ASPCO, for example, does not grant other countries observer status.631 Moreover, as China becomes more capable in space, it will become a more attractive partner for Europe, Russia, and smaller space powers. These activities may increase multipolarity by presenting another avenue for countries to participate in space in addition to―or without―the United States. This is especially true in the area of human spaceflight where the lack of an independent capability to launch humans into space by the United States has made China an attractive new partner for collaboration. Although Europe states that its collaborative activities with China do not mean a diminution of its activities with the United States, reduced budgets for space programs and the orbiting of China’s larger space station at the same time that the International Space Station will be nearing the end of its service life may result in increasing influence for China in space. These additional opportunities for collaboration could not only assist China’s space program in becoming more competitive, they could also assist Europe’s space industry in becoming less dependent on the United States for space technology. As China’s space program continues to improve, countries without the security concerns of the United States will increasingly look upon space as another venue for interacting with China. China cooperates with many countries in space and looks to Europe in particular for access to technology and expertise denied by the United States. It maintains important cooperative activities with Russia and Ukraine and has cooperative relationships with the European Space Agency and the countries of the European Union. Spurred on by U.S. export control laws, European cooperation with China could improve China’s space technology while at the same time making Europe more technologically independent of U.S. industry. Although the “ITAR-free” satellites sold to China were eventually determined to be anything but, the possibility of further collaboration cannot rule out such satellites being developed in the future. The importance of China’s space diplomacy should not be overstated, however. Relations in space do not drive relations on Earth. <<card continues>>

### Chinese Space Dominance Now

<<card continues>> International cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a critical component. Although China’s increasing space power does play a role in advancing its diplomatic interests, there is no evidence that it has directly produced tangible political benefits in other areas besides space.632 As its space power increases this may change. China, for example, could have more of a say in international technical organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union over rules governing satellites and satellite frequency issues, but as yet this is unrealized. Conclusion Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. The real question concerning U.S. competiveness may not be whether Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their U.S. competitors, but whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry that can offer moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete effectively in the market. Similarly, a Chinese space program that can provide a good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of military intervention for an adversary may be all that is necessary. If the current trajectory of China’s space program continues, by 2030 the China will have a new line of advanced launch vehicles, a robust, space-based C4ISR network made up of imagery satellites with resolutions well below one meter, and more capable electronic intelligence communication satellites linked together by data-relay satellites, in addition to a global satellite-navigation system that may gradually approach current GPS standards. At this point, China could also likely have made operational a number of advanced counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill, directed-energy, and co-orbital ASAT capabilities as well as some form of missile defense system. In addition, China’s more capable satellites and launch vehicles could not only compete with U.S., European, and Russian industry but also provide new avenues for cooperation. This could be especially true if China were to conduct manned lunar missions. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space. Despite Chinese statements that it is not in a space race, China’s space program has generated concern both in the United States and in Asia. As Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School writes, “There is a space race going on in Asia, but its outcome―peaceful competition or military confrontation―is still uncertain.” He concludes that although “there are still reasonable prospects for avoiding negative outcomes in space…Asia is at risk of moving backward, motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and hindered by poor communications on security matters.” 633 As a result, China’s progress in space technologies, whether in relative or absolute terms, has implications for the United States and its neighbors. As China’s space program increases in capability, it can be expected to wield this power in ways that, according to Bonnie Glaser, not only “persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from accommodating Chinese interests” but also “deter countries from pursuing policies that inflict damage on Chinese interests.” 634

### Tech Transfer Inevitable

#### Restrictions on cooperation don’t prevent technology transfer

Johnson-Freese, 15 - Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College (Joan, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission “China’s Space & Counterspace Programs”, 2/18, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf>)

Congressman’s Wolf’s perspective assumes that working with the United States would give China opportunities in terms of surreptitiously obtaining U.S. technology otherwise unavailable to it. But we live in a globalized world. Attempting to isolate Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China and other countries into developing indigenous space industries — totally beyond any U.S. control — than they might not have done otherwise, and arguably reap more political and prestige benefits from doing so that if they had gotten the same technology from partnering with the U.S. The only outcome of the past two decades of strict export control there is hard data on is the damage to the U.S. commercial space sector.38

#### Banning cooperation doesn’t protect US technology

Beldavs, 15 – has been engaged in thinking about space industrial development since he taught the first college class in the US on the topic in 1977 at Coe College in Cedar Rapids. Vid now works for the FOTONIKA-LV photonics research center of the University of Latvia (Vidvuds, “Prospects for US-China space cooperation” The Space Review, 12/7, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1>

Clearly sensitive technologies need to be protected. But, protecting US intellectual property is not known to be a domain where the House Appropriations Committee of the US Congress has recognized expertise or where it has been invested with any specific authority. Additionally, NASA is a relatively tiny domain in the vast territory of advanced technology under development by the US. The Wolf Amendment, in fact, offers no protection of American technology but instead empowers members of a Congressional committee with no relevant expertise or authority to play a foreign policy role. Congressman Culbertson clearly recognizes that space technology is key to addressing major challenges facing not only the US, but the entire world community. To bar the United States from participation in global initiatives in the peaceful uses of outer space because China is also involved is, at best, is an overemotional response to the potential for illicit technology transfer with a totally inappropriate instrument. Far more relevant to US national interests would be for Rep. Culbertson to support developing more effective strategies to advance US commercial interests in space. Otherwise, the Chinese, not bounded by ineffective legislation, will eat our lunch. No one has yet developed the technologies for ISRU whether on the Moon, the asteroids, Mars, or beyond. Yet ISRU technologies are central to the whole idea of asteroid and lunar mining. If the Chinese can work with everyone else on the planet, but the US can only work with a short list as approved by the Appropriations Committee, it should be expected that the Chinese, drawing on the knowledge base of the entire world, will advance more quickly. We have no lead in ISRU, and our lead in other domains of space technology may not be particularly relevant to this challenge. It is time for Congress to wake up to the emerging commercial space future and work to fully unleash our commercial space potential rather than complaining about a very high level meeting in Beijing where common challenges in the peaceful uses of outer space were discussed with NASA experts present.

### Tech Transfer Inevitable

#### Other nations fill in to provide the tech --- unilateralism causes a counterspace arms race

Turner 15 [Ronald E. Turner is a Distinguished Analyst at Analytic Services Inc., “Should the United States Cooperate with China in Space?,” May 6, 2015, <http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-space-coop>]

-China is militarily a threat to the United States The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to carefully restrict access to technologies that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but excessive efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the United States. Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the international space community or by developing the capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive in the world market. China is increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and European nations. This supports the technological advancements and economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry, which is hurt in two ways: it cannot compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese participation in or access to those missions. As the Chinese increase their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military space systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese may be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.